InSec

Insecurities in European Cities.

Crime-Related Fear Within the Context of New Anxieties and Community-Based Crime Prevention

Final Report

Prof. Dr. *Klaus Sessar*, M.A.
Dr. *Heike Herrmann*
Wolfgang Keller, Dipl. Soz., Dipl. Krim.
Martin Weinrich, M.A., Dipl. Krim.
Prof. Dr. *Ingrid Breckner*

Supported by

Prof. Dr. *Manuela du Bois-Reymond*, Ass. Prof. Dr. *Irene Sagel-Grande*, Dr. *Leo Toornvliet* (Groningen, Leiden)

Dr. *Tünde Barabás*, Prof. Dr. *Ferenc Irk*, Dr. *Róbert Kovács* (Budapest)

Dr. habil. *Janina Czapska*, Prof. Dr. *Krzysztof Krajewski*, *Anna Jurczak* (Kraków)

Dr. *Gerhard Hanak*, Univ.-Doz. Dr. *Wolfgang Stangl*, Dr. *Inge Karazman-Morawetz* (Vienna)

Content

Appendices

Appendix I: *Questionnaire (quantitative research)*

Appendix II: *Frequency distributions*

Appendix III: *Manual (qualitative research)*

List of figures:

List of tables:

1. Introduction

The report submitted here concludes a European research project titled: "Insecurities in European Cities. Crime-Related Fears Within the Context of New Anxieties and Community-Based Crime Prevention" (INSEC). The project was supported by the European Commission within its 5th Framework Programme (1998-2002) "Key Action: Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge base". Among the seven "Research Tasks" as they were called, the following were relevant for our own plans: Task 2: "Individual and collective strategies in a changing society", Task 4: "Towards social cohesion in Europe"; and Task 6: "Governance, citizenship and the dynamics of European integration". The scientific positioning of the study is in criminology and urban sociology and it has an applied side by involving community crime prevention and community safety, as well as an orientation to comparing cultural patterns of insecurity, anxiety and fear by the parallel study of five large European cities: Amsterdam, Budapest, Hamburg, Kraków and Vienna. Put in a sentence *the research project is about insecurity of cities from the perspective of their inhabitants and what can be done about it.* To obtain information both in the individual cities and for comparing them to each other, the formulation of the methods and instruments applied were standardised as far as possible.

The application for a grant for all partner cities was made in June 2000 by Professor Dr. *Klaus Sessar*, then Director of the Department of Criminology at the University of Hamburg and his research assistant, *Martin Weinrich*, M.A., Dipl. Krim. It was approved for the sum of € 1 million in January 2001. Whereas this was the maximum amount that could be approved for accepted projects, it still represented a cut of 24% compared to the sum applied for. Consequently, some of the research steps planned, above all a *media analysis*, could not be done. The project ran from 15th October 2001 to 15th June 2004.

The following institutions and persons were involved in the project work. For Amsterdam: University of Leiden (Professor Dr. Manuela *Du Bois-Reymond*; Dr. *Leo Toornvliet*) and University of Groningen (Assistant Professor Dr. *Irene Sagel-Grande*); for Budapest: National Institute of Criminology (Professor Dr. *Ferenc Irk*; Dr. *Andrea Tünde Barabás*; *József Kó*; Dr. *Róbert Kovács*); for Hamburg: University of Hamburg (in addition to the named applicants *Wolfgang Keller*, Dipl. Soz., Dipl. Krim. as well as for a time *Wiro Nestler* and *Daniela Trunk*) and the Technical University Hamburg-Harburg (Professor Dr. *Ingrid Breckner*, Dr. *Heike Herrmann*); for Kraków: Jagiellonian University (Professor Dr. *Krzysztof Krajewski*; Dr. habil. *Janina Czapska*); and for Vienna: Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminal Sociology (Dr. *Gerhard Hanak*, Dr. *Wolfgang Stangl*; Dr. *Inge Karazman-Morawetz*). The scientific co-ordination (*Sessar*) and the Project management (*Weinrich*) were in Hamburg

The Final Report is divided into the following sections. It begins with some initial theoretical considerations guiding and accompanying the project. They lead over into the criminological main emphasis of the study identified by the terms insecurity , anxiety and fear (2.). This is followed on by expositions of the urban sociological part of the work regarding the research field „big city" (2.3), as well as on the area of crime prevention in the cities' security policy (2.4). There is a short presentation of the research plan and research methods in a further section (3.). There follow the compressed result summaries

from all five cities, being the sole responsibility of the respective partners (4.). A selected few of the results from the five cities were then compared in rough outline using the population surveys, the in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants of the cities (5.). The Final Report ends with some considerations of the overall results and an outlook (6).

2. Theoretical considerations

If the title of the project is broken down into its components, five content complexes result: Insecurities and new anxieties; fear especially related to crime; strategies for its prevention, the entirety as a problem for the city, especially European large cities. The following, very general considerations refer to these:

- How the current transformation processes in Europe (indicated by terms such as globalisation, individualisation, and also by social invalidation and segregation) shape and change the emotional and cognitive attitudes and the behaviour of the residents. More precisely, to what extent are new, possibly lasting forms of insecurity and anxieties developing in our (urban) societies, becoming the background for much life planning and influencing the quality of life.

- What significance do modern risks like environmental destruction, climate change, food contamination, world epidemics and others have for our feelings of insecurity and our anxieties ?

- What fear-generating role do new socio-spatial factors and conditions play, such as the transformation from production to service economies, the development of urban consumer cultures, residential segregation, increased mobility and fluctuation, multiculturalism, but also the failure to integrate foreigners, social disorganisation and social disorder.

- What resources on an individual as well as on the communal level exist or do not exist but might be activated to compensate the negative consequences of the said changes;

- What security and prevention strategies are exercised by whom in these cities; and, finally,

- which policies at a regional, national, or European level seem to be suitable in order to reduce, respectively to prevent existing and foreseeable insecurities in these and other European cities of similar size and structure.

This general catalogue of questions should not be confused with the *research design,* which in view of limited research resources had to be more modestly structured. It is therefore rather a *research framework* that should help us to formulate more concrete questions verifiable with our means. Since with many of them we are venturing into new territory, this also means at the same time that the research presented is of explorative nature in its essential features.

2.1   The new anxieties

It may well be no exaggeration to see our world in a fundamental, radical transformation hitherto unknown. Developments in one part of the world have an immediate effect in another, meaning that a regionalisation or localisation involving the closing off of large scale problems is becoming ever more improbable.

A relevant heading for this is *globalisation.* Under this is understood firstly a world encompassing linking and integration of once national and regional economies as well as an unprecedented variety of communication with the aid of the new media with which the world comes into every home. Since globalisation's main driving motor is maximising profit by using rationalisation to the extreme, all economic processes and ever more social processes are made subordinate to it, leading to endangering and damaging civilisation considerably, at least for each and every individual. Examples are of the economic kind (unemployment as a permanent effect of international mergers), ecological kind (climate change, extinction of entire animal and plant species, unrestrained using up of the last natural resources), technological kind (uncontrollability and vulnerability of nuclear power stations), biological kind (gentechnical manipulation, poisoning of food chains), or of an epidemiological nature (AIDS, SARS, BSE). The globalisation of terrorism and crime is also in full swing. Finally, the institution of national borders is ever more losing meaning as an instrument of controlling and directing and as a symbol of defending cultural identity.

Little is put up to counter such developments. Therefore it can be observed that such problems are increasingly making themselves independent, and they can at best only temporarily be slowed or stopped. One consequence is powerlessness ("powerlessness in relation to a diverse and a large-scale social universe", *Giddens* 1991, 191), a feeling of being exposed to the mercy of this, precisely insecurity or unsafety: What can I still eat with a good conscience? Do I have to cancel my holiday flight because of possible terrorist attacks? Yet another child murdered, when is it the next one's turn? My company has been taken over too? Swimming baths and youth clubs are closed, new prisons are opened? What, only with a condom now? "It is ever less a question of whether the food is good, the area you live in is nice or the sexual partner is attractive but ever more a question of whether all this is secure" (*Golbert* 2003, 20).

An entire literature deals with the new forms of insecurity in the face of growing globalisation and the dangers for civilisation coming from it. One author reaching over from earlier societies based on need to today's anxiety based societies is Ulrich *Beck* in his work "Risk Society" (1992)*. Beck* sees a change from unequal societies to insecure societies, from the demand for equal distribution of the cake to being equally spared the poison in it: "The driving force in the class society can be summarised in the phrase: I *am hungry!* The movement set in motion by the risk society, on the other hand, is expressed in the statement: *I am afraid.'* The *commonality of anxiety* takes the place of the *commonality of need'* (1992, 49*;* emphasis in original). *Niklas Luhmann* goes one step further: "Anxiety resists any kind of critique of pure reason. It is the modern apriorism - not empirical, but transcendental; the principle that never fails when all other principles do. It is an 'Eigen-behavior' that survives all recursive tests, one that seems to have a great political and moral future" (1989, 128).

The empirical question founded on this is in what form do such global fears manifest themselves? The respondents' answers in the framework of our survey gave information on attitudes to certain international core problems. Whether they contaminated other attitudes, expressing themselves for example in an exacerbated fear of crime, is still not answered. There are survey in which "social coldness", "deterioration of the economic situation" or "too many foreigners" attain high anxiety values, yet it may not be possible to empirically trace them back to global developments, however plausible this may seem here and there.

In other words, a theoretically based "transfer" from the level of global fears to fears in every day life is missing. *Zygmunt Bauman* offers the plausible picture of the "portioning of anxiety" as a heuristic approach: " In its pure and unprocessed form the existential fear that makes us anxious and worried is unmanageable, intractable and therefore incapacitating. The only way to suppress that horrifying truth is to slice the great, overwhelming fear into smaller and manageable bits - recast the big issue we can do nothing about into a set of little practical tasks we can hope to be able to fulfil" (1999, 45). However, a reverse direction, from the micro to the macro level, is just as imaginable and has to be taken into account. "... feelings of personal impotence may become diffused `upwards' towards more global concerns" (*Giddens* 1991, 193). All this means keeping global anxieties as background variables in mind, but only being able to operationalise them to a limited degree.

2.2   Insecurity and fear – clarifying terms

In view of a project investigating urban insecurity, it was not necessary to go into the discussion on "internal security" ("Innere Sicherheit") with all its ideological and political convulsions. At least we could learn from this discussion the need to beware of not to falling for all the empty phrases and tautological constructions (security as the absence of threats, being free of anxiety). It is too well-known that their intoxicating help is used to get an unlimited extent of state interventions approved to provide security of whatever sort against whomsoever possible.

The study of attitudes relating to insecurity factors of the community required the use of empirically proven concepts. Since (in)security, despite all the extensions already implied has a great deal to do with crime, it presented itself to check the concepts used in fear-of-crime research and adopt them should they be appropriate for our purposes.

This, of course, was easier said than done. In view of research on what should be understood by security or insecurity, one was continuously coming up against the problem of a clean cut operationalisation of the relevant terms. In English, for example, referring to: insecurity, uncertainty, unsafety, worry, concern, uneasiness, angry, anxiety, fear, dread (in German referring to: Unsicherheit, Ungewissheit, Schutzlosigkeit, Beunruhigung, Unbehagen, Unwohlsein, Verunsicherung, Irritation, Betroffenheit, Vorsicht, Sorge, Angst, Furcht). The complexity multiplied itself when the theoretical connections had to be made - that is to dangers, risks, problems, or threats. To this also came the social space in which such attitudes arise and receive their meaning, differentiated according to the world, the city or just the neighbourhood. Finally, looking at the internationalism of the project the problem of a valid comparability had to be observed.

The main concern and objective of the research of conducting a common study in five cities using essentially the same questions with the aid of the same methods compelled a considerable simplification when formulating the terms. It turned out namely that the cultural diversity of the countries involved would not only affect the content, but already started to play a role in the preparation of the methodological instruments. This became most apparent when drafting the questionnaire for the surveys - what will the respondents understand by anxiety, fear, uneasiness etc. in their respectively different social and cultural contexts, and is the understanding the same in Hamburg as in, for example, Kraków or Amsterdam? We entered into a certain risk here, the extent of which we did not know and would not get to know since we lacked the possibility of a pre-test in order to clarify the terms internationally and adapt them to each other. Being very much aware of this , we often took recourse to the more neutral concept of "social (here urban) problem" used in the social sciences.

What we wanted to find out, then, is how problematical are the compiled risks dangers, situations or ways of behaviour assessed by the inhabitants under the aspect of social problems in socio-spatial contexts and how these are connected to individual insecurities and fear (of crime). This, then, in the various cities of Europe, among them two from the former eastern Block.

2.2.1 Insecurities

Zygmunt Bauman has repeatedly suggested adopting the German term "Sicherheit" (and with it "Unsicherheit") into the vocabulary of English and thereby replacing three English terms: "Security" ("Whatever has been won and gained will stay in our possession; whatever has been achieved will retain its value as the source of pride and respect; the world is steady and reliable..."), "Certainty" ("Knowing the difference between reasonable and silly, trustworthy and treacherous, useful and useless, proper and improper..."), and "Safety" (Providing one behaves in the right manner, no terminal dangers - no dangers one cannot fight back against - threaten one's body and its extension, that is one's property, home and neighbourhood..."). According to the author "Sicherheit" covers all these facets so that three different terms can be dispensed with (1999, 17; 2000, 214). These thoughts helped us to reconsider our own positions, to clarify and concretise the formation of our concepts. We concluded on the contrary that the differentiation had to be retained in order to be used for our project.

We did not escape the semantic confusion, though. Looking through the relevant research literature revealed not only the wealth of closely related terms, but also that they are almost arbitrarily interchangeable. That may have something to do with imprecise research. Perhaps though many subtle differentiation are starting to become unimportant in the face of some overdimensional threats, so that instead the ultimate generic term "Angst", also used in English, could spread - and even "fear" was generalised. So, the book of *Benjamin B. Barber* on the fear-ridden superpower USA is titled "The Fear's Empire (2003), and the work of *Mike Davis* on the city of Los Angeles tottering on the brink of the abyss is called " The Ecology of Fear" (1998). See also the above quotations from *Ulrich Beck* and *Niklas Luhmann.*

Getting back to *Bauman's* discussion of the terms of security, certainty and safety, we have put "security" in its plural opposite, "insecurities", and made it the guiding concept of our research without attempting ourselves to operationalise it empirically. "Certainty" and "safety" on the other hand are broken down to subcategories with predominantly "safety" (resp. "unsafety") remaining empirically significant for us. By this we understand the feeling of well-being relating to the social space, of being sheltered and being protected, the absence not only of drugs and violence, but also of filth and demolitions. The presence of an intact local infrastructure also contributes to what can be called "community safety" (see chapter 2.4.3).

2.2.2   Fear

"Fear of crime is now bigger than General Motors" (*Ditton et al.* 1999, 83)*.* Indeed, a whole research and prevention industry as well as the political arena have taken this phenomenon over, making it their own, with an enormous output of fear and related feelings resulting. Hereby it is becoming ever more obscure as to how far this output is due to rising crime, to research or to certain policies which needed and used it for its manoeuvres.

At first it was an element of a growing crime discourse in the USA in the 1960's, triggered by a dramatic growth of offences seen in police statistics and victim surveys. Initially, a moderate idea was to knock the bottom out of it by better education and upbringing, fighting poverty and redeveloping the inner cities. A conservative idea, on the other hand, counted on combating fear by combating crime. In so doing it was discovered that fear was eminently suited to setting up a general criminal policy directed towards law and order and stiff punishments. Fear thus became a new political issue independently of what other reasons could trigger it, respectively how far it was objectively founded (on the American history of such a fear-of-crime policy, see *Harris* 1969; *Boers* 1991, 15-24*).* It has never lost this Janus face - on the one hand fear of crime as a result of real threats, and the basis for extending law enforcement on the other. On the contrary, in the course of time it became two faces meaning that a discourse on the fear of crime developed that was independent of the discourse on crime, with correspondingly different ambitions.

Criminology (politically naive, as so often) was not uninvolved. It considered fear of crime as a given social problem and that in connection with criminology's very own pitch. So, to adopt it seemed the most obvious thing to do. Add then to this the lucrative orders to do research on this commissioned by the body politic, and at that in the form of regular Victim Surveys, at least in Britain and the United States. Of course, it is correct to say that fear of crime is a serious problem greatly impairing the quality of people's lives. What is left out, though, is that criminology massively contributes to fear by researching on it, and this in a double sense. With its terminology and studies it puts into the world the relevant definitions of what fear, anxiety, unease, etc. "are", and then to go on to say that "you are afraid", "anxious" or "worried". That then in turn is studied. This "fear of crime feedback loop", for which further explanation and details can provide some confirmation, should merely act as a warning here that "as criminologists we need to be mindful of our own power effects on this field of inquiry. Mindful that we do not produce the very criminological objects we then propose to measure, examine and analyse" (*Lee* 2001, 480-482).

One of the central criminological hypothesis was that fear of crime resulted from experience with crimes, be these personal experiences or those passed on by third parties (family, friends, acquaintances – called indirect victimisation). At first in the United States the question, "how safe do you feel walking alone in your neighbourhood after dark" was used to measure fear. The answers to choose from were - "very safe", "somewhat safe", "somewhat unsafe", "very unsafe" (*Ennis* 1967, 73). This so-called standard question, since then used internationally and occasionally modified and supposed to measure the affective component of fear, yielded higher rates of fear (more precisely rates of unsafety) throughout in women and older people (above all in older women) than in younger people (younger men) although the former had less to fear in public than the latter. Such findings were called the *fear of crime paradox,* which could at least be partly cleared up. If you ask more precisely about a worry concerning certain violent crimes that could happen to one in the evening, the answers turned out to be closer to reality. For rape it was now young women most worried (but see chapter 5.2.6 with contrasting results from Kraków). That they were worried concerning crimes of robbery too was attributed to a "shadow effect" according to which attitudes towards a possible rape would include attitudes towards other possible violent crimes (*Ferraro* 1995, 87; *Boers* 2003, 12-13).

Independently of this, the extent of worry was not infrequently in contrast to the extent of real violence. This becomes clear when the so-called cognitive component of fear of crime is studied. The respondents are asked how they assess the likelihood of becoming a victim of a robbery, an assault, a rape , a burglary etc soon/in the near future/in the next twelve months. The answer alternatives are: "very unlikely", "somewhat unlikely", "somewhat/fairly likely", "very likely". From the many studies on this just one succinct example: In a victim and crime survey four years after the Berlin Wall had come down, 36% of the young female inhabitants of large East German cities regarded being raped in their district as likely or very likely (*Boers, Gutsche & Sessar* 1997 and *Codebook* 1994, 162). In view of the low incidence of rapes outside the private sphere, such a discrepancy between the subjective risk assessment and the objective risk situation is highly remarkable. It harmonises with other observations as well, such as with the findings that crime figures are falling, but fear rates can remain, even rise (*Taylor & Hale* 1986, 152). When all this is taken into account, the question is whether the methods used were right or/and if other factors than crime can trigger fear of it. "Is 'fear of crime' more than 'fear' of 'crime'?" (*Garofalo & Laub* 1978, 242-243*).

Concerning the method problem, it would appear that despite enormous research efforts, we still do not know what fear of crime actually is. Despite its widespread use, the above mentioned standard question is still viewed as not very valid, not least because crime or definite specific offences are not asked about, meaning that unsafety could refer as well to fear of the dark or as being alone. Or the question is linked to the fear of falling, being run over or being attacked by a dog. Then, independently of this, is current or anticipated fear measured? Since physiological symptoms like high blood pressure, adrenaline release or a narrowed field of vision are not available for studies, only expressive or emotional attitudes remain for measurements and thus have to tolerate proximate notions such as worry, concern, anxiety (*Skogan & Maxfield* 1981, 49) or angry (*Ditton et al.* 1999) . It has also been supposed that fear tended to fit violent crime, and worry property offences (*Maxfield*

1984, 5). Another even further-reaching suggestion was made to give up the fear of crime concept completely in favour of a worry-about-crime concept (*Williams, McShane & Akers* 2000). The swapping of notions such as fear and anxiety occasionally observed is seen as particularly problematical, since belonging to different attitude dimensions, they would measure different things. Furthermore, it has been disputed why the positive assessment of one's own victimisation risks is fear of crime (its cognitive component; see above). In fact, there is no fear as long as the assessments concur with objective risks and dangers; in those cases, what we have is the realistic perception of a threatening situation. Then there is also a *behavioural component* consisting of the two elements *protective behaviour* (additional securing of the house or flat, carrying a weapon, getting a dog etc.) and *avoiding behaviour* (staying home in the evening, only going out with several together, avoiding public transport, certain public places or groups of people etc.). These elements are criticised as not being indicators of fear, but rather their consequences.

These are only a few critical remarks on the endless fear-of-crime debate. In view of such vagueness, the position has already been put forward that "the phrase `fear of crime' has acquired so many divergent meanings that its current utility is negligible" (*Ferraro & LaGrange* 1987, 71). Nonetheless complex models have been developed over time – such as the fear-of-crime model constructed from the mentioned affective, cognitive, and behavioural components (*Boers* 1991, 227; *Hale* 1996, 88-89); or the more general "Interactive model of attitudes toward crime" (*Boers* 2003, 17). The high degree of plausibility and conclusiveness of those constructions should encourage going further in this area.

2.2.3   *Social disorganisation and fear*

Perhaps there has been too much fixation on crime. The uncertainty as to whether that being measured is fear of crime focuses the attention as to what else it could be. In other words, it is about further clarification of the variance in the attitudes of the respondents not explained by crime. It is quite possible, then, that the proportion of fear of crime originating from non-criminal issues is greater than that coming from crime itself.

The field that has to be thought about first is that of social decay in urban contexts. The terms developed for this are "social disorganisation", empirically differentiated according to "social disorder" and „physical disorder", often termed together as "incivility". Social disorganisation is a concept from the ecology of crime studies in 1920s in Chicago where life in transitional slum areas was linked to the committing of crimes. It has meanwhile come to mean a situation in which the family, school, social amenities and the neighbourhood have lost their integrative power and whereby the informal social networks of mutual help and control have loosened or dissolved. This is equally characterised by the decline of political, cultural and social (voluntary) activities in so far as they are an expression of participation in the affairs of the community (see *Snell* 2001, 43). There is, of course, another side to it. It is to be observed how little the local authorities do to counter it by, for example, establishing communal social facilities, by promptly removing damage and dirt, by the encouragement of and financial support for citizens initiatives, by an outfit of public space that stimulates and stabilises security and a feeling of well-being, in other

words, by a functioning infrastructure. On the contrary, many of these urgently needed responsibilities of local government are run down. Characteristics to be counted among those of "social disorder" are: Vandalism, groups of loitering people, harassment, noise, open drunkenness, drug dealing and consumption in public; for the area of "physical disorder": derelict houses, parks grown wild, destroyed objects (public telephones, rubbish containers), Graffiti, dog excrement, dirt and rubbish on the streets (*Skogan* 1990, 51-61).

When fear of crime is associated with that then at first because of the empirical connection between incivility and crime. Where such a connection is less apparent, incivility can have a kind of warning function - where broken windows are not repaired, violence is not far away (*Wilson & Kelling* 1982). This is then a first step to dissolving the original relationship between fear and crime. In a next step, all possible conditions thought to affect the emergence or exacerbation of fear of crime besides or instead of crime are to be tested using multivariate analyses (see *Taylor & Hale* 1986). It would be ideal to have, for example, sufficiently large random samples of urban neighbourhoods available with various crime rates and various degrees of incivility "to untangle accurately their separate relationships with fear" (*Skogan* 1990, 77).

Nevertheless, the clues in the research material were sufficient to initially put the causes and conditions for fear of crime on an ever broader basis: "Sometimes the question of fear seems chronically enmeshed with the dynamics of detraditionalisation and an accompanying sense of disruption of formerly settled moral and customary orders" (*Hope & Sparks* 2000, 5). Similarly *Hale,* who puts the question whether fear of crime should not better be characterised by "insecurity with modern living", with "quality of life", "perception of disorder" or "urban unease" (1996, 84).

2.2.4   *Migrants' fears and being afraid of migrants*

A study of insecurity in a large city almost inevitably directs the attention onto the foreigners living there (who we will call migrants). The European Commission has also suggested that there should be more emphasis on including ethnic minorities. Even if we also share the view that in method and content it is not possible to bring the situation of migrants in large cities under one roof due to their ethnic, cultural and social variety (*Krummacher* 1998, 322), there are some observations that can be generalised concerning this theme: The migrants' fears regarding discrimination and exclusion by the natives, and the natives' fears of being swamped by the migrants, especially the fear of losing, ranging from loss of one´s job to loss of identity (reinforced should the migrants assume the "cultural sovereignty" over certain districts and then also take over parts of the property stock, known as " invasion-succession syndrome"). Fear of immigrants has a lot more to do with social unrest and instability they bring into the lives of the natives than crimes do (*Albrecht* 2002, 165) With respect to urban neighbourhoods such tendencies are reinforced by residential segregation (*Dangschat* 1998) that can even lead to (self) ghettoisations. Or a territorial separation and cutting off comes about, a kind of partitioning of the social space, tantamount to the erection of borders because they make integration and interaction more difficult or impossible and thus produce mutual fear (*Snell* 2001, 136, relating to the situation of Afro-Americans in not yet separated American neighbourhoods).

2.3 Urban societies

2.3.1 From an abstract category to the district level

We are referring to the city of the 21st century, studying "insecurity" and "fear" in the urban context. At the same time we are assuming that the "urban" or the "urban society" is something special in the sense that there are specific characteristics distinguishing urban society from rural regions and their societies (a higher density of people, lower social control etc.). Urban life contains the "liberation from something, a perspective of emancipation" (*Siebel* 1998, 262) – what sounds very positive – and at the same times a kind of danger, resulting from one's freedom and that of the other. The 'possibility to be different' is combined with fear of unpredictable behaviour of others and with the fear of locations, where accidental, noncommittal encounters may occur: The old woman meets the neighbour's skin son on the street. The reaction to noncommittal encounters could be, as already described in classical sociology, a (necessary) ignorance towards people on the street, in parks or the tram (see *Simmel* 1993 [1903]). An ignorance towards people who are "strangers", respectively different, with strange behaviour.

The classical sociology and modern social theories take a very abstract approach looking at the urban societies of the present and the future (see *Giddens* 1984; *Soja* 1989; *Bourdieu* 1991; *Davis* 1998). The strength of our research relates to another special step: At the level of the "districts" we try to link the spatial and the social dimension of insecurity and fear. Just as the spatial and social signs of the socially deprived, poor and ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods intensify the poverty and social exclusion (see *von Kempen* 1997), we also suppose that the spatial and social signs lead to a high level of insecurity and fear in precisely these problem districts of our cities under investigation. For making these signs clear, we limited ourselves – predominantly – to these certain residential areas.

Poverty (people with low income, education etc.) is mostly found in the remnants of early industrialisation and of housing estates on the outskirts. The structure of these districts and their architecture seemed to have an additional influence upon forms of crime or violence and the "endangerment of public safety".[1] Political suggestions for solutions aimed at reducing factors of fear were predominantly of a spatial – constructional type: Improving openness and clear view by brighter lighting, avoiding dark, blind corners, reducing hiding places by cutting back the plants etc. This has stayed the same up to the beginning of the 21st century (see *Schneider & Kitchen* 2002). The preference for certain types of development and building type was furthermore supposed to enhance possibilities of formal and informal control. Since the beginning of the 1990s, additional attempts at strengthening informal control by evoking a neighbourly "community", and formal control by reinforced police presence and private security firms have been gaining in importance. The approaches mentioned have then been concentrated on the material structuring (and here limited to the

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[1] Studies conducted in North America, especially those of the architect *Oskar Newman*, had shown that in buildings consisting of more than five floors there are significantly more criminal offences (1973). Additionally, *Patricia* and *Paul Brantingham* by developing their approach about "Environmental Criminology" could demonstrate the impact of the building environment on crime (1998).

symbolic expression of the material, e.g. removing graffiti) and enforcing the rules and laws.

By taking the place into account as a dimension of analysis in its own right, we hope to include other factors of feelings of fear and insecurity of our respondents.

2.3.2 Some definitions: space, place and location

In our research urban space is, in addition to the categories mentioned above, just as much action space as the space surrounding the dwelling. As such it is to be seen as a spatial and social "context" (imparting security or insecurity). We search for use structures of locations by way of asking for "action spaces" connected with experiences of insecurity. Through the descriptions of our respondents the urban space takes on tangible structures. We found that a certain degree of variety, confusion, even untidiness is tolerated in different places to a different extent. *Where* though does this tolerance end and when? Where does unease start (when the neighbour in the tram smells unpleasant?) and where does fear begin (when he becomes verbally aggressive)? The question formulation shows that we see the "everyday anxieties" addressed in chapter 2.1 not only as being triggered by social and global anxieties or direct or reported victimisation, but also being set off by tangible spatial factors that can be named. We asked for single elements (for example, for signs of vandalism) and for "compositions" of factors inherent in the locality, which were described by our qualitatively interviewed respondents as disconcerting or fear inducing. The space described by our respondents – in its material and symbolic markedness, the use structures and rules – is an analysis category of its own.

We would define "place" as a generic category, which can be clearly named in its (perceived) geographic boundaries: a definite quarter in the districts studied (like „Reiherstieg-Viertel" in Hamburg–Wilhelmsburg) or also in the entire area studied.[2] Places are settings of interaction, symbolisms, rules and material things. Furthermore, places always have a special history; they have a time dimension.

The same applies to *locations*, which can be observed and described more comprehensively in their characterisation (because of the smaller spatial level). "Location", then, would be defined as a local configuration of material, symbols, roles, people and their relations; people and their social practices, connected by residence or use in a particular area, e.g., the "Karlsplatz" in Vienna or the "Vogelhüttendeich" in Hamburg. That follows *Giddens,* who argues that locales cannot be described in terms of physical properties and human artifacts alone. A locale only gets meaning – and a special meaning in the terms of insecurity – by "the modes of its utilization in human activity" (*Giddens* 1984, xxv, 118). The situated character of interaction in time-space, involving the setting of the interaction, the actors co-present, and the communication between them gives social life and social institutions (and

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[2] Yet, the term *place* is rather indefinite (and the term *community* or *neighbourhood* is loaded with emotional meaning). The idea of place as a setting of interaction is a generally accepted one (e.g. *Soja* 1985, 148; *Storper* 1985; *Thrift* 1983). *Giddens* (1984), in developing his theory of social structuration, reserves an important role for place or locale, as he names it, by emphasizing its character of "being a setting of interaction" (p. 375). Our research includes this view, but also goes beyond it.

fears, feelings of insecurity?) in different locales their specific feature (*Giddens* 1984, pp. 118, 132, 373).

2.4   Local prevention policy and practice

The European Commission's Guidelines of the 5th Framework Programme require that socio-economic research receiving financial support should formulate their questions with a view to *policy relevance* and with *reference to practice and application,* and not merely in view of a basic research project.

The analysis of the city's concrete prevention measures, in particular within our research on feelings of insecurity and anxieties (see the surveys which were conducted in the districts), and their local and global causes in large cities meets these requirements. Three dimensions were taken into consideration: Community Crime Prevention; Community Policing; and Community Safety.

2.4.1   *Community Crime Prevention (CCP)*

Hierarchical structures based on a traditional punishment (and treatment) model were softened by the introduction of some horizontal structures. One example is "restorative justice" the (actual) core of which is victim-offender mediation. The long-term ambitions are more far-reaching in that a complete systemic reform is envisaged (*Bazemore & Walgrave* 1999, 5) with the victim, the offender and community members playing active roles in the justice process (*Umbreit* 1999, 213).

Our example and subject is *Community Crime Prevention*. Connected with the insight on the state's limitation in combating crime, it was found that crime control shouldn't be the matter for the police alone, but for society as a whole or, more closely, the communities and their citizens. The police and the community should share the task of preventive crime control. This is the way from protection to self-protection, at least partially. Community Crime Prevention has become "a flourishing and ever-growing enterprise, initiated and fostered especially by governmental, but also by non-governmental organizations" (e.g. "Neighbourhood Watch"). This process can be considered as an international phenomenon - as a reaction to "widespread fear" (of crime, sc., [to]) the "apparent exhaustion of the capacity of traditional criminal justice agencies to control crime", and to "broader paradigmatic changes in the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens, as well as between state agencies themselves" (*Gilling* 1997, xi).

The essential cue seems to be 'community', which is broadly used to express new forms of basic interest ("community medicine", "community architecture"; see *Crawford* 1997, 44). Regarding the problem of crime and the many ways of dealing with it, the community 'provides' regulatory elements (zone bylaws, building regulations), structural elements (residential distribution and segregation of the residents, living and working zones), spatial elements (parks, public places, traffic systems), and service delivery elements (social services, security services, drug treatment facilities, red-light districts). Changing one or several of these elements can change the crime situation by way of decrease, increase, displacement, and so forth. True community crime prevention may consider these elements

as parts of its programmes, at least as the framework of such programmes. In practice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to remodel the basic structures of a community for the sake of public safety. Some of them, however, especially those that have to do with urban planning or the reconstruction of deteriorated neighbourhoods, are worthy of thorough consideration. In criminology, "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design" (CPTED) is one of the most developed approaches to shaping and organising the physical environment to reduce the opportunities for crime. The starting point was to design modern cities in a way that crime would be designed out of them ("defensible space", see *Newman* 1972). In the meantime criminologists have had to learn to become more modest in this respect, which has helped them to become more precise in developing an "Environmental Criminology" on the basis of very different theoretical approaches such as human ecology, human geography, behavioural ecology, environmental psychology, and the like. The observation is that people "decide about shape, react to it and change what surrounds them, but are limited, constrained and directed by their surroundings at the same time" (*Brantingham & Brantingham* 1998, 32). Contiguous models are the "routine-activity approach" and the "opportunity-structure theory" and "life-style theory" which serve as the theoretical and practical basis of what is called "situational crime prevention" (*Clarke* 1995). In any of these approaches two central elements are found: space and time; they direct the activities of the people as well as they are inversely shaped and changed by those who make use of them. The structured knowledge of these interactive processes between the individuals and the environment helps to identify and classify the vulnerability of specific urban areas as well as the behavioural patterns of (potential) offenders and of (potential) victims depending, among others, on the rhythms of daily life, on the attractiveness of targets and on the absence of social control. Once these processes are known it is possible to develop preventive strategies against crime. Thus, crime prevention uses the socio-spatial dimensions of the community in many of its facets.

Our own attempt used some of the theories mentioned. Distinctions between different levels of structural deficits were made, however, following the three-step design of the study: city, research areas within districts, and neighbourhood. Considering the topic of the project the theoretical approaches to understanding and preventing crime patterns served as models to explore insecurities, anxieties and fears, may they be related to crime or to other threatening issues in society.

The overall value of this approach is manifold. On the macro level a problem profile of the cities was established by which the weaknesses of local governance to safeguard the well being of the citizen could partially be displayed. Some rather traditional points are, for example, the low levels of social and police control regarding crime in which case the goal will be to reduce crime in order to reduce fear. Our basic assumption transcended this linear association (although it did not deny it) by placing crime-related fear in a broader scope of general urban insecurities. Therefore, community crime prevention is considered to be part of the more general preventive involvement of the community to improve its liveability and the social conditions of its people.

Therefore, specific attention was given to urban sites suffering from serious social problems. The exploration referred to the residents' views and attitudes towards two

essential fear-generating components of disorder: physical and social items which correlate very strongly, however (*Skogan* 1990, 51. For the definition of physical and social disorder see chapter 2.2.3). The social conditions and the linked security problems of marginalised people were of special interest in the research project: We know a lot about people's fears and anxieties with respect to crime and incivility in their community, but we know very little about their fears with respect to the community by which they are surrounded. The fear issue hand in hand with the prevention issue were extended and supplied with additional meanings; otherwise it wouldn't have been possible to study the "insecurities of cities" in a general way. The assessments of the respondents should serve to develop proposals for security-related prevention programs and the reorganisation of neighbourhoods with the help of those afflicted by bad social conditions.

2.4.2 *Community Policing (CP)*

Another point of view is prevention through communication and interaction. While CPTED and other approaches are trying to model and remodel essential environmental and situational conditions of the community for preventive purposes, additional support is expected from systematic control initiatives set up by citizens in co-operation with the police (or vice versa). This is the field of *Community Policing*. It has two sides. On the part of the police, considerable changes are needed, resulting in the reformulation of police "philosophy" and the redefinition of police roles. Community Policing requires major changes in organisation, management, and police culture (problem-solving, besides law-enforcing).

The other side is the public. The people are invited to become (unpaid) volunteers for the surveillance of the area in which they live. Moreover, they are called upon to establish informal social networks in order to explore solutions to local problems involving crime, fear of crime, disorder, and decay, together with the police (*Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux* 1990, xiii). The consequences are the development of numerous neighbourhood watch schemes, very often integrated in self-defined 'crime-watch communities'. It is impossible to display the meanwhile countless projects and models to bring citizens and the police together for mutual efforts to combat crime and fear of crime. What can be said is that, in terms of long-term crime reduction, the results are more or less negative and that in terms of fear reduction they are not obvious. *Ross* assembled numerous critiques of Community Policing. Most important for our project is the "lack of transferability of community models from one setting to another" and the "insensitivity to cultural differences among and inside advanced industrialized states" (1995, 245). This is the point: There is no one community policing philosophy, nor practice. Even if socio-cultural diversities among nations, cities and neighbourhoods are taken into consideration, community policing is still not a model for automatic adoption; the diversities may still remain too strong. *Skogan* found out that in American cities "residents of poor and minority neighbourhoods with serious disorder problems often have antagonistic relationships with the police. They regard the police as another of their problems" (1990, 172).

What, for the moment, can be taken from the existing experience is the need for a greater and systematic involvement of citizens in securing their own and community life. The

project was open to many imaginable ways, among them a structured collaboration between citizens and the police or for a citizen-community model in which the police plays an assisting role.

2.4.3   Community safety

One main assumption behind community-based initiatives is that high levels of crime are related to low levels of communal cohesiveness and social order. Consequences from this are crime-related fears and anxieties, which, however, have common origins: crime *and* social decline. The idea hereby is to re-establish social stability by using the communities' dormant capacities (the dormant "local capital") and by integrating the residents. In our case, for the purpose of crime prevention: by taking on responsibility for the community and by demonstrating attentiveness and the willingness to intervene in support of common values *citizens will contribute to maintaining social order and thereby deter crime;* these are processes and modes of what can be called 'Community Building'.

In this connection it was apparently first in Britain that the concept of "community safety", occasionally also called "public safety" was systematically applied (cf. *Hughes & Edwards* 2002, *Hughes; McLaughlin & Muncie* 2002, *Matthews & Pitts* 2001), extending and replacing the notion of "community crime prevention" previously current. Its increasing acceptance had to do with community crime prevention being too reminiscent of a purely police task and making it more difficult to realise that crime is but a part taken from the bigger social problems of a community and intrinsically interwoven with it (*Morgan* 1991, 13). So the semantically close model of "community policing" did not fit either, at least not in the form usually understood as an attempt to give a certain officers permanent responsibility for a definite district, making them the fixed contact for the inhabitants there for the case of local problems. The idea behind this was one of partnership in the search for a solution to such problems, in which the police, inhabitants and local authority should work together. (On the corresponding "philosophy"" of the Vancouver police, see *Sessar* 2001, 146-147).

In practice, of course, it was often so that the police' view and not the citizens' view of problematic cases and situations dominated, or that the police had to pass, being more versed in thinking in terms of individual incidents than in problems (*Crawford* 1998, 146-147; *Skogan* 1999, 8*). Therefore, either the aspect of the problem was put right at the centre of community policing *(Community Policing in Chicago* 2003, 49-63*); or the attempt was made to develop and support initiatives arising from the community and its diverse public, voluntary and private organisations with the notion of "community safety". This is, as it is understood, a problem- oriented, holistic approach (*Crawford* 1998*, 8-13). The aim is to understand everyday crime and related phenomena in a *local* context and prevent them with *local* resources.

The objective of the research project was now to ascertain whether explicit local prevention policies in one way or the other exist in the cities studied. In the case of absence the further aim was to find out which implicit programs or activities of a preventive nature substituted for official prevention policies.

3. **Methodology**

3.1   Research plan

The research interest was focused on the socio-spatial dimensions, more precisely, urban dimension of insecurity including fear of crime, resulting from criminality as well as from various forms of incivility. This involved the supposition that an intact community does not only mean a kind of "natural prevention" regarding incivility, but also against many manifestations of everyday criminality. Also that a good local municipal infrastructure is a helpful vaccination against fear of crime.

As has already been mentioned, the limited resources curtailed the range of our approach. Thus, we could only make a start on linking "global anxieties" to the conditions of urban life, however much the concept of "glocalisation" called for this. This, though, would have needed a longitudinal study. Neither was it even considered to empirically investigate the insecurity problems of an entire big city. Structured basic information on each city was rather obtained so as to draw up a rough problem profile with respect to certain of its "hot spots". Therefore, the onus of the research interest was rather on segments of the city, that is on specific districts and urban neighbourhoods selected under the aspect of being burdened with serious problems.

To complete this task, a three-level design was developed as a central element for the empirical studies, differentiated according to a macro level (city), meso level (district) and micro level (living surroundings) (see Figure 1).

Figure 1:   *Model of areas under investigation*

The macro level included the establishment of the said problem profiles, an analysis of the local crime prevention policies and the corresponding projects and programmes. It was expected that by contrasting the initiatives of all five cities to find out all that was done to enhance the citizens' security and to learn from this what is lacking, respectively what could be improved, in one's own city. On the meso level, a representative sample survey

was conducted in the districts, based on a common questionnaire. The micro level comprised in-depth interviews with selected people from the districts under investigation.

The division of tasks among the partners as required by the European Commission was a fundamental element of the research structure. This meant that each partner assumed the responsibility for one or more clearly defined parts of the project (so-called *Work Packages*). This included the preparation of the respective methodological instruments, agreeing and co-ordinating with partners, organising expert meetings if needed be, and finally checking the completion of the respective research step. The work plan was agreed among the partners and declared binding on receipt of the European Commission's approval.

The following division of tasks research steps was agreed among the partners:

- Work Package *No. 1*: Producing the *problem profile* for each city (macro-level): Amsterdam, supported by Budapest and Hamburg-Harburg.

- Work Package *No. 2*: *Sample surveys* in the selected districts, or research areas in the districts (meso-level): Hamburg, supported by Kraków.

- Work Package *No. 3*: *In-depth interviews* in the closer living surroundings of the respondents in the two selected research areas (micro-level): Vienna, supported by Kraków.

- Work Package *No. 4*: *Description and analysis of local crime prevention policies* (macro level): Budapest, supported by Vienna.

- Work Package *No. 5*: *Local reports for each city* containing the local research findings, compiled by the respective partners.

- Work Package *No. 6*: The *Final Report* based on the local reports: Hamburg, supported by all partners.

- Work Package *No. 7*: *Dissemination*, meaning gathering all publicised information and statements pertaining to the research project, be they articles, interviews, talks, lectures, panels etc. All initiatives pertaining to the project are also included such as the sessions of the Local Advisory Boards and of the International Advisory Board: Kraków, supported by all partners.

3.2   Research methods

The conceptualisation of the *first section of the research* (macro level) involving the production of an urban problem profile, was largely left to the partners. It very quickly became apparent, that the peculiarities of each city were resistant to methodological standardisation. One only has to think of the different historical experiences (Budapest and Kraków as cities in former iron curtain countries as opposed to the three western cities), the different legal constructions (Hamburg and Vienna as city states) or the different composition of the populations (Kraków and Budapest with almost no ethnic minorities, Amsterdam with minorities maybe soon to be the majority), etc. Concerning the in-depth

interviews in the *third research section* (micro level), concrete guide-lines allowing much flexibility had to be developed. This similarly applies for the analysis of the prevention policies and practices of the individual cities; the question was, which among the many initiatives to be expected had been explicitly developed to ensure the security of the inhabitants with respect to what type of threats. Homogenisation was achieved to a large extent for the population surveys in the *second research section* (meso level). Even here, though, special interests had to be taken into account as one city might have had security problems unknown in the others. This, therefore, led to occasional divergences in the extent and formulation of the questions.

3.2.1   Creating the cities' problem profile

In the framework of the macro-structural research on the city-level, it was about producing a rough problem profile. The information needed was obtained by collecting and evaluating documents, a secondary analysis of statistical data (above all crime and social statistics) as well as interviewing experts and evaluating these interviews.

Interviewing the experts from the various walks of public life took place in spring 2002 (between 20 to 45 interviews per city). City experts as well as district experts from a wide range of various professional activities were chosen: The police (street police officers; head of police departments; the chief of the city's police, if possible); city and district administration; social services dealing with youth problems, or with migration and integration problems; schools; health care; urban planning and urban development; universities; non-governmental organisations; and the like. The fields of work, not the positions, were important for the choice of interviewees (even the selection of the right partners was sometimes difficult, particularly in Budapest and Kraków. It was once said, "the role of the local governments is still unclear"). The interviews consisted of rather freely structured conversations; the local research teams had to decide which basic topics and problems had to be touched. The objective of interviewing the experts was to survey their perception of the cities' problems, their localisation (where and when do problems occur as factors of insecurity in the respective city?) as well as their suggestions on improving the situation, so as lo let these have some influence on the problem profile.

Furthermore, the analysis of the interviews of experts, statistics as well as the documents made available were the basis for the selection of the two districts. The dominant criterion for selection was that they had to be "problem areas" within the city. Here again the two districts to be researched should show different problems as far as possible. Thus it could be a "problematic" (in the sense of conflict strained) ethnic composition of the population to be studied, a problem laden building structure, residential surroundings showing all signs of social decay, or an area with high crime rates - all this under the aspect of a supposed generation or reinforcement of insecurity and fear. Put concretely, there was an endeavour to choose one high-rise estate structure and another with building substance about a hundred years old, so the beginning of the 20th century. These selection criteria were ideal conceptions, which could not always be kept to, when for example in cities like Budapest and Kraków there are no migrant groups worth mentioning. As a result there were various spatial constellations and combinations depending on the problem clusters ascertained.

Sometimes, the selection was made in accordance with the administrative boundaries of the districts; sometimes the problem clusters of two bordering city districts were combined to one area of research; or, only the zones with high–rise estates or old building substance were taken out of a district and included in the research (cf. chapters 4 and 5).

3.2.2 Population surveys in the research areas

The first stage envisaged in the research was a representative survey of the population in the districts which had been selected under the aspect of specific local problems. Its objective was to ascertain the attitudes of the inhabitants to their city and neighbourhood, respectively to the surroundings they live in regarding their well-being and their feeling safe. Of central significance was the connection between the ecological conditions in the closer socio-spatial area and insecurity or fear among the inhabitants, with special emphasis on fear of crime. Two random samples of about 500 persons each should be drawn for this purpose; the method used were face-to-face interviews with the respondents. The type of survey sampling (either based on population registers or quota sampling) and carrying out the interviewing was left to the partners. In Hamburg, practical problems led to a slightly smaller sample than had been envisaged.

Overall, the following random samples were drawn in the cities and districts:

Amsterdam: 1.000 (De Baarsjes 507, Zuidoost 483);

Budapest: 1.001 (District IX 500, District XXIII 501);

Hamburg: 861 (Steilshoop / Bramfeld 457, Wilhelmsburg 404);

Kraków   1.088 (Kazimierz / Grzegorzki 546, Nowy Bieżanow 542);

Vienna: 1.079 (Leopoldstadt 590, Transdanubien 589).

The survey instrument was a Questionnaire applicable for all cities. It was developed by the Hamburg team supported by the team of Vienna and then put to all partners for discussion. After a series of meetings in a circle of experts, a pre-test in all cities and consultations once again, it received its final standardised form. Only in the case of particular situations local solutions had to be found. For example, in the case of Kraków and Budapest, no questions on the immigrant complex were provided for, since foreigners play either no role or only a marginal one in the two cities. The master questionnaire was translated from German into Dutch, Polish and Hungarian. A Turkish version was made for Turkish migrants in Hamburg. An English version was produced for international communication (on the Questionnaire and the items asked, see Appendix 1).

3.2.3 The in-depth interviews in the research areas

After the randomly sampled face-to-face-interviews, a much smaller number of in-depth interviews with respondents from the surveys were conducted, however, on a non-representative basis. The respondents had been asked whether they were prepared to have another interview; those who agreed constituted the new sampling frame from which the group of interviewees was drawn. For a number of reasons it was not always possible or advisable to take respondents from the first investigation; in those cases people from the same

area, in one case also from neighbouring areas were interviewed. Criteria for selection were age and gender, in some cities ethnicity.

The investigation by way of in-depth interviews was based on four essential, though very general topics as a result of a common agreement among the partners. These topics are: "social networks", "action space", "feelings of (in)security and fear", and "prevention". As a consequence, a Manual was developed including a list of questions and topics derived from the selected themes in connection with the findings from earlier stages of the project (for the Manual see Appendix 2). It was decided that every research team was free to develop further questions, or to drop questions, according to national or local specifics. The research group also decided on a common opening stimulus to motivate the respondents for the interview.

The topics "social networks" and "action space" both involved the types of action and social contacts the respondent pursues in his or her daily life (labour, shopping, recreational or family activities, etc). The spatial dimensions of action referred to the respondents' territorial behaviour. The questions were, among others, which locations are important to them. How do they typically get around (on foot, by bicycle or car , or did they use public transport); do they just move in the vicinity, or in the entire city?; or which kind of people (family members, friends, neighbours) do they meet more frequently. Special attention was paid to feelings of well-being, integration or isolation. The topic "feelings of (in)security and fear" involved possible perceived or personally experienced situations of insecurity and uneasiness including personal victimisations or those of others, and the coping strategies that the people employ to deal with such feelings and experiences. The topic "prevention" referred to the respondents' opinion on the (local) government's policy and effectiveness in terms of community-focused preventive measures as well as on the neighbourhood's social capital and how it could be activated to enhance the living conditions in the quarter.

Basic information about the interviewee and his or her housing conditions (name, address, gender, age, et.) was noted down on a separate info sheet, as well as a brief summary about the interviewer's impression of the physical surroundings, the furnishing of the house or flat, the appearance of the interviewee, and the atmosphere of the interview. The average duration of the interviews should not exceed 60 minutes. In a few cases interviewers were not invited into the respondent's home so that the interview had to take place at the front door, in cafés or other public places. The majority of the interviews were tape recorded. If tape recording was not possible for some reason, interviewers took detailed notes and wrote a protocol immediately after the interview. As a rule the interview transcripts should contain detailed (verbatim) sections of significant narratives and statements.

The field work began in January 2003 (in Kraków in October 2003). In *Amsterdam*, 70 interviews were conducted, the majority of them stemming from the survey sample. A research bureau specialised in interviewing non-Dutch groups gathered a substantial number of non-Dutch inhabitants (25 respondents). In *Budapest*, 100 inhabitants were interviewed (exactly 50 in each district), with 25 of them having been contacted for the first time. *Hamburg* exhibits 54 qualitative interviews (27 in Wilhelmsburg and 27 in Steilshoop/Bramfeld); all respondents had previously been interrogated. The qualitative sample in *Kraków* consisted of 71 interviews; 36 of them took place in Nowy Bieżanów and 35 in Kazimierz / Grzegórzki. In *Vienna* 86 interviews were completed (45 in the

Transdanubian research site and 41 in Leopoldstadt); 60% of the respondents were interviewed a second time; the others came from the same research sites but didn't have previous contacts with the research team.

3.2.4   Analysis of the local crime prevention policies

The analysis of crime (and of fear-of-crime) prevention included the following topics and questions:

Firstly, the history of the legal, structural and organisational conditions of crime prevention in the respective countries and cities should be delineated. The *focus* was on the city under investigation. First came the national legal definitions of crime prevention (should there be any), especially those relating to cities. The structure of crime prevention referred to the level of preventive interventions: primary, secondary, and tertiary level. By organisational conditions the modalities of planning and financing of crime prevention were meant. For our research purposes only concrete preventive programs, projects and initiatives were taken into consideration, especially those which by their own definition were *crime* preventive activities. The main interest was in activities which were undertaken in the research areas. For reasons of comparability we had agreed on the "prevention scan criterion" of *van Dijk & de Waard* (1991, 483 - 503). The analyses of the programs and projects should include their evaluation (if there was any). The aim was to find out and to describe the most typical and, maybe, the most efficient activities in the city/the research areas; the ambition was not to collect all of them.

Secondly, those results from the surveys which were relevant to crime prevention should be presented.

Thirdly, evaluations were made and conclusions were drawn from the results obtained. The research questions were among others the following:

• What are the official reasons to establish local crime prevention policies?

• How valid are these reasons?

• Who or what is the aim of local crime prevention?

• How much prevention is accepted by the public?

• Are there areas of social conflicts where no prevention exists, and what are the reasons?

• How can tensions between rule -of- law norms and preventive activities be judged?

• Is there an awareness of those problems at all?

Some partners attempted to relate issues like globalisation and individualisation to crime preventive measures. Possible questions were:

• Has the state/the city given up the claim to be solely responsible for preventing crime, more precisely, have *partnerships* been set up with private companies or with civil society organisations established to share this duty?

- Who is involved in these *partnerships* and to what extent does "the economisation (meaning commercialisation) of security" in the sense of neo-liberal developments play a role?
- What role does migration play in a "preventive turnaround"?

Finally, there should be an attempt to sketch a prognosis for the future development of prevention in the cities.

In detail the following methods of empirical social research were applied:

- Interviewing experts (especially police officers);
- Analysing laws, orders, documents;
- Integrating relevant results from the surveys and the in-depth interviews.

4. Empirical findings

4.1 Overview

The following short characterisations of the cities that precede their presentation by the partners should be seen as a sort of "mug shot" or "wanted poster" of them. It should enable a classification of our results in an international context in terms of the size of the cities and their prevailing problems. The presentation also contains a description of the respective research areas selected, including the selection criteria. By characterising the physical structure and referring to the ethnic composition, at the same time we lay the foundation for a meaningful comparison of the cities, both within and to each other. Which "contexts of insecurity" are similar and what makes up the differences? This way the high-rise housing estates of Hamburg, which are viewed as a problem (the name "Steilshoop") und Kraków ("Nowy Bieżanów") can be compared.

The main criteria of selection of the research sites were a) *unfavourable housing conditions* (mansions/dwellings built in the late 19th, respectively in the early 20th century *or* high-rise buildings mostly from the 1970s) and b) *specific urban problems* such as high percentages of minority groups or a very poor population. We selected two research areas with approximately 30,000 inhabitants in each city. In almost all cities at least one research area was subdivided according to certain criteria; for example the area researched in Hamburg of „Steilshoop/Bramfeld" consists in part of a central, built-up estate (Steilshoop) and partly of the district of Bramfeld with typical terrace house residential estates (Bramfeld). It was left to the discretion of the individual research teams to diverge from the selection criteria according to needs and actual conditions.

Amsterdam

Amsterdam (736,000 inhabitants in 2003) is the main city of the Netherlands, though not being the seat of parliament and government. The main problems named by the experts, are integration problems regarding specific migrant groups. The two research areas are De

Baarsjes and Amsterdam Zuidoost with De Bijlmer. The main differences between the two districts are as follows:

a) De Baarsjes dates from the 19th century and the buildings mainly from the period between the two World Wars. The area is densely populated with about 100 living units per hectare and only few green areas. Most houses in De Baarsjes have three or four stories and several houses are rather wide.

b) Amsterdam Zuidoost was planned and built after the Second World War. In De Bijlmer there are large green areas and many lakes. The design of the flats originally provided for ten stories and was extremely wide.

Further there is a difference in the population mix of the two districts: In De Baarsjes, 48 % and in Amsterdam Zuidoost, 30 % of the inhabitants are Dutch autochthonous/natives. The main minority groups in De Baarsjes are from Morocco (12 %) and from "not industrialised countries" (11 %). In Amsterdam Zuidoost, 7 % are from Surinam and 22% from "not industrialised countries".

Budapest

In 2000, Budapest had 1.81 Mio. inhabitants. The security problems of the city are dominated by the results of the ongoing transformation processes: Due to the global financial market movements there are considerable economic and social problems in view of high prices, high unemployment rates or the privatisation of council flats by the local government. New types of poverty are growing up and the experts see a "Crises of values". In addition to these problems ruling the Budapest people's everyday life, modern and traditional post-socialist worlds clash in the districts in the most varied ways.

The two research areas are Ferencváros (the 9th District) and Budafok-Tétény (the 22nd District). The districts are very different concerning their physical parameters, their location in the city, their criminal burden and their local crime prevention efforts. The team of Budapest selected the 22nd District as a "control district" for comparing the peculiarities of a central problem area and a middle class district. The main differences between the two districts are:

a) The 9th District, Ferencváros, is situated on the left side of the Danube, with slum-like areas. The outer parts consist of areas with a mixed residential and industrial function, traditionally of a lower status. The percentage of Romas in this district is, in comparison to other districts, exceptionally high (about 10%). Although there is a very successful redevelopment, the environmental situation is difficult: A significant portion of the territory of the district is occupied by railway junctions.

b) The social situation and the role that the 22nd District, Budafok-Tétény, plays in the city are basically different from that of the 9th District. Budafok-Tétény lies in the outskirts, is spatially isolated and still of rural structure to today. With its fragmentary structure this area has buildings from the 1950s urban type buildings and later periods. A part of the research area is traditionally in a better situation, consisting of modern, detached, luxurious houses.

Hamburg

Hamburg, being the central city of northern Germany has a population of 1.73 Mio. inhabitants (2003). The main problems of the city are those of a modernised city, like conflicts between different ethnic minority groups (integration problems) or drug problems. Also, Hamburg has to restructure its harbour, growing to a services metropolis with the heavy consequence of a kind of structural unemployment.

The two research areas are Wilhelmsburg and Steilshoop/Bramfeld. The main differences and equalities between the two districts are as follows:

a) Wilhelmsburg dates from the 19th century and the buildings are mainly from the period between the two World Wars. A high-rise estate also belonging to Wilhelmsburg was excluded from the research because of its completely different physical structure.

b) The large estate "Steilshoop" together with a small part of the district of Bramfeld forms the second research area. Steilshoop has 12-to-14-story buildings; the density of the population is very high. Bramfeld was included for having an outside perspective on the high-rise flats through the perception of the respondents. At the same time it was thought to serve as a kind of "control group" considering the much lower social problems in terms of drugs, crime, rubbish and litter, etc.

Both research sides have large green areas, some of them with a lot of water space. Like in Amsterdam there is a difference in the population mix of the two research areas: Whilst in Wilhelmsburg one minority dominates public space (people of Turkish origin make up 29% of the population) in Steilshoop / Bramfeld we find a mixture of over 24 nationalities.

Kraków

Krakow is situated in southern Poland in the Wisła (Vistula) valley on both banks of the river. The city has 742,000 inhabitants (2000); it is the third most populous Polish city, after Warsaw (1.63 Mio.) and Łódź (823,000).

In Krakow the only ethnic minority group of some importance are the Romas. Most of them live in the industrial zone of Nowa Huta as a consequence of the communists' policy in the 1950s and 1960s of settling Roma families in the cities. However, in contrast to the frequent situation in Slovakia or in the Czech Republic, but somehow similar to the situation in Budapest, the Romas in Nowa Huta are not concentrated in a kind of ethnic ghettos in one particular part of that district. Rather they are scattered over the district living among the Polish population. It is then not a minority comparable with that of the other cities.

a) One of the research areas belongs to two administrative districts. The partial area *Kazimierz* was taken from the district Stare Miasto, Grzegórzki from *Grzegórzki Zachód*. Both border on each other; together they form a relatively homogenious unit regarding not only the structure (19th century), but also the socio-demographic make-up and problems. This research area received the name *Kazimierz/ Grzegórzki*.

b) The other area, *Nowy Bieżanów*, is part of the 12th administrative district Prokocim-Bieżanów. It is situated on the east bank of Vistula, far away from the city centre. It consists of huge, faceless and ugly apartment buildings each containing hundreds of apartments. They were built mainly during the 1970s.

Vienna

In 2000, Vienna had a population of 1.62 Mio. inhabitants. According to experts and the perceptions of the respondents, the capital of Austria is a "safe city". The first research area informally called "*Transdanubien*", the second „*Leopoldstadt*".

a) The first area has two parts: "Großfeldsiedlung" and "Rennbahnweg". They are almost entirely dominated by suburban public housing estates that were constructed in the (late) 1960s and 1970s. Both projects were, in some respects, considered to be problem estates, with especially Rennbahnweg acquiring a bad reputation and the stigma as the worst (Viennese) case of urban expansion and design.

b) The second site selected for research purposes is situated in Vienna's 2nd District, the Leopoldstadt, comprising two of the district's residential quarters: *Volkert Quartier* and *Stuwer Quartier.* They both can be described as triangle shaped neighbourhoods, separated from each other by the tracks of the northern railway, and connected only by the hinge of the Praterstern traffic junction and the Wien Nord railway station. Both quarters have been working class and can now be described as low income residential areas. They are densely built-up, two thirds of the buildings still dating from the late 19th century.

This brief introduction is followed by the condensed presentations of the five cities in view of some essential results and of first impressions and conclusions gained from the investigation.

4.2 **Amsterdam** (by *Manuela du Bois-Reymond; Irene Sagel-Grande, Leo Toornvliet*)

4.2.1 Amsterdam and the two research areas

Amsterdam is the chief city of the Netherlands, its cultural centre and its capital, but it is not the seat of parliament, government and the residence of the queen, which is in The Hague. On the 1st of January 2003 Amsterdam had 736,045 inhabitants. The population is increasing. In 2003 the population density was 4,424 inhabitants per square kilometre. Amsterdam is a rather dynamic community. Over ten years two thirds of Amsterdam's population has been replaced. That is also an important fact to take into account in research that takes place in this city; things move fast. Therefore the reader has to keep in mind that our data and results are based in the research period 2001-2003.

Amsterdam is an international city and a member of the large city network "Euro-cities". On the 1st of January 2003, 38.4% of the total population of Amsterdam belonged to ethnic-cultural minorities and this percentage is increasing. In that year 172 nationalities were living in Amsterdam. It is expected that more than half of the inhabitants will belong to ethnic-cultural minorities by the year 2030.

The two INSEC research areas are De Baarsjes and Amsterdam South-East/Bijlmer.

The parcelling in De Baarsjes dates from the 19th century and most buildings were constructed in the period between the two World Wars, while Amsterdam South-East was planned and built after the Second World War. De Baarsjes are densely populated with about 100 living units per hectare and only few green areas, while in De Bijlmer there are large green areas and many lakes. Most houses in De Baarsjes have three or four stories and several houses are rather broad. The honeycomb design of the flats in De Bijlmer all originally had ten stories and was extremely broad.

The population of the two districts shows a high degree of national and ethnic-cultural diversity. It is noteworthy that in Amsterdam South-East the percentage of autochthonous Dutch inhabitants is lower than for the allochthonous population (per January 1, 2003):

Table 1: *Origin of the districts' populations in Amsterdam*

	De Baarsjes	**Amsterdam South-East**
Surinam	7.2%	31.8%
Antilles	1.0%	6.4%
Turkey	9.7%	1.0%
Morocco	11.8%	1.8%
Southern Europe	3.3%	1.5%
non-industrialised countries	10.6%	22.3%
industrialised countries	8.7%	4.8%
The Netherlands	47.8%	30.4%

The highly divers groups of minorities make the population in Amsterdam and its districts special and different from the population in the InSec research districts of most other InSec cities.

In what follows we discuss, firstly, selected results of the survey (Section 2-6, I. Sagel-Grande/L. Toornvliet). In Section 7 (M. du Bois-Reymond) we present main findings of the qualitative study, in Section 8 (I. Sagel-Grande) we focus on prevention policies and practice in The Netherlands and in Amsterdam.

4.2.2 The Dutch and foreign citizens in the two research districts of Amsterdam

Amsterdam equals Hamburg to the extent that in both cities the population is divers. Therefore a special section with questions was added to the survey in these two research sites to collect information about relations between autochthonous and allochthonous citizens (foreigners). Our findings can be summarised as follows:

In general autochthonous Dutch inhabitants were open minded and willing to accept newcomers, they experienced the presence of many nationalities as pleasant. A majority

had contacts with ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood, in their social networks and in their work. (See however Section 7 for some contrary evidence),

The Dutch underline the need of more contacts with foreigners but emphasise at the same time that foreigners ought to conform to the Dutch way of life. We interpret this attitude of Dutch respondents as being fairly tolerant, but we must add that recently their tolerance has become less (the "Pim Fortuyn effect"). A relevant finding in this regard is that tolerance is related to the level of education and social participation. Between the population mix in the two areas, De Baarsjes and Amsterdam South-East, there are important differences. As we have shown in our table, more Surinamese than original Dutch, as well as Africans and several smaller groups of foreigners populate the quarter. In De Baarsjes besides almost half original Dutch, there live three groups of almost the same in number: Africans, Moroccans and Turks.

There were only few cases of manifest discrimination reported by the minority respondents. Africans and Antilleans in Amsterdam South -East regarded themselves most often victims of discrimination.

Primarily Moroccans and Turks have friends of their own origin (almost 60%), while Surinamese (43%) and even more often Antilleans (65%) say they had friends from different nations. The origin of friends is related to social participation: the less social participation, the greater the likelihood of friends from the same origin.

In general, the Surinamese are the best-integrated group of the none Dutch origin. For the average African, Moroccan and Turk the distance to Dutch social life is still great. The general level of education and, more specifically, language competence play a decisive role for the social integration of allochthonous inhabitants.

4.2.3   General well-being

There is a remarkably big difference between the general contentment of the population in South-East and that of the population of De Baarsjes. A majority of the inhabitants of South-East is satisfied with their surroundings (76.7%) as opposed to 49.3% in De Baarsjes. In all measures of the social atmosphere the biggest differences between the two quarters are found in the items "calmness" and "attractiveness" of the district.

In both districts a vast majority of inhabitants is positive about the transport connections and the availability of shopping facilities. This is also the case for the question about friendly neighbours, although for this item there is a considerable difference between the two districts: more (16.6%) South-East inhabitants experience the people around them as friendly. A majority in both districts have a negative opinion in this regard.

There is a small difference between the districts when it comes to the question whether or not you can rely on the police. 60.1% in De Baarsjes and 53.4% in South-East give a positive answer. Big differences exist on the items housing costs and the availability of sport and leisure facilities. A majority of South-East respondents regard the rent they have to pay as too high (57.3% to 33.0% for De Baarsjes). On sport/leisure opportunities a majority of De Baarsjes is negative (67.1% to 32.6% for South-East). It is possible that these elements play a role in the difference in satisfaction that exists between both districts.

4.2.4   Victimisation experiences

Generally victimisation experiences are collected in order to get insight into the level of criminality which exists in a city. Accordingly victimisation is restricted to victimisation by crime. Crime is a rather technical phenomenon based on national legislations and therefore a comparison between different countries and nations is difficult to make.

As criminality is only one among many factors, but of course a rather important one, which causes anxieties, fright, feeling uncomfortable etc., the interviewees in the InSec research were asked to report more generally on threatening incidents they had experienced during the last three years. In this way, a rather broad concept of victimisation was introduced which corresponds to the information we were interested in: not the actual number of committed crimes, but the intensity of feelings of insecurities. Next to this we added indirect victimisation in order to find out about the extent of influence on feelings of insecurity caused by incidents not experienced by the respondent themselves but heard about second hand.

Direct victimisation

The reported percentages for all incidents that happened during three years, which are not necessarily all criminal offences are 20,6% for direct victimisation of the people living in De Baarsjes and 12, 24% for the inhabitants of Amsterdam South-East. In both districts the development over the last three years shows a slight increase, a little more for Amsterdam South-East than for De Baarsjes.

We have no conclusive explanation for the differences between the two districts.

Indirect victimisation

The results for indirect victimisation were as follows: In De Baarsjes 16% as opposed to 20% in Amsterdam South-East. Concerning indirect victimisation the number of cases decreased with the length of the period since the incidents happened. Perhaps an over-reporting of the more recent events is more probable in cases of indirect victimisation than in cases of direct victimisation as what happened to somebody else might be more easily forgotten than what happened to oneself.

In both districts several persons were directly as well as indirectly victimised. There were no remarkable differences between De Baarsjes (13.13%) and Amsterdam South-East (14.56%). In both districts about half of the inhabitants were neither directly nor indirectly victimised during the last three years. In the Security Plan of Amsterdam (2003) it is stated that 53% of the inhabitants of Amsterdam as a whole became a victim of at least one criminal offence in one year.

Here we have to emphasise that 24% of the directly victimised people of De Baarsjes were involved in at least one accident during the last three years. In Amsterdam South-East this percentage is much lower. The reason for this difference is to be found in the different traffic situations in the two districts: traffic is more dangerous in De Baarsjes.

The use of our broad victimisation concept resulted in answers that pointed mainly into the direction of property crimes and to a lesser degree to offences against the person and freedom. In De Baarsjes traffic accidents were more often reported than criminal offences against the person.

The broad InSec victimisation concept that was restricted to the two most severe cases during the last three years resulted further in the fact that the total number of incidents was restricted to qualitatively relevant cases.

The restriction to the two most severe cases during the last three years has, as a matter of fact, as consequence that the number of crimes mentioned in the InSec interviews is relatively lower than the numbers in the Amsterdam monitor.

A quite interesting fact however is, that of our sample of 969 persons, 194 people were directly victimised reporting 346 incidents, 50 of them being traffic accidents. So we can conclude that the 194 victims reported 296 criminal offences which leads us to the hypothesis that only little more than half of the victims seem to have been victimised twice in three years time. Accordingly we can state that it is not so likely that the restriction to the most severe two cases during the last three years in the questionnaire cuts away many cases.

The kind of cases reported is not so serious as to conclude that all what belongs to the average, frequently committed crime is missing under the criminality reported in the InSec research. The contrary is more likely.

In sum: the InSec research gives circumstantial evidences for the hypothesis that crime rates might be lower in reality than are often measured in official statistics. The fact that people often try to answer in accordance with what they think the interviewer wants to hear is well known in social sciences. In short interviews by phone this chance might be bigger than in face to face interviews where it is possible to explain questions, the interviewees can ask questions and the interviewer can also give explanations and make sure that there are no misunderstandings etc. The consistency we found in our data supports this view. The chance that offences are reported, which, according to the law, are not criminalised, should not be underestimated. The same is true for the chance that something actually happened in another year than told in a short answer. A broad victimisation concept does not direct people so clearly in the direction of criminality.

Concerning the relation between the groups of crimes we could compare, although only under reservations, strikingly the results of the Amsterdam monitor and the InSec data were almost the same.

Another interesting result is the finding that indirect victimisation is of greater influence on the feelings of insecurities of people than one would suppose, but that these influences do not last for long. Policies should take this fact into account as indirect victimisation seems to have a stronger impact on feelings of insecurities in society than generally expected - at least for a shorter period directly after the crime was committed.

In cases of indirect victimisation reported by the interviewees it is important to emphasise that it was not the influence of the media that was decisive, as the persons who were

directly victimised were not unknown third parties, but members of the family, friends or neighbours. Thus we regularly find a close personal relationship between the directly and the indirectly victimised persons. That may also explain the intensity of the influence of indirect victimisation , at least to a certain extent.

As far as *ethnicity* is concerned, there were only small differences (not significant) found between the group of Dutch and non-Dutch people concerning feelings of insecurity after direct and/or indirect victimisation.

4.2.5   Insecurities on three levels

The InSec study differentiated primarily between three levels on which insecurities can be found: The global level, the city level and the city-district level. Although the national level was not a special research item in the interviews, it must be kept in mind, since national culture and character, educational system, the social and economic situation in the Netherlands etc. are also influences both for the situation in Amsterdam as a whole as for its districts. Next to the peculiarities of the country, the special character of the Dutch and the high number of ethnicities living in Amsterdam play an important role in what the atmosphere of community life is like, what manners, mentality and way of living, thinking and feeling is common and what is only alive under certain ethnic minorities. Therefore all three levels should be observed and interpreted in correlation with these national peculiarities and distinctive features.

Global anxieties

In order to get an idea about the general anxieties of the respondents in De Baarsjes and Amsterdam South-East, they were asked about their feelings concerning 10 global anxiety variables.

We found that people from Amsterdam South-East have a significantly higher overall anxiety score than the inhabitants of De Baarsjes. However, both means lie well above the theoretical mean level of the five-point scale. Thus global anxieties have a strong impact on the people in both districts.

In Amsterdam South-East wars got the highest rank (4.26), followed by contagious diseases (4.24), terrorism (4.23), conflict between Islam and the Western World (4.14), mass unemployment (3.96), transnational crime (3.91), ecological destruction (3.73), nuclear power stations (3.53), overpopulation (3.16) and migration from poor to rich countries (3.16).

In De Baarsjes contagious diseases and the conflict between Islam and the western world together have the highest rank (3.92), followed by wars (3.80), mass unemployment (3.77), terrorism (3.75), transnational crime and ecological destruction both with 3.52, migration from poor to rich countries (3.36), overpopulation (3.24) and finally nuclear power stations (3.23). It is rather difficult to explain these differences. A reason could be again the difference in population: In Amsterdam South-East the percentage of ethnic "minorities" is more than 60%. The biggest group are the people from Suriname followed by people from non- industrialised countries, among them many from African countries, where wars and

dangerous diseases are a constant threat for the people living there. In De Baarsjes the percentage of ethnic minorities is "only" about 40%. The biggest group are the Moroccans, followed by inhabitants from non-industrialised countries and Turks. The differences in number between these ethnic groups are not big. In relation to the total population the impact of the African inhabitants is less strong than in Amsterdam South-East.

City concerns

In this part of our research 12 items were presented. Again the inhabitants of Amsterdam South - East had significantly more concerns than the inhabitants in De Baarsjes.

The highest score in Amsterdam South - East was the item "dealing and using drugs in the street" with 4.23 on a scale from 1 (not at all concerned) to 5 (very much concerned), followed by "crime" (4.11), "environmental pollution" (3.79), criminal foreigners (3.70) and "poverty" (3.62).

In De Baarsjes the five items with the highest scores were: "dealing and using drugs in the streets" (3.97), "crime" (3.95), "unemployment" (3.75), "criminal foreigners" (3.58) and "crime against foreigners" (3.48).

In both districts dealing and using drugs in the street is the main concern, followed directly by fear of crime. In Amsterdam South-East environmental pollution with a clear distance is the third concern, while in De Baarsjes this is unemployment.

In Amsterdam South-East hooligans and insufficient medical care are causing least concern, while in De Baarsjes the people are least afraid of hooligans and unsafe busses and trains.

On an average the crime-related items are judged almost the same as the social aspects. But when we focus on the differences between the items, we find that the crime-related factors definitely cause the most concerns at city level.

Fear of crime at city level thus is a hot item, whereas on a global level (transnational) crime was in both districts on rank 6.

Insecurity in the district

The five most irritating items in South-East were:

"Homeless beggars" (3.96), "rubbish or litter in streets and parks" (3.93), "violence in public space" (3.51), "vandalism" (3.50) and "groups of teenagers hanging around" (3.42).

In De Baarsjes the following items got the highest scores:

"Rubbish and litter in streets and parks" (3.74), "groups of teenagers hanging around" (3.57), "lack of leisure time facilities" (3.30), "lack of social services" (3.29) and "too much noise" (3.20).

As a matter of fact there seems to be more violence in South-East than in De Baarsjes as all items that include behaviour related to violence have a higher score in South-East and at the same time scores that lie well above the middle of the scale. That is true for violence in public space and for domestic violence. This might be the reason that stronger punishments

for violence and violence prevention in schools got high scores on the scale concerning measures to solve the problems and homeless beggars are causing so many anxieties.

Three levels

When we compare the concerns on the three levels, we find a slight decrease in the height of the scores between them. Global anxieties are interpreted or felt to be more serious than concerns on city level, and city level concerns are weighted heavier than district concerns. This is a realistic way of observing things. Indeed, we still are living in a country, in a city, in a district relatively far away from most of what the real big problems of our world are. Nevertheless there is a constant threat people are aware of and which they seem to regard as serious.

4.2.6   Coping strategies, protective and avoiding measures

The citizens in both districts primarily make use of avoiding behaviour and only on a limited scale of prevention measures. There does not automatically exist a relation between the extent of anxieties and the extent of prevention activities as those groups showing relatively high scores on the insecurities scale do not make use of relatively more prevention measures. However, avoiding measures are not always possible and protective measures usually involve costs. Yet people surely could do more to prevent incidents that can cause victimisation. Therefore we propose to stimulate the citizens regularly in this direction and to help them in preparing and using adequate means.

Furthermore there is certainly room for empowerment, training and perhaps also individual guardianship, and in special cases for teaching citizens how to manage everyday problems related to insecurities in their living space, whether it is in an area as De Baarsjes, densely populated, with narrow streets, much traffic, little space for children to play and many coffee-shops with wards being involved in criminal activities, or in Amsterdam South - East with high rise buildings and large green areas with specific problems caused by environmental design. The presently running "huisbezoeken" project in De Baarsjes in which direct contact with all inhabitants of the Ortelius-neighbourhood is initiated by social workers visiting everybody at home, could be a good starting point for those activities. In connection with the strengthening of coping abilities, a rather important subject will be how to prevent violence and how to act if violence has already appeared.

4.2.7   The qualitative study

The qualitative study consists of 70 in-depth interviews in the above mentioned quarters, 24 in de Baarsjes and 46 in Amsterdam South-East. Both quarters show a high variety of different ethnic-cultural origins of the inhabitants, typical for late-modern metropolitan areas in many parts of Europe (though not all: Vienna, Krakow and Budapest much less so than Hamburg and Amsterdam). We interviewed people with as varied backgrounds as possible - not only according to educational/occupational level, age and gender but also concerning their ethnic-cultural backgrounds. We therefore interviewed, with the help of interpreters, besides Dutch inhabitants also people from Lebanon, Turkey, Morocco and

from African countries, and of course inhabitants who came from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles.

When we compare the outcomes of the quantitative and the qualitative study, we find not only convergence but divergence as well. As concerns some discrepancies in our two approaches, we can, with due caution, state that the survey tends to give a more rosy picture than the in-depth interviews. Several reasons account for that: one reason is that we interviewed slightly more persons of non-Dutch origin than is in accordance with statistical representativeness. Another reason lies in "hidden persons" like illegally staying inhabitants who do not show up in surveys but whom we included in the qualitative study. And still another reason is that people have more chance to specify their answers and express mixed feelings in open interviews than in surveys. We present results of two main themes which figured prominently in the interviews:

- feelings about the neighbourhood and
- social integration.

We then present a typology which shows relationships between the social-physical contexts and the biographical constellations within which feelings of insecurity occur.

Feelings about the neighbourhood and the neighbours

When we asked our respondents if they liked their neighbourhood, they reacted mainly with positive comments.

Compared to the Baarsjes and residents who live in low-rise areas of Amsterdam South-East, inhabitants of high-rise buildings – mostly non-Dutch residents – describe a smaller area as their neighbourhood. They consider their neighbourhood as mainly restricted to their apartment building and only a few streets around their apartment blocks. In other words, housing type appears to influence the way respondents perceive their neighbourhood. Figuratively speaking, the definition of neighbourhood tends to go upwards in Amsterdam South-East and "sidewards" in de Baarsjes.

Feelings of well-being and feeling uncomfortable or dissatisfaction are highly diverse in the two quarters and between the different populations groups, which is interesting in itself as it points to the fact that there is no overall measure for the degree of well-being and unease which holds for everybody in the same way.

Contrary to the survey, we found that the inhabitants of the Baarsjes feel more at home in their neighbourhood than respondents in Amsterdam South East. We have no convincing explanation for that and tend to give more credit to the survey in this respect.

People in Amsterdam South East who expressed discontent were mainly non-Dutch. In particular Ghanese feel isolated and do not manage to connect with other inhabitants. They feel most often discriminated, in and outside their neighbourhood. Dissatisfied Dutch as well as non-Dutch Amsterdam South East inhabitants tend to live in high-rise buildings. It concerns elderly people and families with young children. However, we want to stress in the context of INSEC, that it is not so much feelings of insecurity which makes them want to

leave but they rather prefer a quieter quarter. And generally speaking all respondents prefer low-rise to high-rise blocks.

Feeling uncomfortable and frustration is expressed differently by Dutch and non-Dutch. While Dutch respondents express their feelings of discomfort more in terms of annoyance and anger, non-Dutch respondents might do so more in terms of frustration and hopelessness. That points to the implicit fact that Dutch people have, by and large, more options than non-Dutch - they could move away more easily, if they wanted.

Intra- and interethnic preferences and prejudices are an essential factor for the well-being of the inhabitants in a quarter. The composition of the quarter - which groups live together with whom in which type of house and on the street - accounts to a large extent for city dwellers feeling comfortable or uncomfortable.

Social integration

While the survey data suggests in first instance that there is, by and large, quite a lot of interaction between Dutch and non-Dutch inhabitants, a closer look at the survey itself, but also at our qualitative data, shows a less positive picture and also shows differences between our two quarters:

According to the survey (Amsterdam report, part 2, p. 13), a comfortable majority in both districts are "on friendly terms" with their neighbours, and an even higher percentage say they can rely on their neighbours. But from our qualitative interviews we know that the different ethnic-cultural groups tend to "click together" and would not easily mix with other groups. E.g., if many groups with different ethnic-cultural backgrounds live together in a high-rise building, they would rather stick to their own people and not to other groups in that building. If you then ask: are you friendly with your neighbours, people would say yes - meaning in first instance their contacts with their own group.

The survey asked Dutch respondents about personal contacts with their non-Dutch neighbours and found again a comfortable majority in both districts who had such contacts and more than one third who had even contacts via family and close friends (p. 52).

Yet the same survey also found that the non-Dutch gave very, very low percentages of Dutch friends and many more of their own country of origin (p. 58). These differences can be explained if one imagines the social situation and the physical settings within which both kinds of contacts take place:

"Friendly contacts" do not say much - it can come down to not much more than a friendly "good morning" in the staircase on one's way out; and often does, as our non-Dutch respondents told us when we informed about the quality of the contact. The question, put to non-Dutch inhabitants, if they have Dutch friends, is a much harder indicator of intercultural neighbourhood life than "friendly contacts". Then it shows that there is little of it indeed. When we informed about mutual visits and shared activities, we were told by both, Dutch and non-Dutch, that closer contacts between heterogeneous groups were negligible, although there were clear exceptions, especially among left-wing young middle-class Dutch people who told about their non-Dutch friends and who liked the multicultural

atmosphere in Amsterdam South East, and among active non-Dutch inhabitants who were engaged in community activities.

Both, survey and in-depth interviews, found language a key variable accounting for communication or alienation in neighbourly contacts. The Dutch speaking Surinams and Antillean people have a clear advantage over Turkish or Moroccan inhabitants who are less adept at the language. And in as much language is also associated with level of education, the better educated non-Dutch will have more chances of interacting with Dutch neighbours, this even more so because they tend to live in better neighbourhoods with low-rise buildings.

Social-physical contexts and biographical constellations of security and insecurity – a typology

As the title of INSEC suggests, at the core of the project lies the question about feelings of insecurity. It is well known in criminology that crime-related fears do not necessarily correspond with factual experiences of victimisation. We tried to get hold of the intricate relationship between subjective and objective factors contributing to feelings of insecurity by means of a two-dimensional typology.

Before we interpret the 4 types, some cautious remarks about the status of the typology: For one thing, it concerns physical, social and biographical *constellations* rather than concrete houses and persons. The second caution concerns statistical likelihood: we have constructed the typology on the basis of our qualitative material which is not representative. Although our sample is a fairly reasonable reflection of the city dwellers who live in the two quarters, the subgroups like young people, elderly, Dutch vs. various non-Dutch etc. differ in size. Finally, there are "grey zones" between the categories, like when a person has experienced unsafe situations and feels insecure (type 1), but to a lesser degree than another person in the same category. Therefore we will focus on qualitative properties rather than quantifying types. We will only go as far as telling that within our sample, there are two bigger and two smaller groups. The two bigger groups are represented by type 1 and 3, the smaller by type 2 and 4.

Table 2:   *Typology of unsafe situations*

Feelings of insecurity Unsafe situations	High	Low
High	TYPE 1 • more high-rise • more non-Dutch • more elderly • more women	TYPE 2 • more low-rise • more Dutch • more men • less elderly
Low	TYPE 3 • more low-rise in both quarters • more Dutch • more women • more elderly	TYPE 4 • more low-rise • more Dutch

Type 1: respondents who have concrete experiences with unsafe situations and feel insecure

The group consists mainly of people in Amsterdam South-East who live in high-rise building blocks and who are non-Dutch by origin. Sex (more women) and age (more elderly) may be added. Two decisive factors make up for this constellation: minority status and housing type. These two factors are interrelated: the chance to end up in high-rise buildings, which are a feature of Amsterdam South-East as opposed to the de Baarsjes, is much greater for non-Dutch than Dutch- born people. And the likelihood that scary incidents happen in such buildings is high.

Perhaps contrary to normal and formal definitions of insecurity and unsafety, we have included in this category also feelings and incidents of being (strongly) discriminated. This concerns especially immigrants from Africa, Turkey, Morocco and Lebanon as well as illegally staying persons.

Type 2: respondents who have concrete experiences with unsafe situations but do not feel insecure

This type - by far the smallest group - is composed of city dwellers who "should" feel insecure because of concrete experiences with unsafety, but don't. They are to be found in both quarters, live rather more often in low-rise buildings, are rather (but not exclusively) male and share an attitude of "positive thinking": alright, there is petit and not so petit crime, but what do you want, if you live in a big city like Amsterdam you must be prepared to run risks, not fall from your chair if your car is burgled - it can happen, it has happen, it might happen again, but life goes on.

Generally speaking, it is the mobile metropolitan with a rather high education, a car, a good job - and thus more likely Dutch than non-Dutch, and also more likely male than female.

Type 3: respondents who have no concrete experiences with unsafe situations but feel insecure nevertheless

This type represents more Dutch than non-Dutch respondents. An explanation may be found in the fact that more Dutch than non-Dutch live in low-rise buildings. Those inhabitants run a lesser risk of experiencing unsafe situations than those residing in high-rise buildings. Their feelings of insecurity derive more from media coverage and other indirect sources; they feel to a more or lesser degree insecure without corresponding personal experiences. Women are more prone to such feelings than men.

Type 3 city dwellers expose feelings which many people have who live in European metropolitan areas - and certainly in sensation-ridden Amsterdam where you can hardly open the (local) paper or listen to local radio or watch TV channels without getting your daily portion of criminal incidents or discussions about how the police fails (the survey data do not confirm this consideration - see Section 4, indirect victimisation).

Discriminatory imagery of "the stranger" (from both sides, Dutch as well as non-Dutch) adds to diffuse feelings of insecurity.

Type 4: respondents who do not have concrete experiences with unsafe situations and do not feel insecure

This type is also quite frequent among our respondents, but not as frequent as type 1 and 3. Those are the "well-being" city dwellers who like their neighbourhood and their surroundings.

One might wonder why this group is not by far the biggest after what we stated earlier about general satisfaction with their quarter. The discrepancy can be explained by a different focus on the topic: to the more general questions about well-being, people responded with expressing their satisfaction with their housing situation and friendly neighbourhood or lavish green. When shifting the focus to topics of unsafe situations and feelings of insecurity though, the respondents felt invited to express their concerns. This holds especially for non-Dutch with strong negative experiences of being (or feeling) discriminated by other groups.

After what we have told up to know it comes as no surprise that type 4 is represented by Dutch rather than non-Dutch who live mainly (but not exclusively) in low-rise buildings.

In conclusion

We have given some evidence of the relationship between social and physical features of typical metropolitan quarters and neighbourhoods. From the biographical accounts of our respondents, feelings of well-being and discomfort, including feelings of insecurity, are in many ways related to ethnic-cultural backgrounds. And because non-Dutch born inhabitants generally have worse social and economic prospects than the Dutch, they tend to cluster in quarters with cheaper housing. There are more tensions between the different population groups in these quarters than in more homogeneous (white) neighbourhoods. But it is encouraging that none of our respondents - Dutch or non-Dutch - suggested more homogeneous living quarters and thus by implication a separation policy. Instead, they suggested a better balanced composition of the heterogeneous population. That also means that the majority accepts living in a multicultural city.

4.2.8   Prevention policies and prevention practice

Modern prevention policies started in the Netherlands in the 1980s when criminality, in those days mainly minor offences or misdemeanours, increased quickly. The basis of Dutch prevention policies was laid down by the policy paper "Society and Criminality" of the Commission Roethof in 1984. The starting point was the conviction that criminality is a social phenomenon that cannot be successfully tackled with police and criminal law means alone. Society and all its members, communities, organisations, interest groups, whether public or private, they all are co-responsible for what is going on in society and therefore all must be activated to co-operate in the prevention of crime. Three forms of integration were already thought of:

- integration of planning of local authorities and police force and the penal law strategies of the Ministry of Justice,
- integration of prevention and repression and

- integration of penal policies of local authorities, police and judiciary and the contributions to the prevention and control of criminality of other members of society.

Accordingly public and private organisations were involved in crime prevention.

A start was made with great enthusiasm. Crime prevention was discovered as some kind of fight against criminality that had many advantages against classical forms of repression:

If prevention works, there is no victim, neither material nor immaterial damage, no law is violated, there is no need of prosecution, safety and order are safeguarded and the citizens feel safe.

Many prevention projects were developed and initiated, most did not last for long. Several projects were evaluated and afterwards further developed insteps until they got a clearer structure and were realized according to a certain procedure. For the prevention of burglary, and shoplifting for example, special quality marks were developed. Other pilot projects were institutionalised by public instances after they had been tested, for example the Justice in the neighbourhood bureaus, or on a private level the HALT bureaus. Already in 1986 van Soomeren developed the so-called preventological model that is focusing on criminality and the built surroundings.

Next to these more structured and longer lasting preventions means always many pilot projects are practised and sometimes they lead to new models that are standardised.

The present national policy paper "Towards a securer society" stresses the need of the right combination of repression and prevention and emphasises repression without neglecting the benefits of prevention. In connection with the wish to change and intensify the mix of prevention and repression the new concept "tegenhouden" was introduced, that can be translated as crime prevention with a bite (standing your ground). In contrast to the early years much of the optimistic enthusiasm was replaced by a more realistic estimation of what prevention can achieve. Now there is a conviction that crime prevention was not developed to an extent that is needed. To better the situation the Centre for Crime Prevention and Security was initiated in de form of a private law foundation by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior in 2004 in which private and public partners will operate together in order to improve networking, know-how, management of quality-marks etc.

The new prevention policies that stress repression more than some years ago are the answer of the government to the growing demand for more security increasingly articulated by the public.

At present in Amsterdam the Security Plan 2003 is in force. In this new policy paper a two pronged strategy was chosen : special target groups and special places. Most of the means summarised have a strong repressive impact.

On district level many, "innumerable", prevention projects are in use focusing on the well-being of young people, housing conditions, security (neighbourhood safety plans, safety posts, surveillance), economy and work, empowerment, leisure time etc.

What has been developed until now in the field of crime prevention followed mainly the need of the day. It did not start with a detailed concept. The experience from the many projects resulted in a broad spectrum of prevention measures. At present more structure of the whole is being sought.

The question, whether and in how far crime prevention in the Netherlands is community based knows two answers. Theoretically it is community based, but in practice community seems to lack the mentality needed for community based crime prevention. The majority of the people voted for more security and asked the government to care more for them and their needs. The present government accepted its responsibility to improve objective and subjective security, adding carefully that realising a secure society is the responsibility of society as a whole.

When we overview the many prevention projects in which citizens more or less participate, we must conclude that they are in most cases initiated and carried out by rather competent and eager officials or employees who are able to motivate people but nevertheless are the motor without which there is only little activity. In practice prevention mainly still functions top down and is only exceptionally created by the community. Until now the fact that real community based crime prevention is a precondition for a securer society is not yet internalised by the people and therefore not alive.

This is confirmed by our findings concerning the prevention measures taken by the people of our survey. There are only few prevention means in use:

In De Baarsjes 60% and in Amsterdam South-East a bit more than 50% of the respondents take additional protective measures in and around their homes. 8,5% of the sample in De Baarsjes attended self defence courses and 14,6% in South-East. Relatively many interviewees have a defence weapon, in De Baarsjes even more (20%) than in South-East (17%).

When we asked how many protective measures people use, we found that more than a third does not use any protective measure. In South-East with several hot spots where people feel criminality as a threat, nevertheless 38% of the respondents don't use a protective measure. 40% of the people in South-East and 47% of the population in De Baarsjes use one protective measure, while two means are used by 16% of the respondents in South-East and 19% in De Baarsjes. In De Baarsjes protective measures were used by 2% of the sample and in South-East by 5%. Four means were used by 2 % in De Baarsjes and 0,5% in South-East.

From research we know that the likelihood to become victim of a crime decreases not proportionally to the number of measures, but much more. That should be known by the people and it is therefore important that they are regularly informed again about this connection.

The differences between the use of avoiding measures in our two research districts were not so big. We can therefore summarise that about 20% of the people make use of one avoiding measure, almost 25% of two, 13% of three, 10% of four and 5% of five. That means that avoiding measures are favoured in regard to protective measures. That is not so strange as they are natural reactions to more or less dangerous situations, easy and not expensive.

4.3   **Budapest** (by *Tünde Barabás, Ferenc Irk, Robert Kovács*)

4.3.1   General conditions and their explanations

Hungary is situated in the basin surrounded by the Alps, the Carpathian and the Dinari mountains, along important routes passing from north to south and from east to west. Budapest, the capital of Hungary lies in the intersection of these routes. Plains as well as a few mountains of medium height occupy most of the territory. Owing to the geographical location of the country, different weather fronts and impacts prevail, which have considerable medical-meteorological effect on people's general feelings.

At the beginning of the 20th century Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and it entered the 21st century in a process of gradual integration into the European Union, with accession taking place in the middle of the first decade of the new century. During the 20th century, however, it had a more or less isolated existence as a state of one nation, first under right-wing, later left-wing dictatorships. In many respects it took a gradual process for a democratic state based on a market economy and the rule of law to be formed, still, it meant a shockingly radical transformation of the economy and the society, considerable changes in the structure of the society, the loss of markets, unemployment and poverty for huge sections of the society. Perhaps globalisation and individualisation are the notions that characterise the past one and a half decade best.

Market economy and the democratic political system created new conditions in the local public administration. In 1990 municipalities became the most important elements of local public administration and the local system of provisions. While the rights of the local governments received strong legal protection, laws concerning the different sectors that are passed through a simple majority of votes specify their tasks. Most of the financial sources of local governments are also determined in the annual national budget.

The overall picture of Budapest is defined by the Danube, which divides the city into two parts: Pest and Buda. The former is a mainly flat area while the latter is hilly. The urban structure of the Pest side follows the pattern of inner ring roads inherited from the 19th century Budapest was formed in 1873 when the cities of Pest, Buda and Óbuda were merged. The present image of the city was created to a large extent at the time of a construction boom following an economic upswing around the turn of the 19th and the 20th century. The present territory and the administrative structure of the city were essentially established in 1950. The current system of administration was formed in 1990. Now there are 23 district governments as well as the local government of the capital city, which have a horizontal division of labour.

Concerning urban structure *the inner city* and the ring around it, that is, the historic parts of the city give the real character of Budapest. The institutions of central administration and the museums are to be found here together with some residential buildings. *The housing estates* can be found scattered in different places, in larger groups, usually in the outer areas of Pest and Buda. Since the mid-1990s the prices of flats have dropped and now they provide expensive housing (with high heating costs) for a poor, low-income social group. *The industrial belts* are located mainly along the railway lines and certain main roads leading out of the city. After 1990 some of these areas were transformed rapidly and new

commercial services appeared but most of these areas still consist of run-down, contaminated neighbourhoods. *The outskirts* mostly consist of neighbourhoods with detached houses: some rural in character, some modern, while in Buda mainly luxurious houses. In Budapest there are only traces of such characteristic quarters as the Chinatowns of some cities, the Grintzing, the Saint Germaine or the Soho. Quarters that have survived the different, often haphazard tendencies of urban development policies can still be found in a few places and a new tendency of certain activities coming to the same neighbourhoods can be observed. There are streets and neighbourhoods that are being filled with second-hand bookshops, restaurants or cafés "unnoticed".

4.3.2   The locations of the survey

Budapest as the capital of the country and as a city where the most important resources are concentrated, is the place where the intellectual, business and political elite live. In connection with this we should mention that the social inequalities within the capital city are approximately as great as between the regions that are in the best and in the worst situation in the country. The second very important characteristic feature of the demographic situation in the capital city is the decreasing population, and mainly a highly dynamic suburbanisation process, which concerns sections of the population both with a higher and a lower status. The society of the capital city is more complex than that of any other municipality in Hungary from religious, cultural and ethnical aspects as well although the estimates and analyses based on traditional sources of data from statistics or a census do not show this fact adequately. It is clearly the gypsies that constitute the most significant ethnic minority. Their situation is characterised by social and cultural disadvantages and often by rejection on the part of the majority as well. The number of foreign citizens is not too high and we do not know a lot about which parts of Budapest they typically live in. We must note that many of the immigrants are ethnic Hungarians who come from the neighbouring countries and have by now become Hungarian citizens.

In the capital city the elderly people tend to live in the inner parts while the active generation, the families with children prefer living in the outer parts of the city. The younger generations can typically afford a home of their own in the housing estates. The cheapest solution is to have your own house built in the southern – south-eastern areas of Pest, the eastern areas are somewhat more expensive and an average citizen in Budapest cannot afford the sites in the western, hilly areas of the Buda side. One of the chief factors to propel suburbanisation is the relatively low price of sites that are outside the boundaries of the city but are located in a similar environment. Single parents are usually among the people who live in the most difficult circumstances and their proportion is higher in the areas of the city with the lowest prestige (the housing estate at North-Buda, certain parts of Kőbánya and the middle and outer areas of Ferencváros).

For the purposes of the survey we selected two districts of Budapest that have different characteristic features: Ferencváros (the 9th district) and Budafok-Tétény (the 22nd district). They are very different concerning their physical parameters, their location in the city as well as in their criminal statistics and their local crime prevention efforts. Our choice of these two districts was justified by the significant differences that exist beside the

similarities and the different problems and solutions. The 9th district, Ferencváros, is situated on left side of the Danube, with slum-like areas, the inner parts of which are near the extending inner city while the outer parts consist of areas with a mixed residential and industrial function, traditionally of a lower status. A significant portion of the territory of the district is occupied by railway junctions. That is the reason why the density of the population in the district (5,191 people/km^2), although it was above the average in Budapest in 2001 (3,450 people/km^2), is much below the 20-30 thousand people/km^2 in the most densely populated neighbouring districts. The social situation and the role that the 22nd district, Budafok-Tétény, plays in the city are basically different from the situation and the role of the 9th district. In this case we have to do with an outer district, which is isolated and rural to this day. Behind this image of the district, however, there is a highly complex reality, not free of contradictions. In this district, along the Danube there are wide main roads leading out of the city in southern – south-western direction.

The change in the regime brought about a considerable change in the criminal situation of the country. The 1980s were characterised with a moderate rise only. In the period immediately after the change in the regime, there was a sharp rise until 1998. From that year on there has been a decrease in the figures. In the 1990s the number of crimes was the highest in Budapest, practically continuously throughout these years. In the capital city there was a growth in the 1980s already, which was slow but still above the national average. This accelerated in the 1990s and from the middle of the decade on there was stagnation at a level around twice as high as the original. In 2001 there were 6,770 crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants, a figure well ahead of the county that came second on the list with 4,900 crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants. It is also important to note that the outstanding number of crimes in Budapest was committed by a number of perpetrators that was significantly lower than the national average (916 people / 100 thousand inhabitants). Ferencváros (the 9th district) is the less secure of the two districts included in the survey while Budafok-Tétény (the 22nd district) is the more secure. These districts have hardly changed their positions on the list of the Budapest districts between 1981 and 2001. The 9th district had the 5-7th position among the 22-23 districts, while the 22nd district had mostly the 19-22nd position. There were 8,794 crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants in the 9th district and 3,738 crimes in the 22nd district. The figure for perpetrators per 100 thousand inhabitants is 1.5 times higher in Ferencváros (in 2001 1,353 perpetrators were registered per 100 thousand inhabitants), than in the whole of Budapest. In the 22nd district the 967 perpetrators per 100 thousand inhabitants is just above 5% more than the figure for the whole of the city. In the 22nd district the proportion of detection is nearly 50% higher than in the 9th district.

4.3.3   The results of the empirical survey

4.3.3.1   The probability of victimisation

According to criminal statistics, there is a considerable difference between the populations of the two districts concerning their victimisation experiences. In the survey 50% more of the interviewees said they had already been victims of crime in Ferencváros than in Budafok-Tétény. Based on the answers of the inhabitants the most frequent crime in the

22nd district was burglary (40%) followed by a nearly equal percentage of thefts (26%) and car thefts (24%). In the 9th district, however, the most frequent crime was car theft (32%) followed by theft (27%) and burglary (22%). There were also violent crimes in the 9th district (robbery, physical violence, insult) although with a quite low rate of frequency.

Table 3: *Victimisation rates in the Budapest districts*

	9th	22nd	Total
I have been a victim in the past three years	*143* 28,6%	*93* 18,6%	*236* 23,6%
It has not happened to me yet.	*357* 71,4%	*408* 81,4%	*765* 76,4%
Total	500 100,0%	501 100,0%	1001 100,0%

What kind of crime was committed against the victims?

Table 4: *Victimisation experiences in the Budapest districts*

	9th district	22nd district
Burglary	22%	40%
Assault	6%	5%
Car burglary	18%	12,3%
Car theft	32%	23,6%
Theft	27%	26,4%
Robbery	5%	4%
Others	11%	9%

Concerning the frequency of the cases, we found similar proportions in the case of indirect victimisation as in the case of direct victimisation by crimes: a significantly higher number of people said in Ferencváros that somebody became a victim among their acquaintances in the examined period. In the 9th district, when we examined indirect victimisation the neighbours were more often mentioned (56%) than in the 9th district (38%). In Budafok-Tétény the composition of crimes was similar for the two different kinds of victimisation, while in Ferencváros there were some differences. In the 9th district burglary was the most frequent among the crimes experienced by acquaintances (44%) and the proportion of robberies increased (11%) and physical violence was also mentioned by some people (7%).

Table 5: *Rates of indirect victimisation in the Budapest districts*

	9th	22nd	**Total**
There are no people among my acquaintances who have become victims in the last three years	269 53,8%	325 64,9%	594 59,3%
There are people among my acquaintances who have become victims in the last three years	231 46,2%	176 35,1%	407 40,7%
Total	500 100,0%	501 100,0%	1001 100,0%

In the survey we found that the crimes took place usually in the close vicinity of the home of the victims (61%). This means their own home in the case of burglaries but car thefts and such typical crimes as the ones committed by pickpockets and muggers also took place usually in the street where the victim lives.

4.3.3.2 Fear of crime and defensive techniques

It seems that the people in Ferencváros have come to live together with crime in the district; their behaviour is not determined by the fear of becoming a victim of crime although there is a high probability of that. Crime has a smaller impact than what would be seemingly justified on the behaviour of the inhabitants concerning whether they stay at home or go out after dark. In Budafok-Tétény controlled behaviour because of fear of crime was more characteristic of the people interviewed in the survey although this was demonstrated only in the case of a minority. The answers to the questions about personal assessment of risks indicate that the people in Ferencváros are aware of the dangers threatening them. They are more conscious of danger than the people in Budafok-Tétény. This, of course, is related to the fact that those people assess the risks higher whose awareness of danger is stronger, who have already become victims and in whose environment a lot of crimes take place. Besides those "involved" in this way it is the women and the people with a lower level of schooling who think it more probable than the average that they will become victims of crime. The people in Budafok-Tétény tend to prefer active forms of defence (self-defence courses, insurance, security equipment or having a dog) while the people in Ferencváros tend to prefer strategies of avoidance and defence (avoidance of certain places, streets and group, reserved behaviour).[*]

The problems that appear in the local housing environment also influenced the interviewees' general sensitivity to problems, in an inverse proportion. In the 9th district, where local problems cause more concern, where making a living is more difficult and the financial and social situation of the inhabitants is more unfavourable than in the 22nd district and people are less sensitive to the problems of the city and the "world" because they are

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[*] See them in the Appendix.

kept busy by the local cares. The population of the 22nd district, which is in a better situation, is more sensitive to the more distant events, urban and global events because the more peaceful environment makes it possible for them to be more open to more distant issues.

The qualitative survey actually confirmed the results of the quantitative survey. The focus group survey, first of all, made it possible to analyse issues that count as very sensitive in contemporary Hungarian society, such as the connections between the problem examined in the survey and the ethnic identity of the inhabitants. In harmony with this, it turned out clearly that the attitude of the population of two districts is different towards the ethnic minorities and first of all the gypsies among them. Our surveys showed that the level of crime in the districts does not determine directly the forms of behaviour we found in the survey. The population usually gets used to a certain level of crime and lives together with it. In this way it is not the high level of crime but a fast change in a certain level of crime that the population is used to that can cause the most serious problem for a community. This fast change can be the result of the construction of a new shopping centre or the fast integration of an area to the rest of the city owing to the construction of a new road. We can see that people can get used to the high level of crime, which decreases people's general sensitivity to problems and adds to the importance of the problems existing in the municipality or the area. Through this mechanism fear of crime and realistic fear of becoming a victim make the inhabitants more sensitive to the social and ethnic problems in their neighbourhood and the tendencies that have other explanations become related to crime and appear as criminal problems.

4.3.3 Responsibilities in decreasing the fear of crime and the prevention of crime

In Hungary the state and more directly the organisation set up for this special purpose, the police, are responsible for law enforcement and crime prevention. As a consequence of the democratic changes in 1990, local governments are responsible for the local issues, including the security of the local community. Within this framework, although in a slow and contradictory process, the local governments are being given more opportunities, mainly in the area of crime prevention. At the same time, the civil social organisations that were nationalised in 1948-49 are being revitalised.

4.3.3.1 Investigation of crime and crime prevention

The history of efforts in crime prevention in Hungary goes back to the time before the change in the regime. Certain elements of crime prevention appeared in the documents of the 1960s and 70s but these efforts became more determined in the 1980s, as the result of the growing level of crime. It was in 2002 that crime prevention in Hungary came to the point when the idea of a new law on crime prevention appeared in the election promises and the government programme after the elections.

The concept of crime prevention adopted the international terminology, mainly that of the relevant UN documents in the Hungarian academic life, in the professional documents and in the police action programmes. There are three target areas of prevention, which are equally important: the (potential) perpetrator, the criminal situation and the community. There is a view concerning the crime prevention efforts in the local community that has

become stronger in the past few years, namely that it is not enough to prevent crime but it is equally important to decrease fear of crime and to increase the feelings of security among the population. In the present survey we used a more developed model, the van Dijk – de Waard two dimensional crime prevention model. This system of paradigms proved especially useful in categorising crime prevention actions. For example, there was a change that became clearly visible, namely that crime prevention efforts that were concentrated on the perpetrator and the location before the change in the regime are now concentrated on the victim and the location. This change was partly the result of the democratic changes in the political system and the fact that new participants came on the scene of crime prevention. It is also true, however, that dealing with potential victims is given a significant role in the crime prevention activities of the police as well.

4.3.3.2 Certain organisations: competences, capabilities and interests

The police

The fact that the police are mainly an organisation set up for the investigation of crime makes the crime prevention tasks of the police more difficult. The mixture of functions creates a contradictory situation. It is especially true for the period before 1990, when the police also performed a strongly repressive function among the circumstances of an oppressive but "softening" regime. In the first half of the 1990s as a result of it there was a crisis of legitimisation at the police as they were looking for their place among the new circumstances. After the change in the regime the other main problem of the police besides the stigma attached to them was the lack of funding. This is shown by the low level of incomes, the aging equipment and lack of funding for new developments. The situation has been improving concerning both the moral prestige and the financial situation of the police since the second half of the 1990s although the condition of the equipment and the funding for new development continues to be a problem.

The expert cited in the detailed study, Géza Finszter characterised the police as an organisation that is decentralised in their structure but centralised in their decision making procedures. This makes it difficult to promote local interests and to form a local crime prevention policy, which consequently has to be the task of another organisation.

Local governments

The situation of the local governments compared to the situation before 1990 changed perhaps to the smallest extent in connection with public security. Although the local governments were given some responsibility and a limited influence over the police, this is limited to the right to have a hearing of the local police leaders and to the task of supporting the police. The opinions of the interviewees differed on whether a local government police would be necessary in Hungary. The senior leaders of the police clearly refused the idea but there were police leaders in the district who supported it, mainly in the hope of higher incomes. Among the local government officials it was the leaders of the local government of the capital city who supported more definitely the subordination of the police to the local governments. This is exactly the local government unit that could be the potential supervisory organ and the owner of a new organisation of this kind.

The local governments that take their tasks in connection with public security seriously form a public security concept and provide support for the police according to this concept. Most of the local governments that pay attention to the issue of public security at all provide only cars, flats and a certain amount of funds to the police and do not take into serious consideration the interests of the municipality concerning the performance of this task. The installation of cameras supervising public areas financed by the local government and operated by the police is, to some extent, a fashionable form of co-operation between the local governments and the local police forces.

A certain kind of co-operation at an organisational level is becoming natural between the local police and the local government in the cities and there is also a tendency for this co-operation to go beyond the legal requirements in most cases. The local government interests are mainly political, they are in the foreground mostly in connection with the success and the re-election of local politicians. It is definitely an important aspect of the issue for most local governments to "contract out" this task in the framework of certain financial agreements. Some smaller local governments put a lot of energy into creating an independent police station in their municipality. The interests of the police are mainly financial: they would like to receive local funds through the local governments and central or foreign funds (grants) that may not be available for them directly.

As the legal obligations of the local governments to provide public security for the local population are not too heavy, only those local governments go beyond their obligations where public security is a serious problem or where the inhabitants' feelings of security is deteriorating or where there is a person who considers the problem especially important and mobilises energy and resources that otherwise would not be available. Experience shows that this person is very often a former or still active policeman. On the whole, it may result in local government public security policy being subordinated to the organisational interests of the police. It is not the handling of the problem that is in the focus but what the police can do in the interest of it. This means that often more expensive solutions are realised with worse efficiency.

If a local government wants to go beyond the usual instruments and direct co-operation with the police, it possesses other means in the area of crime prevention. At the organisational level these may include supporting the civil organisations or setting up a police patrol unit providing presence in the streets (e.g. public areas supervisors, district guard) or the creation of a position or an office within the mayor's office to co-ordinate crime prevention efforts and to develop a strategy at the local level. Besides these, the local government can organise and support programmes to show the specific public security problem of a social group or a municipality (or some areas of it), the right attitude of the population in concrete cases and the possible attitudes of prevention.

Civil organisations

In the period preceding 1990 there were practically no civil organisations that were independent of the state. There were, however, organisations with civil roots, specialised at certain social groups. Most of these represented the interests of the state and the communist party and had limited autonomy. Their tasks included crime prevention as well but these

tasks mixed with the self-defence reflexes of the establishment in most cases. Mostly the youth organisations had such tasks (e.g. preventing young people from becoming members of street gangs).

The creation of the organisations of the civil sphere started very slowly after 1990. Crime prevention can perhaps be considered an especially important area where self-organising movements appeared faster than on average. Two factors helped to accelerate this process: the self-defence organisations of the local population set up by retired or still active policemen, which were mostly integrated into the civil guard and the movements created by certain international organisations relying on international experience. There was also a third type of organisations, perhaps not so often, when professionals in their own field but outside the area of research took an active part in the legal and/or therapeutic protection of certain victim groups. This process, as far as I know, was not documented and can be reconstructed only from some signs of it.

The role of these civil organisations is important but not crucial. A lot of them receive state or local government support as well. It happens that local crime prevention relies on the activity of the civil guard as a factor in crime prevention.

4.3.4 Special characteristics in Budapest and in the two selected districts

When analysing the crime prevention efforts in Budapest we must not forget that it is the largest city of Hungary, a city that has a dominant influence on the public opinion in the country and on the image of Hungary abroad. We must also take note of the complicated administrative scene characterised by the co-operation and the disturbances in the cooperation of two levels of public administration not subordinated to each other (the local governments) on the one hand and an executive organ directed by the state (the police) on the other.

In the area of crime prevention the situation seems to be simpler than elsewhere. In the case of the police it is the level of the capital city that announces programmes and supervises the activity of the district police forces. The number of police programmes registered at the level of the capital city (77) was 3.5 higher than the number of programmes initiated by the rather active police in Ferencváros, which initiated twice as many programmes as the police in Budafok-Tétény. Besides, the police in Budapest maintain a connection with the local government of the capital city, an active participant and mediator of crime prevention in Budapest at the same time. The capital city has its own crime prevention programme, which has been approved by the Assembly and which is revised from time to time and it is also the owner of the public area supervision authority, which is the largest – and for a long time it was the only – local government owned organisation with a crime prevention function. It has an equally important role by announcing programmes and tenders as well as distributing funds among the organisations that actually perform crime prevention functions, e-g- the district governments.

The local government of Budafok-Tétény deals little with issue of crime prevention. They practically deal with routine tasks only, such as the protection of the neighbourhood around the schools and the shopping centre and patrolling around the housing estate. The local government of Ferencváros, on the other hand, is rather active: it has formed its own

district guard, intends to take over the public area supervision authority patrolling in the district, it has set up a crime prevention firm and has appointed a local government trustee. It has also drawn up its own crime prevention programme and worked out a solution to handle the problems in the parts of the district most infected by crime in a complex way. The level of the districts is clearly an executive level with real independence in the case of the police. Still, there are differences between the two districts. We can see, for example, that the police in Ferencváros initiated 22 programmes, while the police in Budafok-Tétény initiated only 13 programmes. Nevertheless, those involved in it said everywhere that the relationship between the police and the local government was good. Ferencváros was one of the first places in the country where the assembly of the district government did not accept the report of the district police chief because of the lack of cells in the police station and because of its secondary implications. In this concrete case the local government used its limited opportunities to influence the police.

The difference between the two districts is seemingly the result of the difference in the level of crime in the two districts. The different figures, however, clearly show that the high level of crime in the 9th district was decreasing to some extent in the 1990s, while the level of crime in the 22nd district was growing rapidly, although still below the average in the capital city. As a result of this, the difference between the two districts was not so marked concerning the opinion of the inhabitants, the level of fear and the different attitudes. We must also consider the fact that Ferencváros consists of urban neighbourhoods while there are a lot of rural areas in Budafok-Tétény with detached houses. As a consequence, co-operation among the inhabitants is stronger in the 22nd district so it may become the cradle of civil guard organisations to be spread over the capital city or even the whole country. It is also important to note that Ferencváros has to cope with the district's own criminal group, while in Budafok-Tétény the majority of perpetrators come from outside the district. That is why the 9th district regards its rehabilitation project as a kind of crime prevention programme scattering the population of an area where a lot of the criminals live. There is no need for a programme like this in the 22nd district.

The different groups of foreign immigrants usually come from higher status social groups. The number of foreigners is not very high and they have only occasional connections to crime so they do not constitute a factor that would generate fear. It is only in the case of the Chinese people that the idea of larger groups of them having some kind of a connection with crime would be entertained at all. But we have only estimates about their number and they have not appeared in the eyes of the public as perpetrators of outrageous crimes yet. Obviously, the gypsies have the highest proportion among the ethnic minorities of Hungary and in their case it is true that the different kinds of drawbacks have accumulated. Owing partly to these factors the gypsies are often mentioned in connection with different crimes and there are strong prejudices against them. Many of them live in the run-down parts of the 9th district so the crime prevention programs in Ferencváros must pay special attention to their situation. The capital city and the district local governments and the police work together with the gypsy ethnic minority organisations.

If we look at the different types of crime prevention, we can see that there are a high number of general programs among the ones announced by the different organisations and

different levels of organisation in the capital but most of these programs concentrate on the (potential) victims now. There are only a few programs that concentrate on the perpetrators and only at the level of the capital. It can also be seen clearly that the programs that deal with victims are less focused (a lot of them are secondary) than the ones that are situation-oriented, which are usually tertiary programs.

4.3.5 A summary of the experiences of the survey

The change in the regime in Hungary was the result of a process, certain elements of which go back to the middle of the 1960s, and the roots of the present situation can be found in the 1980s and 90s. The collapse of the Kádár regime meant the victory of a democratic and open society and at the same time an end to the security that had existed and an end to "simple" relations. The change in the regime meant a restructuring of the whole economy with new owners, new production and completely new relations. Competition on the international scene and globalisation, which only had an indirect, filtered impact before the change in the regime, now determined the conditions concerning prices, markets and labour directly. This meant unemployment for the population and insecurity in all the areas of employment and life. Towards the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, one and a half decades after the change in the regime, the Hungarian society is still learning what life is like at its accelerated level when foreign speculation against the Hungarian currency brings down the value of it, causing high prices or in other cases raises the value of it so high that jobs are lost.

Insecurity, the accelerated place of life and the proliferation of information all play a significant role in causing and fuelling fear. A lot of people sink into poverty and values that people thought would last forever disappear in a new social and political environment. These factors have caused a very significant rise in the level of crime since the 1980s. The crisis of values meant for many that being unscrupulous was an example to be followed and freedom meant a total disregard for rules. At the beginning of the 1990s even the police were in a crisis of values as an organisation that had served a dictatorship. The experts we interviewed from various fields all attached special importance to the change in human relations and the crisis of values. Nearly half a decade had to pass until the new circumstances slowly consolidated, economic growth started and unemployment started to decrease. Since the second half of the 1990s crime indicators have mostly been stagnating as well.

The capital is in a special situation in every respect. The inhabitants of Budapest were less affected by the difficulties of the change in the regime. At the same time, the level of crime has always been higher here than in other parts of the country. The new relations made the public administration in Budapest rather complicated, forcing co-operation on the participants in a period when co-operation usually ceased between the members of the society and the individuals were left to themselves and did not even find it wrong that an extreme version of individualism ruled after half a century of collectivism. Crime prevention found its place in a local government system that functioned more or less adequately and the roles of the state-owned police and the local governments of the city and the districts were more or less clarified.

In 1990 the victory of a democratic and open society also meant an end to the security and to the "simple" relations that had existed. Competition on the international scene and globalisation, which only had an indirect, filtered impact before the change in the regime, now determined the conditions concerning prices, markets and labour directly. This meant unemployment for the population and insecurity in all the areas of employment and life. Towards the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, one and a half decades after the change in the regime, the Hungarian society is still learning what life is like at its accelerated level when foreign speculation against the Hungarian currency brings down the value of it, causing high prices or in other cases raises the value of it so high that jobs are lost. Concerning fear, insecurity, the accelerated pace of life and the proliferation of information all play a significant role in causing and fuelling it. A lot of people sank into poverty and values that people thought would last forever disappeared in a new social and political environment. These factors have caused a very significant rise in the level of crime since the 1980s. The crisis of values meant for many that being unscrupulous was an example to be followed and freedom meant a total disregard for rules. Nearly half a decade had to pass until the new circumstances slowly consolidated, economic growth started and unemployment started to decrease. Since the second half of the 1990s crime indicators have mostly been stagnating as well.

In the new environment with its many participants crime prevention and the need to reduce fear of crime delegates tasks to the state, the local governments and the civil society as well. The state appears on the scene as a sponsor providing funds and as the owner of the police, the most important organisation of investigating and preventing crimes. The local governments, a new kind of institutions after the change in the regime, are looking for their places in the area of crime prevention and the reducing of fear. They can find their place partly in co-operation with the state-owned police, partly through developing their own instruments. Many times, however, they only shake off their ambiguously phrased legal responsibilities. The civil society is just waking up after half a century of sleep. It is slowly recovering and most people still prefer the idea of a state that pays attention to everything and to everybody. The change in the regime brought about a radical change in crime prevention as the victims came into the centre of attention rather than the perpetrators. The characteristic features of the more democratic new system, which has more participants and tends to view citizens as less suspicious, explain this tendency to some extent.

Appendix (**Budapest**)

Table 6: *Personal risk assessment (Budapest)*

In your opinion how likely it is that you will become the victim of the following crimes involving injuries or damage?	Rate of probability	
	9th district	22nd district
Burglary and theft from your car	3,72	3,26
Burglary in your home	2,98	2,96
Attack by a dog involving injury	2,76	2,70
Road accident (involved as a pedestrian or a cyclist)	2,68	2,48
Robbery in the street (not involving aggression)	2,79	2,39
Mugging	2,46	2,12
Harassment	2,20	1,75
Assault and battery	2,15	1,73
Different kinds of sexual molestation	1,86	1,62
Rape	1,63	1,49

Table 7: *How often do you leave your flat after dark? (Budapest)*

	9th District	22nd District	Total
Almost Never	95 19,0%	82 16,4%	177 17,7%
Rarely (more than once a month)	92 18,4%	101 20,2%	193 19,3%
Occasionally	95 19,0%	122 24,4%	217 21,7%
More often (at least once a week)	217 43,4%	196 39,1%	413 41,3%
999 (No answer)	1 0,2%	-	1 0,1%
Total	**500**	**501**	**1001**

4.4.   **Hamburg** (by *Ingrid Breckner*)

4.4.1   Hamburg city subcultures as spatial context of insecurities

The city of Hamburg provides a great deal as a research object on the theme of insecurity: As a port it is a platform of constant encounters between the familiar and the alien in the most manifold forms as well as structural and process contexts that are forever varying.

Several immigration and emigration movements in the 20th century had a formative influence on the city's population development. These - along with wars and other factors of demographic influence - are responsible for the quantitative fluctuations in the population of the city, its distribution in various city districts and the more or less individualised cultures of urban practices (see: de Certeau 1988, p. 179 ff.). The latter were formed in a continuous reciprocal effect of the familiar and the alien as well as the compelling need for the recognisable self-presentation of individuals and groups of persons and is reflected in the structure of the housing stock among other things: The type of building and the form of settlement create sensibility for:

- wealth in villa areas,
- expressions of middle-class-avant-garde in the traditional housing stock of 'Gründerzeit',
- ethnic segregation in not modernised buildings or older council flats with lots of satellite dishes and the unusual use of free spaces and balconies and finally
- living spaces of war refugees and "ordinary people" in large estates and simple detached house settlements out on the outskirts.

Hamburg's political culture is traditionally characterised by a hanseaticly practical, matter-of-fact openness. Even in times characterised by ideology or dictatorship this was necessary so as to remain economically capable to act. A social democratic government in office furthermore promoted sensitivity and perceptiveness for the respective other position. At the beginning of the 21st century, the declining power of Hamburg's Social Democrats to be a socially formative force led to a change of government, which has continued up to the present (2004). The Christian Democratic government has meanwhile made its mark above all on social, cultural, educational, housing and security policy: The welfare state is being drastically cut back in favour of investments orientated towards business. Urban conflicts are met with repression rather than prevention by the conservative government. We have to wait and see as to how far the democratic-liberal tradition of this city is sustaining irreparable damage. It is now already striking that even in the comparatively rich region of Hamburg there is a climate of anxiety and unease attributable to uncertain future prospects reaching up to the upper middle classes as well as unsolved urban problems, town planning policies going wrong and then covered-up. It is then very difficult under such conditions for courageous and constructive political commitment to develop.

In Hamburg, as in comparable cities, the social, economic and political dynamism of development is constantly regenerating a climate of change in which crime, and fear of it, can flourish and at the same time the potential for overcoming it. Large cities are not fixed formations easy to comprehend and keep track of, but are ever surprising. The many and

varied people who live here inevitably have both good and bad experiences of structural change making them more, or less competent as city dwellers. Of course not all people perceive developments in the city in the same way. They think and act in various economic and socio-cultural frameworks with various generational, biographical and sex-specific life experience. Differentiated normative and moral judgements on urban and social reality result from this, and these give a slant to everyday and political dealings with the city outside of traditions of acting leading to surprises in everyday city life.

Against the background of the summarised urban character of Hamburg (see more detailed part B of the "Local Report"), in our research project we are interested in people's experiences of insecurity in the various spaces of the city as well as their cultures of coping with the corresponding realities. We enquired about the things being connected or independent of each other in the conflicting area of insecurity and crime as well as about the qualities of the insecurities that can be expressed in the form of seen as a nuisance, fears, (of being affected by crime in future, among other things), anxieties and / or protective and avoidance behaviour.

In doing so, the "spatial turn" in social sciences was followed (see *Löw* 2002 and *Keim* 2003), which tries to investigate social phenomena in their spatial and temporal contextualisation. This means we were not just interested in whether someone or a certain group in the city is insecure, but also where, when and for how long this state arises and for what reasons and also what preventive measures are implemented, or would be desirable in this area of operation with what results. On the supposition that insecurity does not only come about from conditions in the close vicinity of the living area in the district or just in the present, global and entire city changes as well as experiences of the past and the prospects for the future were incorporated into the research. The connection between the researched city population's experiences of insecurity in their own time and space and the discussion in the media on this topic could not, unfortunately, be researched as planned since the grant at our disposal did not suffice for this.

4.4.2   The research areas

The empirical surveys were carried out for reasons of comparability in large European cities. With limited means a selection of urban partial spaces was necessary (two per city). In the view of the European sponsor they should concentrate on urban problem areas. In the EU Science Administration these were understood to be districts with a high proportion of poor people and such persons with a migrant background, difficult building development structures (e.g. large estates) or a restricted spatial and social mobility. With a view to comparability of the numbers, the guideline value was seen to be about 30,000 inhabitants per district (60,000 per city).

In Hamburg after carefully studying the available data, interviews with experts and random sample analysis of media discourses on (in-) security, the districts of Wilhelmsburg and Steilshoop / Bramfeld were selected for the empirical research.

The research district *Wilhelmsburg,* at the heart of the city region, is characterised by a persistently difficult economic situation which makes the access of the low-qualified in particular to the labour market difficult. The proportion dependent on state transfer benefit

payments (supplementary benefit, unemployment benefit or housing allowance) is correspondingly high. If we look at young inhabitants prospects for a change to this situation, we have to observe that many young people in Wilhelmsburg already fail in their school education - even in the secondary modern, of all schools, more than half the leavers each year have not even passed the exams of this level. The concentration of people of migrant background in Wilhelmsburg is in part an explanation for this in so far as there are still considerable gaps in the language integration of immigrants. Poorer people moving into the district and the exodus of the middle classes most probably reinforce the social segregation to be seen in the data anyway. Thus the political change from long-standing, stable voting for social democracy to protest votes for parties on the right of the political spectrum or increasingly abstaining could be explained by a further growing and so dominant, ethnically mixed "urban underclass" in Wilhelmsburg. The geographically central position of this research area goes with a marginal position in the economic, political and socio-cultural respect endowing the district the character of a largely unknown, stigmatised periphery at the heart of the city region.

The research area *Steilshoop / Bramfeld* is geographically on the periphery along an axis running north east and it is without a rail connection to the city centre. The structures of large estates built in the 1960s with a high proportion of council flats are mixed here with detached house residential areas of poorer and richer social strata. In the past the population of this research area, which is rather more on the younger side, formed small-scale localised quarter identities clearly differentiated themselves from each other even within the large estate. People from the Arab world live in certain parts of the estate, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe in another. The individual groups have actively created the necessary infrastructure here.

 Ethnic segregation together with commitment to the district and maintaining socio-cultural networks assist them in integrating into the city society. This also became apparent in the research, according to which this research area shows lower rates of insecurity and fear than Wilhelmsburg.

The crime burden (offences per 100,000 population) for Steilshoop / Bramfeld is below the city average, for Wilhelmsburg above it. Four years previously in Wilhelmsburg it was below the Hamburg level. This discrepancy, or rather development has to do with a change in police strategy from prevention to repression of drug dealing around Hamburg central station. It is significant for the security level of this district that the crime is not surpressed, merely forced out, ending up in Wilhelmsburg among other places. In both districts crime and fear of crime are treated preventively in co-operation between state organisations and organisations of civil society.

4.4.3   Empirical findings

4.4.3.1   Quantitative findings

The findings in Wilhelmsburg at the *micro- spatial level* show a greater prevalence of insecurities than in Steilshoop / Bramfeld. In both districts the reasons for feeling insecure subsumed under the item "incivilities" (noise, vandalism, graffiti, rubbish on the street, youths hanging around) are significantly more pronounced than insecurities from

"structural defects" or "violence" against women and children, domestically or in public space. In Wilhelmsburg the insecurities can clearly be differentiated along ethnic lines (simplified differentiation according to Germans and migrants). Whilst German respondents are by far made most uneasy by "incivilities" in the social sense (especially older people), for migrants this is joined by physical disorder, meaning "structural decay". This could result from migrants in Wilhelmsburg living in considerably worse building substance and structural surroundings than Germans. Insecurities from harassment in public space attain just about the same values for Germans and migrants. One of the more essential results is that incivility, that is different manifestations of social disorder (focused for measuring purposes), is connected to fear of crime: In Steilshoop / Bramfeld and Wilhelmsburg to fear of muggings in the evenings or other possible damage (so almost always staying at home), in Steilshoop / Bramfeld moreover with people taking measures to protect themselves against crime.

In both research areas the preparedness of respondents to co-operate in overcoming the districts problems and high expectations regarding *social* solutions to problems were striking. Calls for strategies of control and repression on the other hand achieved low values. In Steilshoop / Bramfeld 78 % stated they could rely on the police in the district, whereas in Wilhelmsburg at just under 72 % the respondents were slightly more sceptical. For the question about trust in the "institution police" the two Hamburg districts attained at 64%, respectively 61% the highest results in international comparison along with Leopoltstadt (Vienna). Only medical provision at 75 % attained a higher score in Hamburg than trust in the police. It just remains to point out the marked connection (only in Wilhelmsburg) that the multi-path analysis shows between xenophobic attitudes, risk perception and protective and avoidance behaviour of respondents.

Xenophobia here goes along with low schooling and is concentrated on the Turkish population, which is dominant among the migrant population of Wilhelmsburg. The same applies for the Amsterdam district of Baarsjes by the way, in which Moroccans and black Africans live besides many Turks.

This connection, which neither we had expected, complemented by the connection between "incivility" and fear and fear avoidance (see above), can be seen as evidence for one of our central initial thesis - that fear of crime is considerably fed by non-criminal factors. It belongs to a general insecurity gaining a grip on ever more areas of life.

A look at the results of the quantitative research at the *meso-spatial level* of the city as a whole shows that insecurity from crime attains higher levels in both districts than for the overall city.

In international comparison Hamburg unease about crime is at about the Amsterdam level, lower than in the research districts in Budapest or Kraków, and considerably higher than Vienna's crime unease value, which is the lowest. If the registered crime burden values are compared, it is noticeable that Amsterdam and Hamburg face a comparably high level of crime, whereas in Kraków, Budapest and Vienna only about half the number of cases are registered. The low crime burden creates about twice as much unease in the two eastern

European large cities as it does in Vienna, which probably has to do with the insecurity in these two cities coming from the transformation process of the last 15 years.

At the *macro-spatial or global level* Hamburg respondents are made to feel insecure by the dangers of terrorism, unemployment or environmental destruction, whereby it remains unclear as to how much this finding is tinged by discussions in the media, political propaganda or their own experience of such social realities.

4.3.2   *Qualitative findings*

Among other things, the qualitative interviews served to deepen the quantitative research results by giving the standardised survey factual and spatial contexts and explanations. For this reason, the sample for the qualitative study was drawn from the quantitatively questioned random sample with attention paid to it being representative of the population groups and spatial contexts promising to enhance the explanatory content of the previous research results.

For Wilhelmsburg the finding of a connection between the various manifestations of the "alien" and prevailing insecurities at the district level was also confirmed in the qualitative research. Here it becomes clear that xenophobia is always strongly developed then if personal experiences of the different tend to be tainted by conflict - be these of migrants, youths, other spatial contexts or other cultures. Positive experiences such as in the form of "good neighbourliness" appear then only as exceptions.

Since the qualitative findings in principle point to a connection between insecurities and group- specific use of space, they were evaluated and interpreted milieu specifically. Here five district milieus could be discerned in Wilhelmsburg:

The "*old, established worker milieu*" is made to feel insecure by the accelerating speed of changes and movements in the space as well as "disorder". Security is produced by family ties, activities in clubs and religious communities.

The Turkish population of Wilhelmsburg can be subdivided into an "assimilated" and "religious" milieu. *Assimilated* Turks are made to feel insecure by (for them) aliens on the street ("blacks", "Kurds", young people recently moved in) and their "life between the cultures". They look for security in the family, familiar people as well as religion. In the *religiously tied Turkish milieu* the traditionally passed down value orientations of the society of origin - due to the strict religious practices and being exclusively embedded in their faith community - remain dominant as security strategies.

The ethnic differentiation reflected in the milieu construction and therefore dominant for our theme also produce different neighbourhood relationships. Germans maintain relationships to neighbours that tend to be relaxed and non - committal, whilst respondents of Turkish origin cast their neighbourhood networks wider with a high degree of commitment over generations.

Notwithstanding all the differences the respondents overwhelmingly felt good in their district. Here the quantity and quality of green areas turns out to be a highly valued good. Insecurity on the one hand, arises there where due to predominant use by youths, drunks

and dog owners its use is limited. This is above all of particular importance for working people who are restricted to and dependent on certain times. Some work shifts and therefore have to be out and about in public in the district very early in the morning and very late in the evening. So therefore they are faced with darkness most of the year on their unavoidable ways, which, it is known, exacerbates insecurity from dark, confused situations. Conflicts about the use of green areas escalate accordingly. For their part, elderly people who no longer work feel they cannot cope with insecure paths and wish for spaces in which they can stay free of fear.

4.4.3.3   Findings on prevention

The research on crime prevention policy in Hamburg aims at casting light on the criminological context of insecurities. Taking an historical analysis of the structures of crime prevention in Germany and the specific Hamburg context, prevention projects of civil society and the Hamburg police are presented and discussed.

In the two Hamburg research areas police prevention work is concentrated on the deployment of an accessible "bobby" officer. They are the contact for the inhabitants in all conflict situations in which the police can involve their competence. Among other things they should watch factors that promote insecurity, discuss these with the inhabitants and pass this on to the responsible institutions of the city as the case may be. In the area of civil society a special role falls on the schools here, which, together with family centres, youth clubs and housing managers should reduce insecurities arising from youths in public places – without, however being equipped with adequate staff or material resources for this. For almost every school there is a policeman who is a permanent contact for conflicts and to whom offences are reported and he takes charges.

Drug consumption and dealing present a particular problem area in the prevention context. In this area due to repressive measures a geographical displacement of the activity out of the centre of the city to other places is becoming apparent, among them Wilhelmsburg (or spaces inside such as hotels, asylum-seeker hostels, city transit railway stations). With this an even more complex crime-related and socio-spatial bundle of problems then come about, for which no adequate resources are deployed to deal with them.

The heavy instrumentalisation of security problems for political purposes in the recent past has promoted low-cost actionism in Hamburg prevention policy and pushed the necessary conceptual work and reflection off the agenda. There is just as much a scarcity of long-term concepts considering the complex, multi-variable interplay in the area of action of public security as there is a systematic evaluation of short-term practise. It seems hardly anything is evaluated, virtually none of it documented and certainly hardly anything published. This way interior policy leaves the field of interpretation of (in)securities to the media, which for their part are more interested in raising circulation figures with "bad news" and less in complicated realities. With this the inhabitants of the researched Hamburg districts are lacking a support for reflection on their everyday experiences of (in)security in urban space. Above all in the empirical prevention relevant findings of the qualitative study show a comparatively realistic view of the people on their insecurities, which become all the more hazy and vague the less concrete experience they have of the things they should judge. For

this reason fear of crime at the level of the city as a whole and the global level seem considerably more pronounced than at the level of the district, in which people live. The question remains as to how strongly this finding is formed by the discourse in politics and the media.

4.4.4   *Conclusions from the Hamburg findings for various areas of action in society*

The fact that the Hamburg results show if anything the greatest parallels to those of Amsterdam, clearly demonstrates the necessity of taking into account the specific character of a large city when perceiving and explaining urban (in)securities. In this question ports obviously "tick" differently to inland metropolitan areas having a specific history and structure, or eastern European large cities with their respective special experience of transformation. At the level of the districts too, the "genius loci" plays a role in the perception of and dealing with the respectively specially structured feelings of insecurity, as becomes apparent in all large European cities.

According to Hamburg findings, the role of discourse in the media is evident and requires special analytical attention. It presents itself, as a first step, to take core results from the InSec project in total and integrate these into the training of journalists so as to make them more sensitive for the theme complex so as to (try to) preclude empirically unverified phenomena of insecurity being scandalised in the media. Here a central objective of passing on our scientific findings should be making it clear that, if anything, then reporting close to reality opens a realistic and reflected access to a complex problem to the city inhabitants, being then able to mobilise their potential to co-operate appropriately in overcoming the problems.

The path analyses on quantitatively researched insecurity in the Hamburg areas studied show that problems of the city as a whole are only perceived as such with difficulty by the respondents. Social problems in the district are at the fore in perception, but can hardly be adequately analysed with respect to their structural causes. Reflective and discourse supports are needed for this, that contribute to the problem of insecurity not growing into an area of projection for radical and undemocratic political orientations. Otherwise problems in connection with unemployment and alienation become interwoven with those of insecurity merely because the population thinks they can win the public's ear this way. Solutions then ensue at best in the field of security policy without touching on the difficult social problems that can trigger feelings of insecurity. The results of such strategies of action turn out correspondingly unsatisfactory because the relevant problems are left aside.

The perception and processing of insecurity in Hamburg show substantial cultural differences.

Migrants have apparently learnt to cope with the life conditions strange to them in the society they have immigrated into. Her they avail themselves of their culturally familiar resources of the family, neighbours and religion and in so doing they alienate their native fellow citizens, who do not want to or cannot have anything to do with alien worlds. Perhaps even conflicts of envy arise between Germans and migrants in the districts, because the latter have better mutual self-help from more effective networks. These findings clearly show that measures for integrating immigrants – from language acquisition

through promoting school education and vocational training to the organisation of sustainable relations to the German population – ought to be an essential aspect of security policy.

Common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge about how insecurity issues made up in European large cities should play a central role in security policy both in Hamburg and elsewhere. It is about collating the rich experience and cultures of knowledge regarding urban (in)securities with the intention of understanding them so as to be able to realise effective crime preventive action. That the police alone cannot be responsible for this, as expectations continue to suggest, goes without saying. Rather it is about finding out all the protagonists in the sphere of societal action, who, aware of it or not, influence security in urban spaces, so as to encourage, empower and enable them to act in co-operation beyond envy and competition.

4.5 **Kraków** (by *Janina Czapska*, *Krzysztof Krajewski* and *Anna Jurczak*)

Kraków is doubtless no typical or average Polish city. As the countries capital, with rich history and tradition ,it constitutes an important element of Polish national tradition. One of the most important features of the city is the evolutionary character of its development, without major catastrophes or disasters, something not to be taken for granted for many other Polish cities. Because of this Kraków may belong to those Polish cities with the greatest stability and continuity of development. This is with regard not only to developments of urban structure and substance which have accumulated over the centuries, but also the social history of the city. It is also one of those Polish cities with the strongest bourgeois traditions, which prevailed decisively over any other type of tradition, including the proletarian one. Combined with the special character of the city as one of the most important cultural and educational centres Poland's all this resulted in a very special character, atmosphere and flair of the city.

This does not mean that contemporary Kraków is an "unproblematic" city. Developments since the end of the World War Two, which left city practically untouched, constituted probably one of the most traumatic periods in city's urban and social history. Construction of the Nowa Huta steel mill, enormous migration from rural areas, and development of large working class groups, changed the city's character and social structure significantly. Although Kraków never lost its character as a cultural and educational centre, it became also an important industrial centre. The creation of the originally satellite city of Nowa Huta, which over the years amalgamated with historical Kraków, resulted in an enormous population growth, and rapid territorial expansion of the city. Kraków changed from a middle sized city to a modern metropolis. This put also enormous strain on the city's infrastructure in every respect, results of which may be observed till today. This regards first of all public transportation and road system. The shortcomings of the last one became especially visible during the 1990s with exploding car numbers resulting in almost permanent traffic congestions. Nowa Huta caused also severe environmental problems, although they subsided somewhat after 1990 as a result of cuts in industrial production and some investments in environmental protection. In sum Kraków, while offering an enormous amount of attractions for anyone living there or visiting the city, does not belong

necessarily to Polish cities with the highest living quality. For example in the recent ranking by the prestigious weekly "Polityka", it took place ten, and was preceded by such cities like Poznań or Wrocław, and even Warsaw (although criteria of this ranking were very complex).

Kraków in general belongs no doubt to those big cities in Poland which adjusted relatively well to the new realities of market economy. Because of the Nowa Huta steel mill, which used to be the biggest employer in the city, and few other industrial facilities established by the communist regime it constituted as a matter of fact a perfect candidate for the city in enormous trouble due to profound structural problems, like de-industrialisation and unemployment resulting from the transformation processes. Although such problems appeared in the city after 1990 they did not completely overshadow the city's development, what was the case in some other industrial centres like for instance Łódź or Silesian cities. Despite the necessary closing of industrial facilities, reduction of their capacities, and following redundancies Kraków managed to adjust to the new realities relatively well and to maintain an unemployment level well below the national average for Poland. This was mainly due to the technological and educational potential of the city, which was able to attract some foreign investors, and to create alternative employment possibilities for many people. This was also because the city became one of the most important tourist attractions of Poland and tourist industry constitutes one of the most dynamic economy branches in the city.

For several years during the 1990s, Kraków belonged to those Polish big cities with a relatively low level of recorded crime. It scored in that respect much better not only than Warsaw – notorious for high crime rates – but also such cities as Szczecin, Łódź, Katowice or Wrocław. This situation did not last long however. At the end of the 1990s crime rates started to grow in a more rapid way, and Kraków started to catch up with other Polish big cities. This regarded also serious changes in patterns of registered juvenile delinquency, which became – like crime in general – of a more violent and serious character. In consequence in the year 2002 there were only three Polish cities with crime rates higher than Kraków, namely Gdańsk, Poznań and Katowice. Even Warsaw had in that year a lower rate of recorded offences (not including the potential grey area, of course).

What does all that means in terms of "objective" conditions for possible fears, insecurities etc.? On the one hand it may be justly claimed that there are real grounds for serious concern. Certainly, as compared with the situation before the year 1990 various changes to the worse took place. For many people insecurity about their current situation and prospects for the future became a very important concern. The city started to experience several problems unknown earlier, like more serious forms of crime, football violence, various kinds of violent protests and clashes, problem drug use and changed patterns of alcohol abuse. All this, no doubt, may constitute a very good breeding soil for fear of crime, and other concerns. On the other hand, from the perspective of the 1990s Kraków has been no doubt one of contemporary Poland's success stories in economic, social and even political terms. From this point of view the city is still a very attractive place to live, as it offers not only relatively good employment possibilities, but also many attractions decisive for the living standards being quite high by Polish standards. Against this background crime

problem in the city has to be seen in a proper manner, as a phenomenon having no decisive influence on the life in the city. In this respect Kraków constitutes most probably an average European city, neither perfectly safe, nor extremely dangerous. It has its specific problems, but they are not of extraordinary character. This opinion was borne out by the results of the victimisation part of the InSec quantitative survey. It shows that victimisation prevalence in Kraków with offences included in the InSec questionnaire was usually quite comparable with the other four cities, and there was nothing extraordinary about victimisation patterns in the city.

Quantitative survey in Kraków was conducted on a random sample drawn from the population of three administrative districts of the city, namely Kazimierz, Grzegórzki and Nowy Bieżanów. The districts of Kazimierz and Grzegórzki Zachód (West) which border on each other were combined to form together the first of the research areas. The gender, and age structure of the sample was very close to the average for Kraków.

Satisfaction of respondents with the fact of living either in Kazimierz/Grzegórzki or in Nowy Bieżanów was rather very high. High satisfaction with living in the quarter does not correspond always with positive evaluation of the quarter itself. Approximately ¼ of inhabitants of both research areas are not satisfied with the safety situation in their surroundings, but at the same time $^1/_3$ of them in both research areas considered them to be safe or rather safe. Factor analysis performed on variables building up evaluation of respondents living area produced two factors. The first one consists of the perception of its safety as well as its disturbing or calm character, whereas the second one consists of its familiar and inviting character.

In most cases the feeling of well being among the inhabitants of both research areas in Kraków was pretty high. The index included responses to questions regarding public transportation, rents, shopping opportunities, possibilities of going out at night as well as opportunities for sport and leisure time activities. It correlates in a negative way with anxieties on all levels (i.e. from global, through the city to the district level). This may be interpreted as proof of the complex and unified perceptions of these problems, or interrelations between the crime-related opinions and those of the general character.

The picture emerging from answers to the questions regarding contacts with neighbours, which measured in a rough manner social cohesion in both districts is of mixed character. The decisive minority of respondents have no contacts with their neighbours (more in the old part of the city), but this relationship does not have a very intensive character. Despite the passing or superficial character of contacts, about $^4/_5$ of respondents were of the opinion that in difficult situations they can rely on their neighbours' help. The most prevalent form of participation in neighbourhood life was watching or guarding neighbours apartments. The lowest indicator of social cohesion in both research areas regarded such forms of participation like involvement in activities of associations, clubs and similar organisations existing in them, as the overwhelming majority does not take part in such type of activities, and even do not attend meetings or events organised by such organisations. This means that Kazimierz/Grzegórzki and Nowy Bieżanów are characterised by a pretty low intensity of social participation and a rather passive patterns of leisure time activities. Respondents have rather optimistic opinion about their personal resources. Inhabitants of

Kazimierz/Grzegórzki and Nowy Bieżanów are also not very pessimistic about condition of the world and its future. Persons who think that their lives take place according to their plans and wishes constitute a large group and most inhabitants of both research areas have fairly high assessment of their coping capabilities.

Approximately $^1/_3$ of all respondents in both research areas were direct victims of various offences during the three years preceding the interview. The main methods of coping with eventual risks and dangers of victimisation among the inhabitants of both research areas are various passive forms of protective behaviour. The most prevalent forms of protective behaviour constitute avoiding certain groups of people (like teenagers, drunks, beggars or drug addicts), and avoiding certain places or streets.

Respondents were most concerned about global and city level problems and threats. A similar level of concern, though less intense, was established as far as threats at the district level are concerned, as well as personal victimisation. As proven by other research results, the current project also confirmed that fears and anxieties increase with the physical and social distance between respondent and threats. In respondents' perception various threats and concerns of a social nature are dominant. Among all concerns and anxieties the mass unemployment was most frequently indicated as a phenomenon resulting in both, global fears and concerns regarding the city level.

Correspondence analysis shows that the concern with the global problems factor is correlated with general concerns at the city level, crime-related concerns at the city level, threat of violence in the quarter, concern with street level threats in the quarter, concern with condition of the quarter, personal estimation of the risk of a physical attack and passive protective strategies.

The hierarchy of social problems in both research areas is different. Five most problematic phenomena for inhabitants of Kazimierz/Grzegórzki are as follows: drunks on the streets, insufficient police presence on the streets, groups of teenagers hanging around, rubbish or litter on the streets, vandalism, demolished or ruined buildings. In Nowy Bieżanów most reasons for concerns give following problems: insufficient police presence, groups of teenagers hanging around, insufficient leisure time facilities, vandalism, drunks on the streets. As a means of solving problems of their quarters respondents most often proposed to grant more powers to the police and municipal guards, and to improve their efficiency. However, it is necessary to underline that most significant correlations were found between each kind of threat and postulates to improve quarter's infrastructure.

Even if opinions and postulates relating to the quarters are coherent and consistent, they are not independent from the perceptions of the general problems of the city. The most significant correlation was found between opinions about the quarter, perceptions of criminal risk (correlated with individual problems, such as risk of physical victimisation, and passive protective strategies), perceptions of all types of threats in the district and the level of global anxieties. Evaluation of global threats and problems was correlated with personal risk of victimisation, passive protective strategies and opinions about threats in the quarter. This result may support the hypothesis about the existence of generalised fears,

which influence respondents` opinions regarding individual level, the level of the district, of the city as well as global one.

The qualitative part of the research brought quite a bit more detailed information about how inhabitants perceive security in the quarters. Even if only a few narratives about major offences against property appeared, many respondents did mention diverse events that contribute to their feeling of unsafety such as juvenile groups, verbal aggression, and the presence of drunks. Those social problems and minor offences reported by the interviewees are mostly perceived as disturbing and creating a feeling of uncertainty and danger. Another element to be noted is the influence of the media, which appears throughout the research. It is most significant with regard to opinions concerning the quarter, when phrases repeatedly appeared referring to media coverage of events ("as they told on TV", "they say [on the TV, radio] that this quarter is one of the most dangerous" etc). A few narratives from Nowy Bieżanów were built around the murder of a young woman. But they contained rather what people "have heard from the neighbours" than information coming from direct experience, being a witness or similar. This proves that opinions of the interviewees are on the one hand, strongly modified by the influences coming from the macrosocial level, and on the other hand, by the relationships on the microsocial level.

It seems that social problems such as alcoholism (presence of drunks), juvenile delinquency and various forms of verbal aggression/harassment are perceived as most troubling. Any measures taken by the authorities in order to solve them might help to improve the feeling of security among the inhabitants if the city. Media (and city authorities, as well as the police and municipal guards) are playing a crucial role in creating the social image of the quarter. By presenting only negative aspects they confirm for the inhabitants the conviction that the quarter they live in is actually dangerous (even if the inhabitants themselves do not express such an opinion). Inhabitants seem also to feel decisively more secure if they just see more police and municipal guards in the streets. But they would rather welcome some more spectacular actions than just regular patrols. Otherwise, they find both the police and municipal guards to be inefficient.

The most significant influence on the development of the crime prevention structures and strategies in Kraków was exerted by general developments of crime prevention structures in Poland. This is the result of the centralised character of police structures in the country. Additionally evolution of the legal basis of prevention structures, mainly defined in such documents as the Territorial Administration Act, the Police Act and the Municipal Police Act. However, it seems also that Kraków constitutes to a certain extent at least a special case in Poland, as municipal authorities here seem to be more interested in public safety issues than it is the case in other Polish cities. This encouraged and inspired the City Council to adopt in 1999 a special and complex preventive programme "Safe Kraków". Since that time it is considered to be of a model character and is used as such in many other Polish cities. Finally it has to be mentioned that co-operation with numerous foreign and international institutions played also a significant role and contributed to the development of various preventive strategies in the city.

The main goal of the "Safe Kraków" programme was to organise and to co-ordinate activities of different actors, related to security matters, as well as integrate and support all

the preventive projects in the city. The programme establishes partnership and co-operation between the City Council, local councils in the quarters, the police, the municipal guards, the fire department, housing co-operatives, local communities, non-governmental organisations, schools, parishes, insurance companies, private security agencies and the media.

Goals, enumerated in the programme, were: preventive and educational actions, winning support of the inhabitants for the security projects to be implemented, as well as increasing efficiency of repressive actions, aimed at limiting or eliminating most problematic threats. Preventive actions in Kraków are mainly addressed to children and teenagers, especially as far as the primary prevention is concerned.

"Safe Kraków" programme has no time. It also has a flexible structure and open character, what means that it evolves constantly. The fact that it is divided into many sub-programmes allows namely for the structure to be supplemented constantly with new programmes, concepts and ideas. This requires only the City Council's decision, without unnecessary bureaucracy. Unfortunately, so far none of the programmes, which have been implemented within the framework of the "Safe Kraków" initiative has been evaluated in a systematic way. In fact no reliable information and facts about programme's implementation are available. No independent and competent structure even exists empowered to provide such information, as no programme board or similar body was appointed (although its creation was stipulated within the "Safe Kraków" programme). In this context the development of the crime prevention in Kraków is determined primarily by the municipal bureaucracy, by diffuse initiatives of different institutions and by spontaneous initiatives of other actors.

It is necessary to underline that so far crime control policies and programs on the local level in Poland in general, and in Kraków in particular, were mostly of a somewhat purely intuitive character, and only very seldom were in any way evidence based. A few factors contributed to this. First, researchers in criminology were often not used to a type of research design with practical relevance. Second, law enforcement, criminal justice agencies and politicians felt no need to base their decisions on the results of empirical research. As a matter of fact, this tendency, especially for politicians to become experts and to substitute real experts has been growing in Poland in recent years. Third, what may be of particular importance, there was usually no criminological research done on the local level, paying attention to local problems, local specificity, and local needs. This certainly influenced in a negative way the development of local crime control and crime prevention strategies. It is very important to realise that InSec project constitutes one of the first broader research projects on the local level in Poland and in Kraków. Because of this it may and should be expect that this project and its results will bring a new dimension to crime prevention strategies in Kraków and maybe in Poland. In consequence these programs may become of a less bureaucratic and political character, and more evidence based.

4.6   **Vienna** (by *Gerhard Hanak*, *Wolfgang Stangl* and *Inge Karazman-Morawetz*)

4.6.1 Contexts and meanings of "insecurity": The quantitative approach

Apart from the relatively low level of insecurities and crime-related fears the quantitative survey shows a remarkable result that runs counter to other research findings, and is related to social characteristics of local perceptions of insecurity. Except for gender, which displays differences in perceived safety of the quarter in two of the four research sites, for all four research sites[3] no significant differences are attested for social characteristics like age[4], employment status or occupation, on the level of bivariate analysis. Similarly, also the indicators of socio-economic status like per capita income or per capita living space do not yield any significant differentiation with respect to perceived safety. However, in the Transdanubian (suburban) research site, the educated inhabitants (qualified for university entrance) tend to feel more insecure. On the Rennbahnweg, it is especially families with children who declare themselves dissatisfied with the security situation.

Multivariate analysis corroborates the finding that age and socio-economic status do not influence local perceptions of security. Only gender remains a determining factor: Women consider their quarter less safe than men, and this is particularly true for the Leopoldstadt sites. As a result specific to that particular area, in the Großfeldsiedlung quarter, the level of education turns out to be a more important factor than gender. Secondly, it is remarkable that, in spite of manifold differences between the four research areas considering the physical environment, type of urban development, the local infrastructure, composition of the population, etc., only minimal differences in the positive appraisal of security and in housing satisfaction exist. Neither the perception of certain deficits in infrastructure nor the sometimes less positive appraisal of such aspects as cleanness, attractiveness, disorder phenomena etc. can impair the overall satisfaction of a majority with the housing area. We may conclude that we do not find signs of a stronger social polarisation in the urban development or of a deterioration of city quarters in Vienna; negative developments mentioned by the inhabitants do obviously not exceed the critical threshold that would lead to a more negative assessment of the local living conditions.

In general, the data shows that the appraisal of security as well as housing satisfaction are part of a more general atmospheric perception of the city quarter, which is related to different aspects like familiarity, cleanness, or attractiveness. The appraisal of the quarter as safe or unsafe correlates strongly (and significantly) with all other items of affective perception of the neighbourhood as well as to housing satisfaction. Factor analysis shows that the different aspects of the perception of the city quarter, including security assessment, all appertain to one single dimension. This means that in the perception of respondents, security is not detached from other aspects of the quarter's atmosphere, but is part and parcel of a general positive or negative perception of the city quarter. Those who like living in their neighbourhood also consider it safe – and the other way round: Those who consider the quarter unsafe also appraise it more negatively in other respects, namely as less attractive, less quiet, and as unclean. Based on these findings, the local feelings of

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[3] For the description of the Viennese research sites, and criteria of selection, cf. *Hanak* 2004, 57-65.

[4] With the exception of the Großfeldsiedlung, where the result deviates in the unexpected direction and older inhabitants consider the area more safe.

security can be interpreted as indicators of general satisfaction with the surroundings and well being in the city quarter. A negative appraisal of the security situation is to be understood as a component of a more comprehensive syndrome of discontent with the residential quarter, which applies to approximately 15 per cent of respondents, and is slightly increased on the Rennbahnweg estate.

4.6.2 Qualitative research: The "system" mirrored in the data?

First of all, the qualitative data shows that "simple" issues like satisfaction with the quarter, with one's circumstances of living, and urban residents' sense of locale and (in)security are complex and ambiguous subjects. Part of the collected data refers to an important issue, also a considerable methodological problem: the subjects' amazing readiness and willingness to take their physical and social surrounding for granted, and the fact that only specific aspects of their life world are suitable subjects to criticism, rejection, and wonder. For most of the Viennese accounts on insecurities and discontent, the common denominator seems to be that they hardly ever focus on specific experiences (or concrete fantasies) related to urban danger and fear of crime in a strict sense, but on symptoms of disorder, and that the city is mainly described in terms of routine and predictability, and hardly ever as a chaotic jungle like setting with an abundance of risks and menaces that must be controlled or confronted. Late/post modern regimes and strategies of governance[5] frequently operate on "technologies of the self" and pragmatic modes of control that hardly rely on "moral controls" and correctional discourses. Considering the whole range of the qualitative data urban residents seem to have adjusted to the shift in social control and the new governmentality in many respects, and take most of its effects on urban living conditions for granted. In the political and historical context of the Viennese local welfare state (= modification and revision rather than replacement or abolition of the fordist framework of regulation since the 1990s) the shift in control strategies has been softened, and there have been few manifestations of apparent polarisation, social disintegration and exclusion, both on a local and city level that would have motivated a return to punitive and repressive ideologies and policies. Considered from this angle, narratives on substantial discontent & insecurity are a residual category and refer to both biographical and spatial contexts where the subjects feel entitled to complain about the existing moral and social order, and to hold on to interpretations of the social contract that are not completely in keeping with actual circumstances.

4.6.3 Globalisation, individualisation and anxieties

Except for several narratives and accounts that deal with some consequences of migration (and its impact on the city and on the quarters where there is a special concentration of immigrants), there are only very few explicit statements in the qualitative data that are clearly affiliated to the concept of globalisation, and "global anxieties". Most of the Viennese interviews do not give the impression of the respondents' living in a turbulent

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5   Cf. the recent debates on the changed "culture of control" leading from the former „disciplinary society" to dispositives that focus on the „control of risks" and on promoting (demands for) „security": *Deleuze* 1993; *Lindenberg/Schmidt-Semisch* 1995; *Legnaro* 1997; *Ericson & Haggerty* 1997; *Garland* 2001.

world of permanent accelerated change, causing manifold conditions, dynamics and trajectories of insecurity, precariousness and contingency in a post welfare state epoch. Effects of globalisation come into view and seem to enter the subjects' life world mainly as increased migration and to a certain degree, exchange of population, triggering tensions and rejection among different ethnic groups, etc. In the case of Vienna this aspect of social change has caused latent rather than open conflict, even if there has been a considerable tendency of concentration of immigrants in certain types of residential quarters. Remarkably, our data suggests that the phenomenon causes more discontent on the transdanube housing estates (where the proportion of the non-Austrian population is still below per cent, due to the fact that most immigrants have to qualify for Austrian citizenship before becoming eligible for public housing) than in the Leopoldstadt quarters (where the foreign population amounts to 35 per cent), suggesting that the late "intrusion" of migrants to Viennese public housing estates that started in the 1990s is considered more of a problem by the native Austrian long term residents than is the higher proportion of migrant population in the old housing stock and in urban areas where there has been a relatively long tradition of migrants amounting to some 20 per cent of the resident population. However, the data suggests that foreigners and migrants are perceived not so much as a threat and a risk, but as noisy, annoying, and not adjusting which contributes to social disorder.

Processes of economic restructuring are envisioned mainly when some respondents from the Rennbahnweg estate refer to "high unemployment among juveniles" in order to explain some of the local youth's questionable and disturbing patterns of behaviour - a sort of common sense explanation that neglects the specific features of the environment on the estate: The youths who gather in the yards of the estate find themselves in the middle of a "panopticon" and are extremely visible (and audible) to the residents of the estate. Remarkably there is a tendency to connect local problems to the behaviour of youths on the Transdanubian estates (and more on Rennbahnweg than in Großfeldsiedlung, possibly due to both differences in the age structure of the local populations, and in the design of the estates.) At the same time youths as troublemakers is a topic that is almost completely, and mysteriously, absent in the data from the Leopoldstadt research sites.

Another topic completely absent is the restructuring of the welfare state and its impact on the living conditions of disadvantaged groups and households, possibly because the Viennese local welfare state still seems to function, or anyway there is no awareness of substantial change for the worse. Considering police services, deficits in police presence are rather described as a matter of fact (in several interviews in the transdanubian site) and not as a change for the worse or in terms of complaining about a resource that is withheld or denied. Generally speaking the data suggests that respondents experience the city's social and physical infrastructure to be intact and stable, improving rather than crumbling, and definitely not as a source of insecurity. Focusing on politics, complaints about "the system", distrust in the system etc. are almost completely non-existent. As a general rule (confirmed by very few exceptions) there is no rhetoric of claiming and blaming. Most of the time states of disorder and causes of irritation and worry are described in neutral and pragmatic terms without any suggestion of how to restore the moral order (or rather

routine), and there are practically no demands for something like a zero tolerance policy, or for a substantial change in policy.

Considering individualisation, there are a few statements that might be read as complaints about the dissolving of social relations and milieus or about the loss of cohesion affecting local communities and neighbourhoods. Some of these statements are about the closing down of local shops, and others refer to the exchange of population. On the other hand there is not so much evidence of the respondents' participation in local networks and associations. The qualitative data suggests that (in Vienna) many urban residents do not depend on local resources and (local social capital) that much and mainly perceive their quarter as a place where their private lives take place (in their homes) without so much awareness of their surrounding, where shopping facilities are available, and where a satisfactory infrastructure of public transport allows commuting to most destinations of the city and beyond. Anyway we would suggest, and have argued elsewhere, that according to the empirical evidence from some Viennese residential quarters urban residents' sense of security is based on their trust in "the system" (= local welfare state and the urban infrastructure) rather than on regular involvement in activities and patterns of association and participation operating on a local level.[6]

Another topic (or rather rhetoric) that is almost completely absent in the qualitative data, relates to subjects like "moral decay", "visions of decline", "spirals of decay" (Skogan). When doing research in settings that are considered urban problem areas or problem estates in terms of urban planning and redevelopment, this mode of interpretation of recent social change can be expected to emerge in the data. However, the collected material contains pessimistic visions in no more than a homeopathic dosage. Existing local troubles and disturbances are not understood as symptoms of comprehensive negative dynamics of decline and disintegration, and there are very few negative scenarios on urban change (and its direction).

Obviously the strata that can be assumed to be "losers" rather than "winners" of modernisation and globalisation, the low income groups, and those whose social status might become more precarious due to increased demands for flexibility and competitiveness, in the labour market as well as in the sphere of reproduction, are over-represented in our research sites, and also in our sample. However, there is comparatively little evidence of processes of social and economic exclusion, and its subjective correlate: fears of being relegated, and not being able to keep pace, in the data, and obviously there is not so much awareness of an increasing socio-spatial divide in the city, in terms of insecurity or other obstacles to participation. The material contains little evidence of "struggles for recognition" resulting in insecurity, apart from several rather trivial accounts on certain deviant/marginal groups occupying parts and sections of public space, and juveniles congregating in the yards on their estate in the late evenings, and annoying the rest of the local population. And there is practically no evidence of recent crime figures, crime trends (and media reports) affecting the subjects' sense of security both in their

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[6]   Cf. *Hanak* 2003, ‚On the spot' Experiences and Perceptions of Social Exclusion: Comparing Local Communities and Urban Settings, in: *H. Steinert & A. Pilgram* (eds.) Welfare Policy from Below.

residential quarters and in the rest of the city. Equally remarkable is the way respondents refer to most incidents of victimisation and other experiences of crime. Normally these are not presented as symptoms of moral crisis and societal failure, but as risks of contemporary urban life that usually cause no more than moderate material loss or damage, and which can be prevented to a certain degree by cautious and circumspect strategies of action.

4.6.4   Some conclusions and explanations

Obviously some useful prerequisites that have proved plausible when it comes to explaining the emergence of insecurities, anxieties, and fear of crime in late modern societies and cities, also exist in Vienna. The most relevant can be summarised as follows:

1)   A process of individualisation has continued for several decades, with the usual consequences that have been described for most European societies: Dissolving of traditional milieus of class and status, emergence and spread of more sporadic patterns of association, according to life style and "distinction". The whole complex also has its effects on the system of formal and informal controls, and late modern individuals are no longer subject to the former arrangements and restraints of informal control, and "authority". Changed life styles also affect the public sphere, and public space in particular. Informal controls on a local level are weak, in this respect Viennese society (and Viennese residential quarters) are not so different from many other European cities.

2)   Certain effects of globalisation have affected, and still do affect, Austrian society, and especially the eastern region of the country, due to the geopolitical situation and proximity to the former "Iron Curtain". In the years following the opening of the eastern borders (1989/1992) the new mobility caused considerable changes, with regard to migration, and of course also affecting the regional labour and housing markets, tourism etc., with some of these changes causing "insecurities" and irritations, at least for the concerned segments of the Austrian population. For some urban areas waves of immigration have resulted in a substantial exchange of the local population. However, there was a return to normalcy and stability by the mid-1990s, after more restrictive legal regulations curbed immigration, and took some pressure from the city's housing market, and its integrative capacity in general. But it is also some other, more recent aspects and consequences of globalisation that ought to be mentioned: Increased numbers of refugees and asylum seekers came to Austria in the 1990s and since, with many of them finding themselves in a rather precarious situation, since political asylum is only granted to a small minority, and the others are defined as "refugees for economic reasons" *(Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge)*. Due to the precarious and irregular status of this population there is no factual access to the official labour market and social insurance, to regular sources of income, and to social and cultural participation in Austrian society. Thus, parts of this "redundant" population engage in various fields of the shadows economy, black markets, illegal services, drug trafficking etc. (Vienna as the only large city provides the most favourable opportunity structures for these activities, and consequently is the most attractive turf and action space for the respective populations.) Of course the visible presence and the deviant activities related to these groups have caused some concern among agencies, and insecurities among groups of the local population that are confronted with the disturbing side-effects of illegal enterprises.

3)   There have been rising rates of unemployment, and an increase of precarious employment (compared to the preceding decades of fordist policy), implying that the segment of the population that can no longer or only with some difficulty maintain a moderate level of consumption is growing, even if available survey data do not provide striking evidence on the subject. (The proportion of Viennese citizens who say they feel

their financial situation is somewhat critical or who define their own situation as coming close to poverty has not changed much over the last years.) Another aspect of plausible insecurity relates to the situation of the younger age brackets whose entering the labour market has become more problematic than was the case for preceding generations and cohorts. Vocational training and education no longer guarantee satisfactory jobs and income, leading to insecurities with regard to vocational careers, life and career planning etc. - There is no satisfactory information on the growth of marginal groups (for instance: homeless persons), but numbers can be assumed to have increased since the 1990s, even if acute symptoms of poverty become visible and concentrated only in specific spots of the urban landscape (homeless, beggars).

4)   The transition from "social partnership" and "consensus" to "conflict democracy" on the national level after the 1999 elections and the formation of the VP/FP government coalition in early 2000 could be assumed to cause and intensify manifold insecurities in those who are interested in a stable and solid political regime, and especially among those who have been well represented in the old social partnership model and by the traditional institutions of social partnership, and who now are at risk of losing some of their influence. It is also the ongoing political debates that could be supposed to create and spread a sense of insecurity, with their permanent subtext of signifying or rather suggesting, that many things will have to change in the near future, and stressing the necessity of reforms in many fields of politics (especially: impending cuts in order to secure the pensions and health system, limiting free access to higher education etc.)

5)   Last, but not least, the crime rate has been rising rapidly in the Vienna region since 2000/2001, especially with regard to property offences, and risks of victimization have also increased (for instance: theft from motor vehicles, pocket picking, robbery/mugging). Of course concern with this trend that came as a surprise, after a period of relatively stable crime figures, has also been reflected in media reports, and to a certain extent: in political debates on issues of security, police performance etc.

6)   On the other hand, some other useful ingredients to insecurities and anxieties are largely or completely absent:

7)   There is no plausible scenario of urban decay or decline (suggesting that the city's future prospects are in question or that the city might move into a negative trajectory). On the contrary, there is a general discourse on the high quality of living, and most of the time the aspect of safety/security has been explicitly stressed: Vienna as a safe city (also: the social image of the city, ecological standards, cultural life, leisure time facilities and events as important factors…) Occasional city rankings support the slogan of Vienna as a very liveable city, and are proudly presented in the media.

8)   There is no (common) awareness of polarisation and divide (some groups and quarters/ districts appearing as losers, others as winners of modernisation and restructuring, economic and social losses and profits accumulating in certain parts and milieus of the city);

9)   There is no plausible scenario of moral decline and crisis;

10)   Violence as a significant aspect of urban life is largely absent and there is no obsession with aggression in public spaces, hooligans, gangs of juveniles, and political and/or xenophobic riots have not occurred during the last decades;

11)   The urban infrastructure (transport, energy, services, administration etc.) is hardly ever perceived as deteriorating, unreliable, every day routines are rarely impaired by various breakdowns of the technical and social infrastructure;

12)   There is no understanding of marginal and residual groups as "dangerous classes" in a strict sense: Of course there are "undesirable" individuals and groups that are more or less rejected and/or considered outsiders, but not really understood as dangerous and/or a class. ("Gangs from the east", "black drug dealers" might come relatively close to such stereotypes and appear regularly as scapegoats and troublemakers in media reports and political debates on security, but the stereotype is not primarily constructed around a notion of danger and menace);

13)   Extreme (spatial) concentrations of social and physical disorder (slums, no go areas, ungovernable spaces, abandoned spaces) are missing.

14)   The increase of crime and victimisation relates primarily if not exclusively to property offences (theft, burglary, vandalism), and not to violence and other intimidating transactions. Crime is not linked to "confrontation", most of the time, and the loss of property is low to moderate in most cases.

15)   With regard to property crimes the distribution of victimisation risks seems relatively fair, according to survey data (general urban risk rather than specific groups bearing an unacceptable load); and more serious risks are obviously connected to specific milieus and life styles.

16)   There have been relatively few media reports and campaigns on insecurity in the late 1990s and around the millennium. (The situation was different in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the label of "crime tourism" was introduced. However, the absence of crime as a major concern has changed somewhat in recent years.)

Considering the findings from the quantitative and qualitative research the second set of factors seems to bear more significance, and largely suspends or neutralises the interplay of forces and tendencies that can be assumed to promote and to intensify "insecurities" and "anxieties". Some recent survey data that were collected in summer and autumn 2003 (based on a total of 8300 interviews) may serve to illustrate some aspects of Viennese living conditions, also relating to issues of security, and the way they are evaluated by the population.

73 per cent of respondents say they feel safe with regard to crime risks in their residential surrounding, 18 per cent are ambivalent/undecided, and 9 per cent say they feel (rather) unsafe. (Corresponding figures from the quantitative INSEC-survey show a proportion of 12 to 16 per cent feeling (rather) unsafe in their quarter, indicating that the respondents' evaluation of local security is somewhat more critical in our research sites.) The survey data altogether suggest that the quality of living has improved rather than changed for the worse during the last years, especially considering the public transport network, shopping opportunities, housing quality, leisure time opportunities, design of public space, green

areas, and cultural life. However, there are two more aspects and domains of urban life that are supposed to have definitely changed for the worse: Road traffic and employment opportunities.[7]

Another survey that is conducted annually[8] (cf. *Giller* 2003) on the national level, shows that perceptions of security have been rather stable over the last decade. Even if the data point to a slight decrease in the population's sense of security when compared to the previous year, what is more surprising is the fact that the existing patterns and distributions have remained much the same for quite some time, regardless of the specific events, crises and changes concerning the political, economic and social conditions. Furthermore, the level of (in)security proves practically the same in the city of Vienna and in small communities (with a population up to 5000). Thus, there is no evidence of specific "urban insecurities" and fears. Considering socio-demographic variables the women, the retired, the less educated, and those with low income are somewhat more insecure than the others. The considerable political turbulence in 2003 (strikes, protests and demonstrations, discussions on the pensions reform, rising crime figures, further increase in unemployment etc. on the national level) have produced no more than minor effects on the population's general sense of security. (The item used in the survey does not relate to crime but addresses the respondent's feelings and evaluation with regard to safety/security.)

4.6.5 Governance: From municipal capitalism to the welfare state

In retrospect (and in international comparison) Vienna appears as a well organised, densely regulated and orderly city in many respects, with her almost 70 administrative departments which were (and still are) quite effective and successful in coping with most sorts of "fordist" issues and challenges: Guaranteeing broad access to many social services and benefits, providing remedies and facilities for many sorts of difficult situations and crises, providing a largely satisfactory social, commercial and urban infrastructure, creating and promoting favourable preconditions for individual and collective consumption. In return, this performance was honoured by a considerable degree of acceptance and approval from the side of the population.

In keeping with a longstanding (centennial) tradition of "municipal capitalism" and the "Red Vienna" of the inter-war years there is still (and more than ever) a wide range of welfare and service institutions, programs and offers that has undergone further differentiation and extension during the 1980s and 1990s. The range of agencies comprises both municipal and state run programs and facilities, advisory and information centres, hotlines etc, but also offers that are provided by private and/or confessional organisations. The majority of agencies and programs focus on clients in trouble, on special target groups, or on concrete phenomena and consequences of marginalisation – and it is only a minority of agencies and programs that put some emphasis on community integration and community relations on a neighbourhood level. Obviously there are quite a number of

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[7] Source: IFES, Leben und Lebensqualität in Wien, Wien 2003.

[8] Cf. *J. Giller*, Sicherheitsbarometer – Aktuelle Daten zum Sicherheitsgefühl der österreichischen Bevölkerung (BMI), Wien 2003

measures, programs and facilities that contribute to social integration and prevention in a rather broad and comprehensive sense, but are not actually considered as strategies of (crime) prevention in the first place. The concept of prevention is used relatively rarely, mainly with regard to drug and/or health related problems and when addressing juveniles as a special target group, but has been recently applied also for situations of actual or impending loss of accommodation.

4.6.6   *The Viennese welfare state: A culture of inclusion rather than participation*

In Vienna the Fordist era lasted until the 1990s (and beyond), and only lately certain modifications and restructuring can be observed, which up to now have little in common with the sort of neo-liberal turnaround that has occurred in many other west-European countries and cities. (To a certain degree this refusal of mainstream tendencies is also opposed to certain policy trends that partly succeeded on the national political level.) Thus, Vienna still appears as a city that is known for having maintained its welfare infrastructure, and also makes use of that image for her positioning in the international competition of cities. Public transport, public education, institutions and programs of adult education, a broad range of social services and counselling programs are available. Furthermore, an extending scope of leisure time facilities, sports and recreational areas, cultural attractions, and popular events are accessible. Other than in many European cities Vienna witnessed no essential polarisation and divide in the 1980s and 1990s. Policy efforts at preventing dramatic segregation, decay and social conflict, especially in districts and quarters where there is a certain concentration of disadvantaged or marginalized groups, were more or less successful. Tendencies of *"Verslumung"* (quarters turning into slums), as diagnosed in the early 1990s for some late Victorian period quarters were stopped or diminished. However, in some respects a reproduction of longstanding disparities has occurred. It is especially one pattern of discrimination and marginalisation that has been persisting since the 1970s. Immigrants (the so called guest workers of the 1970s and their successors) still hold a rather marginal position in Viennese society, and opportunities for social integration and cultural participation are altogether unsatisfactory. Legal and social discrimination both on the labour and housing market, and also with regard to access to social benefits are seen as largely self evident and hardly ever discussed as problematic issues. Generally speaking, the Viennese type of local welfare state (and the corresponding mode of social inclusion) is based on the authorities' providing a largely satisfactory (social) infrastructure rather than on the pillars of civil society and on arrangements of participation from the side of the subjects.

Apart from the special issue of immigration the dominant pattern of social integration (inclusion) can be summarised as follows: A considerable amount of pragmatic inclusion for the (Austrian) population, a policy that seeks to avoid (or reduce) segregation and conflict, and a relatively low level of actual (political, social movements, grass roots) participation, can be described as the specific pattern of a local welfare state that was established and developed without a strong basis in civil society.

4.6.7   *Conditions of (in)security revisited: Semantics of vernacular discontent and the long shadow of the risk society*

In the case of Vienna existing (and increased) urban crime risks and experiences of victimization do not affect the population's sense of security so much. The long shadow of the risk society is not so pervasive in the empirical data, and there seems to be no widespread awareness of "living in insecure times". A clear majority feel rather safe, and to the others insecurity and fear of crime are not primarily related to distinct perceptions of urban danger and risk, but are embedded in a more comprehensive syndrome of dissatisfaction (actual living conditions not corresponding to personal demands and aspirations, negative evaluation of local social change), and a more pronounced awareness of disorder. The majority's sense of security obviously coincides with the widespread impression that symptoms of social and physical disorder are sporadic and not so dramatic in the subjects' residential quarters and in the other relevant action spaces, and that there is no accumulation and extreme intensification of disorder in certain problematic settings and estates. This pronounced sense of security has remained relatively constant over the last years, and various political and economic transformations, both on the national and international level, have caused no more than minor irritations of the population's basic confidence. Furthermore there is a high level of trust in the system that is believed to provide urban infrastructure, reasonable living conditions and welfare state provisions in many respects. (Key words: Housing conditions, shopping opportunities, leisure time facilities, public transport, ecological standards, health care facilities.) "Trust in the system" has not (yet) been negatively affected by the substantial changes in the field of national politics that occurred around the millennium (transition from consensus to conflict after the breakdown of the big coalition government).

Empirical research in the framework of INSEC shows that the two (interrelated) factors "trust in the system/infrastructure" and "moderate level of disorder in public space/on estates" obviously support the population's sense of security. Furthermore, Viennese stereotypes of insecurity & crime (for instance as being "imported" from abroad) have not yet resulted in the construction of a "dangerous class", and to specific insecurities related to this class. (Even if there is a broad implicit consensus, also reflected in and reinforced by many media reports, that the recent increase in crime rates is mainly due to property offences committed by travelling and mobile offenders, and to drug related crimes committed by foreigners not belonging to the regular population etc., the stigmatised groups are not perceived as "dangerous" in a strict sense, and xenophobic attitudes and discourses rarely mix up with relevant discourses on and sentiments of "fear" in a strict sense.)

Considered from that angle, Vienna's hidden agenda of prevention (promoted and realized by means of agencies that hardly ever refer to the concept explicitly) has proved quite successful over the last decade: Focusing on integration with regard to immigrants *(Integrationsfonds)*, soft urban renewal and area management *(Gebietsbetreuungen)*, and preventing both rapid exchange of population and extreme concentrations of disadvantaged strata in certain quarters and districts of the city. The empirical evidence that has been collected in the framework of INSEC basically confirms and supports some of the findings from other surveys: The quality of living in the city of Vienna is evaluated highly by a clear majority of the population, and existing problems and troubles are not primarily presented and complained about in a semantics of insecurity, anxiety, or fear of crime. In the

Viennese ideological framework "global anxieties" function as a sort of counter-weight or a contrast medium rather than as amplifiers of "local insecurities": Contrasting the scenarios of real and imaginary "global disorder", as provided and reinforced in the media (and to a certain extent: academic discourses) makes the vernacular troubles and turbulences shrink to mere nuisances that are accepted more easily.

In and after a decade of substantial and accelerated social, (geo)political and economic change (especially: opening of the eastern borders followed by increased immigration to the country; Austria's integration into the European Community; various effects of globalisation on the national economy, the state apparatus and on society in general; government's efforts to cut public expenditures and continued discussions on the necessity of restructuring the welfare, and especially the pensions system; break up of the big coalition and formation of the present government; the shift from the traditional Austrian arrangements of "consensus democracy" and "social partnership" to a political system that is reshaped by tendencies of polarisation, confrontation, divide and dissensus), there still seems to be a broad (ideological) consensus about living in a comparatively safe society. Compared to earlier decades, the traditional and fundamental differences between different groups, strata and age brackets have become blurred and levelled, and obviously the subject's feelings of insecurity can no longer be described (and understood) by referring to a very limited scope of factors, especially gender, age, education and socio-economic status. More "individualised" and contingent patterns of perception have emerged, with some of them associated to the above mentioned "syndrome of discontent" rather than to issues of crime and urban danger, or to "global anxieties".

4.7   Selected results in a summarised comparison

4.7.1   General problems of the comparative method

"To compare the `willingness in obedience' to law of an Australian savage with a New Yorker, or of a Melanesian with an Nonconformist citizen of Glasgow, is indeed a perilous proceeding' (*Malinowski* 1926). Although these are rather extreme examples (resulting from empirical experiences, however), they mirror a fundamental objection to any kind of intercultural comparison: How can one compare quite distinct social phenomena without a common denominator (a common theory) and without taking their respective historical and cultural developments into consideration? Such an objection remains valid if we are dealing with societies, in our case with urban societies, which are in part direct neighbours, at least geographically and culturally (middle-European cities). Indeed, our research activities taught us to be careful when trying to compare analytically the results from the five cities studied. Such a precaution was even more advisable in view of the fact that we could not directly study the "real" safety conditions of the cities but "only" indirectly, through the perceptions of the inhabitants and their personal emotional, cognitive or conative attitudes toward them in terms of insecurity, anxiety or fear (or the opposite). Someone who, for example, knows and learns about crime as part of life's general social conditions may be less fearful than someone who has hitherto denied such normality and is by some new developments forced to adjust his mind to the new conditions - the case of the former Eastern block countries (see below). Someone who had lived so far in a well-shaped

community with a functioning infrastructure may feel unsafe in a declining environment with broken-windows effects as opposed to someone who has never known anything else. Loitering juveniles may either be considered as a physical threat or as just another example of some sort of social disorder.

Any comparisons thus mean to compare the subjective reactions to the problems of urban insecurity, much less the problems as objective facts. Perhaps, for this reason the following explanations are better imagined as being structured juxtapositions of some phenomena taken from our research project; that is, the explanations are predominantly descriptive. Despite this, the comparative methodology should be briefly dealt with because it is also used in a description, even if it is only for the sake of implicitly established suppositions or assumptions, or more explicitly for forming hypotheses.

It is true that criminological analyses of society have always included other cultures, countries and societies so as to make their own theoretical constructions more astute, or even make them feasible in the first place. In this way the view of universally valid rules as the precondition for universal crimes could be disproved (the problem of moral geography, already seen in *Pascal* and *Beccaria*); the social origins of moral principles, and with them the social construction of vice and virtue were exposed (*Ossowska* 1970); or the connections between a specific culture or type of society and a specific criminality could be established ("violence as an American way of life" as an example). Concerning sociology, *Durkheim* appeared to set the methodological direction when he said "one cannot explain a social fact of any complexity except by following the complete development through all social species. Comparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology, it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires for facts" (1938 [1895], chapter 6). This thought does not appear to contribute much at first for our own endeavours, since such a view of comparative research belongs to any analytical research method for verifying causalities – whilst here international or intercultural comparison is meant (on this *Villmow & Albrecht* 1979, 164). *Durkheim's* statement can be applied to our theme nevertheless. Just as it would likewise not get us any further to want to study juvenile crime without (perhaps only implicit) reference to adult crime, it would not help us any further either to analyse the prevalence of crime and fear of crime or sentencing strategies in one's own country without wanting to know what things look like elsewhere (*Ferracuti* 1980, 130). Only if other countries or a certain type of country as points of reference are included, it is possible to learn whether one's own country has a low or high crime rate, whether its inhabitants' fear of crime is great or small, or whether a tough or lenient criminal justice system prevails. For asking the question about the differences, cross-border concepts are needed; only which ones?

The suggestion, "to uncover etiological universals operative as causal agents irrespective of cultural differences among the different countries" (*S. Glueck* 1964, 304), could not satisfy us, since this meant transcultural, not intercultural comparisons meaning that differences between cultures and societies were supposed to be irrelevant (*Heintz* 1974, 405). Notwithstanding this transcultural approaches have gone into an array of criminological studies. This required theories that could be extremely generalised. Such a "master theory" is, for example, that of modernisation, according to which a varied level of urbanisation or technological development in the countries studied should

explain differences in their crime rates, as well as their becoming increasingly similarly crime-ridden in the case of catching up on modernisation (*Shelley* 1981). Another theory refers to societies with low crime rates (among others the former GDR in those days, and Japan); what they are supposed to have in common is, "the state of sharing of norms and customs and, beyond that, a system of intact social controls capable of assuring such a sharing" (*Adler* 1983, 157. For this type of control theory the notion of "Synnomie" was coined, contrasting it to Anomie).

This, then, is the comparative researcher's dilemma: He looks for generalisations *across* societies or cultures with the aid of global theories and in so doing finds a fascinating cultural, social, economic and legal diversity *within* societies or cultures, that may interest him more than the overarching things in common. This is especially the case where the researcher's interest is in social attitudes – in our case towards concrete living conditions. A problem of a more epistemological kind is that a theory, no matter how generalised it may be, stems from the culture that the researcher comes from, and equally the operationalisations of his indicators (on the basis of which of his criteria is another culture similar or dissimilar to his own, regarding, for example, social control?). Therefore, "generalization is tantamount to cultural imperialism" (on all this *Beirne* 1983, 23-34).

In so far as they contain the aspect of social developments, transcultural theories require for their verification longitudinal studies with examinations over two or more periods of time. The best example is that of *Shelley's* modernisation theory mentioned. Our research on the other hand is a cross-sectional study, so that just for this reason an important question has to remain unanswered: To what extent were the feelings of insecurity or fear of crime encountered triggered off and formed by structural changes back in time? How far do these changes continue to have effect, respectively no longer play any role? At this point it is necessary to think of the differences between Budapest and Kraków on the one side of the former iron curtain and Hamburg, Amsterdam and Vienna on the other.

On this a related example. In three consecutive crime surveys in east Germany (1991, 1993, 1995), among other things attitudes to crime were studied. It could be shown that the change in 1989 released a fear of crime to an extent out of all proportion to the actual threat. More than this, although the crime rate rose substantially in the course of the years, even exceeding that of west Germany by 1994 at the latest, the fear of it had gradually declined (*Boers & Kurz* 1997, 197-204). As it could be assumed that the 45 year partition of Germany (from 1945 to 1990) had led at least partially to separate east and west identities, transferring this to compare the cities of the former eastern to the cities of the former western block would perhaps look like this : In Kraków and Budapest in 1989 there was a similar modernisation shock with enormous problems of adapting to the new challenges leading to similarly profound social and personal feelings of insecurity and fear of crime in the population. All sorts of imaginary as well as real threats were dumped on this, but also frustrations, deprivations, discriminations and general life pessimism (see *Sessar* 1997). It would now be important to find out what careers these insecurities and fears have taken. From our surveys we know that at least the inhabitants of Kraków still seem to be petrified in some of their attitudes, whereas those of Budapest, being geographically closer to the west show more relaxed attitudes. Only, what was it like before?

Finally, some methodological difficulties that regularly occupy comparative research of any kind have to receive consideration. How are countries, societies and cities compared, the

problems of which are qualitatively and quantitatively far apart? Thus, *Body-Gendrot* points out in her study on the control of violence in American and French cities that it is difficult to venture such a comparison when the problems relating to violence, poverty, incivility, racial conflicts and the erosion of the social capital are so extremely different in two societies: equally so when the traditional control systems and practice of control function so differently (2000, xxx - xxxv). Consequently, at the end of her work we find a condensed contrasting of policies and practices in dealing with the destructive sides of urban societies in the two countries, in which, not unexpectedly , the dissimilarities dominate over the similarities. To advise a French, or in general a European city to assume American practises in the fight against violence may be problematical for cultural - and legal - reasons, with one important exception: mobilising the inhabitants of entire neighbourhoods to remove signs of incivility , to make the surroundings more liveable, to create community safety and altogether a culture of solidarity. The author was able to cite examples of this from France, reminding us of American examples , and perhaps copied from them (*Body-Gendrot* 2000, 250-257).

4.7.2   The Surveys

The following explanations are based on the total of ten surveys in the five cities (two in each city). Since at this point not districts, but cities should be compared, only these were contrasted. With this we accept that the (sometimes substantial) differences between the districts of the same city are lost. Nonetheless, they all have a high degree of social problems in common, so that structurally different as these problems may be, this far we have a common denominator. (Budapest being, as mentioned an exception, where along with the problem-burdened District IX the "normal" District XXIII was included). In so far as variables are treated with their scaled values, the Questionnaire in the Appendix is referred to. If, for example, the likelihood of becoming a victim of a robbery in the near future is dealt with, we will refer to the question E5 in the Questionnaire in the Appendix, where the robbery is letter d). Where a question consists of a multitude of items asked about with the aid of a 5-step scale (ordinal scale) - values ranging from 1 to 5 -, additive indices are formed on the basis of theoretical considerations; respectively. For example, the values of the variables a), b), c) and d) from E5 are added up to form a new variable labelled "street crime", with the values 1 ("very unlikely") to 5 ("very likely").

Descriptions of various forms of problem perception reflecting insecurities and anxieties are at the centre, as well as various attitudes to crime, which can be interpreted as fear; and finally favouring measures which in the mind of the respondents could contribute to solving the problems in the district. In a special section follows the presentation of the connection between xenophobia and fear in a Hamburg and Amsterdam quarter.

4.7.2.1 Perception of global problems

Eight out of a total of ten variables on the complex of global problems were selected and combined into an additive index (B1, a, d-k; e.g.., conflicts between the Islamic and the Western worlds, terrorism, ecological devastation, trans-national crimes, overpopulation). It shows up that according to the city the respondents have greatly varying problem awareness: 18% of Amsterdam people compared to 40% of the Kraków people spoke of a "very big problem" (Vienna 24%, Hamburg 30%, Budapest 34%; see Table 6). It could be supposed that natives react to this more sensitively than migrants, since some of the variables directly or indirectly make foreigners a problem (B1, d, g, i and k). In fact, if these four variables are calculated as an index and only the responses of the native population considered, the picture changes: a separating line arises between Vienna ("very big problem": 28%) and Amsterdam (30%) on the one side and Budapest (42%) und Kraków (44%) on the other (Hamburg 38%). The discrepancies are remarkable - could for the Vienna respondents and above all for the Amsterdam respondents personal experience of foreigners or everyday confrontation with them influence the attitudes (proportion of ethnic minorities including naturalised foreigners in the Vienna and Amsterdam research areas 20% and 47%), is this not possible in a city without migrants like Kraków and in Budapest with a migrant share of about 5%. Attitudes independent of personal experiences show up here, requiring further consideration.

4.7.2.2 Concern about city problems

For problems affecting the respective city, concern was asked about. For forming indices we differentiated between problems relating to crime (D1, b - d, f, i, k; e.g., drugs, school violence, unsafe busses and trains, corruption) and general social problems (D1, a, e, l, n; unemployment, poverty, bad medical care, environmental pollution). Very roughly, this distinction is one between manifest and latent problems of a community. Again, there are substantial differences between the cities and once again the greatest discrepancies are between Vienna and Kraków. In Vienna 4%, in Kraków 45% are "very much concerned" about crime problems in their city (Amsterdam 14%, Budapest 19%, Hamburg 20%). Interesting is the same ranking for social problems: Once again the Viennese are the ones least concerned (4%), the Kraków people the most (49%) (Amsterdam 12%, Hamburg 13%, Budapest 35%). The explanation results from some further observations. Both sets of variables, "urban crime problems" and "urban social problems", are interrelated to each other (with Kendall's tau-b correlation coefficient ranging from .478 in Kraków to .656 in Vienna). This means that in the interviewee's perception little difference is made between crime problems and social ones. It is true there is more concern about crime, but it is placed into the overall problems of the city.

Going beyond this, one of our initial hypotheses had been that there is a connection between the perception of global and urban problem in the sense that a world that has become more insecure determines everyday insecurities (this may be called the emotional side of "glocalisation"). It is just as conceivable that (and this means the causal direction has to remain open) everyday anxieties lead to a dramatisation of global problems (*Giddens* 1991, 193). In order to get an idea about such connections, the index "global problems"

from B1 (see chapter 7.2.11) was brought together with the indices "crime in the city" and "social problems in the city". Interpretable and without exception significant (p < 0.01) connections show up for all cities (see Table 6):

Table 8: *Relation between „global problems" and „urban (crime, social) problems", as perceived by the respondents from the five cities studied (Kendall's tau-b, n).*

Global problems*					
	Amsterdam	**Budapest**	**Hamburg**	**Kraków**	**Vienna**
Urban crime problems**	.429 (677)	.489 (644)	.360 (588)	.395 (739)	.494 (913)
Urban social problems***	.276 (808)	.373 (822)	.301 (732)	.312 (875)	.460 (970)
Urban problems****	.408 (686)	.428 (647)	.324 (593)	.313 (759)	.501 (926)

* Questionnaire, B1, a, d-k; ** D1, b-d, f, h, i, k; *** D1, a, e, l, n; **** D1, a-l, n

The following conclusions can be drawn from these correlations, very cautiously and as very much preliminary. In all cities, all be it to a varying degree, there are relationships between global and local concerns, as we would interpret it. They are more pronounced regarding crime problems than social ones, most so for Vienna (tau-b = .494) and Budapest (tau-b = .489), the least so in Hamburg (tau-b = .360). When these are furnished with causal directions, the supposition seems plausible that insecurity of people who feel unsafe in their city anyway is reinforced by international conflicts. More precisely it is to be assumed that the people develop a feeling for the underlying connections between global and local risks and dangers, and this in both directions - the people are generally relaxed (as in Vienna) or generally not relaxed (as in some other cities). Should this assumption be right, it may well be difficult to reduce insecurity in cities by local crime prevention policies, since it comes from somewhere else, after all.

4.7.2.3 *Problems in one's own district*

When it is about personal insecurity or fear, such attitudes refer in the first instance to the more immediate living surroundings, the neighbourhood and the district in which someone lives. As already mentioned, it is not possible to check the plausibility of such attitudes as we could not study the objective situation in the districts in view of their fear generating elements. Therefore, it has to suffice to give an account of the extent of the perception of problems by the inhabitants restricted to those which relate to physical und social disorder (incivility). With this, on the one hand, the comparison of the cities among themselves should be supplemented in order to find out whether there are city-specific grounds for city -specific (culture-specific) patterns of insecurity and anxiety. On the other hand, the connection between incivility und fear of crime should be checked (see 7.2.16).

The first observation is that the question, "How much do you like living in [name of District]?" was answered positively by most respondents. Between 21% in Amsterdam and

38% in Kraków answered with "very much" (A2, value 5. When value 4 is added, the scores look as follows: 46% in Budapest and Amsterdam, 63% in Hamburg, 64% in Vienna and 71% in Kraków) (no table shown).

These overall positive attitudes have certain parallels in the perceptions of the state of the district. These are checked using the question E2 (Items a-f, h, m, n; e.g. poor lighting, derelict buildings, graffiti, loitering teenagers, rubbish/litter on the streets). Regarding value 5 on the 5-step scale, these district problems are characterised as „very big problems" by 1% of the citizens of the two research areas in Hamburg and Vienna; the respective scores are 4% in Amsterdam, 8% in Budapest and 9% in Kraków (when the values 4 and 5 are combined, the scores look as follows: Vienna 9%, Hamburg 21%, Amsterdam and Budapest 31% and Kraków 43%; no table shown).

4.7.2.4   *Summarised overview of attitudes in the cities studied*

In Table 7 the results obtained should be contrasted once more, supplemented by the attitudes of natives and migrants.

Table 9:   *Perceptions and attitudes towards global, urban and district problems in the five cities studied (value 5 on the 5-step scale, in per cent)*

	Amsterdam	Budapest	Hamburg	Krakow	Vienna
Global problems (B1)	18%	34%	30%	40%	24%
- natives	22%	-	31%	-	26%
- migrants	13%	-	30%	-	15%
Urban crime problems (D1)	17%	26%	31%	46%	7%
- natives	13%	-	33%	-	7%
- migrants	22%	-	28%	-	6%
Urban social problems (D1)	12%	35%	12%	48%	4%
- natives	9%	-	14%	-	4%
- migrants	15%	-	11%	-	3%
Urban problems (D1)	9%	20%	14%	45%	2%
- natives	7%	-	15%	-	2%
- migrants	13%	-	11%	-	3%
Incivility in district (E2)	4%	8%	1%	9%	1%
- native	2%	-	1%	-	1%
- migrants	6%	-	1%	-	4%

The cities Kraków and Vienna are opposite poles just about throughout, whilst the other cities are in the middle with a varying "ranking". It is striking that migrants living in

Amsterdam view the problems of their city and district with more concern than the natives, which can be said neither for Hamburg nor Vienna.

4.7.2.5   *Fear of crime*

As explained in the chapter at the beginning, in research on the fear of crime, a difference is occasionally made between cognitive, affective and conative (or behavioural) construction elements. In this comparison the cognitive part, that is the protective and avoidance behaviour of the respondents, is dispensed with - since the local reasons for having to protect oneself and the possibilities for so doing are too varied to be compared to each other. The same goes for the affective side, that is in our research the reasons for never or almost never leaving the house after dark.

So the question is looked into as to how likely the respondents think it is that they will become a victim of a crime in their district in the near future. We limited ourselves to four situations that can happen in public space (E5, a-d: harassment, beaten and injured, theft, attacked and robbed); again the items are summed up to an index with the values 1 ("very unlikely") to 5 ("very likely").

Concentrating on the answer "very likely" (value 5 on the ordinal scale), the following results are obtained (Table 8):

Table 10: *Chances of becoming the victim of a street crime and of rape, as perceived by the respondents from the five cities studied (value 5 on the 5-step scale, in per cent).*

	Amsterdam	Budapest	Hamburg	Krakow	Vienna
Street crimes*	5%	2%	5%	20%	3%
Rape* (only women)	3%	1%	5%	11%	2%

* Questionnaire, E5, a-d; ** E5, f.

Concerning street crimes, the most optimistic respondents are from Budapest and Vienna, the most pessimistic are from Kraków. Those differences can only have very little to do with personal victimisation experiences in the past (F1). It is true that Budapest at 22% shows the lowest victimisation rates among the cities under investigation (relating to the three years prior to the interview), but Kraków (30%) is on a par together with Amsterdam (29%) and Hamburg (32%), while Vienna is 23%. Especially violent crimes triggering fear occurred only rarely (which corresponds to an international observation).

The absence of a connection becomes all the clearer when women are asked about the likelihood of becoming a rape victim soon. This crime was just as insignificant in the answers about concrete victimisation (this too is a general observation). In Vienna, 5% of the women interviewed regarded such a deed as very likely, in Kraków 11% (see Table 8). The data of Kraków require further considerations. When the sample is grouped into ten-year intervals according to age, women aged 41 to 50 have the highest scores with 19%, followed by women aged 51 to 60 with 14% (no table shown). As the likelihood of being

raped steadily declines with age it becomes doubtful whether fear of crime is measured by using the risk assessment model. Rather, it is possible that women in the Polish districts which are distinguished by an atmosphere of high feelings of insecurity and fear, take (unconsciously) rape as a kind of code to express female-specific attitudes toward the unsafe conditions of the living surroundings. The observation that quite unexpectedly the assessed likelihood increases with age might be attributed to an increased general vulnerability with age.

4.7.2.6 *Fear of crime in relation to urban and district problems*

The question is now important as to how far these "fear" attitudes are connected to city and district problems. As repeatedly mentioned, it is assumed that both perspectives go together, fear of crime then being but a particular form of general fear and insecurity. It can even be said that an attack or mugging is first thought about if there is a negative view of the community is held. Once again for this purpose the studied additive indices, "urban crime problems" and „urban social problems", separate up to now, are again combined to make "urban problems" (D1, a-l, n). "Urban problems" and "district problems" (E2) are then brought into connection with the assessed likelihood of future victimisation relating to street crime (E5; Table 9). It has to be taken into account that for the present only bivariate relations are shown, being uncontrolled by other possibly intervening variables.

Table 11: *Chances of becoming a victim of a street crime in relation to „urban problems" and "district (crime) problems", as perceived by the respondents from the five cities studied (Kendall's tau-b, n)*

Likelihood of becoming a victim of a street crime*					
	Amsterdam	**Budapest**	**Hamburg**	**Krakow**	**Vienna**
Urban problems**	.271 (663)	n.s. (654)	.131 (577)	.268 (810)	.280 (953)
District problems***	.316 (833)	.162 (754)	.226 (764)	.276 (1008)	.420 (1003)
District crime problems****	.265 (736)	.237 (681)	.214 (630)	.345 (832)	.382 (913)

* Questionnaire, E5, a-d; ** D1, a-l, n; *** E2, a-f, h, m, n; **** E2, g, n-p.

As regards the relationship between city problems and assessed victimisation in the future, the assumptions are confirmed, apart from Budapest. The connections between district problems and fear of being a future victim turn out to be much more pronounced, however, the most so for Vienna (tau-b = .420), the least for Budapest (tau-b = .162). This is remarkable in so far as the district problems explicitly only give an account of "signs of incivility". When the crime problems in the district are calculated separately from incivility (E2, g, n-p: violence on the street, harassment of children, girls and women, vandalism), differences can hardly be established (Table 9). It does rather look as if the assessed probability of being a victim of a street crime in the near future is associated with the

general condition of the district, and not just its crime situation. This again would be a verification of our initial hypothesis.

4.7.2.7   Suggested measures to solve problems in the districts

The respondents were also asked what measures they thought were suitable for solving their districts problems. Here it was about finding out which types of measure were given preference (E4). For this purpose three groups were formed from the list of 14 Items asked about and made into additive indices: "Active securing the public space " (E4, a, d, e, h, i: better lighting, less blind corner and places, more sports and leisure time facilities, the citizens' participation in district affairs); "Control of public space" (E4, b, f, g: video surveillance, commercial security companies, citizen patrols); „Police activities" (E4, c, k, o, q: co-operation between police and citizens, violence prevention in schools, police presence on the streets, expansion of the police mandate (Table 10).

Table 12: *The respondents' preference of measures to solve problems in their district (value 5 "very much appropriate" on the 5-step scale, in per cent)*

	Amsterdam	Budapest	Hamburg	Kraków	Vienna
Securing public space*	15%	5%	14%	19%	18%
Control of public space**	14%	7%	8%	16%	10%
Police activities***	20%	16%	30%	57%	27%

* Questionnaire E4; A; D; E; H; I, ** E4, b, f, g; *** E4, c, k, o, q.

Police activities, to which belongs also co-operation with citizens and schools, were uniformly given preference. When the cities are compared, it is the inhabitants of Kraków who find this solution most promising, the inhabitants of Budapest the least so, so there is no indicator that the people from the former eastern block are overall more rigid than those from the former western block. Well behind in second place, in any case in Hamburg, Kraków and Vienna, come such measure that would give the community a better appearance, on the outside by a better appearance of public space, on the inside by efforts for a better infrastructure. Measures involving control of public space only come third - so far a no to wanting to watch and control people in public space without reason.

It is illuminating to learn that one measure is mostly favoured as the solution to the own district's varied problems that after all may well be less suitable in this respect. This measure is "the more severe punishment of violent offences" (E5, m) (Table 11).

Table 13: *The respondents' preference of a more severe punishment of violent offences as a measure to solve problems in their district (value 5 "very much appropriate" on the 5-step scale, in per cent)*

	Amsterdam	Budapest	Hamburg	Kraków	Vienna
Severe punishment*	49%	22%	57%	76%	50%

* Questionnaire E4, m.

A first cautious interpretation then. According to the results of the research, depending on historical, concrete socio-cultural and socio-spatial conditions people have different expectations regarding their own security, and they develop different feelings of insecurity when these expectations are disappointed. The fear of crime is a very important element in this. It rubs off onto other motives of anxiety and fear from the social area just as it also put about by these or amplified by them - these are reciprocal processes. So it is hardly surprising that a crime policy measure like a more severe punishing of violent offences is also a component of such processes, meaning that severe punishments all of a sudden end up in the arsenal of measures promising to produce social safety. (In fact: if two extreme groups are formed, one group with respondents assessing the criminal problems of their district as low, but social problems as high, and another group with the reverse attitudes (E2), then a tougher crime policy is indiscriminately favoured by both groups.) Added to this, because of centuries of programming, punishment is the first thing that occurs to people when it is about solving social conflicts. That is why Vienna comes into the picture now too.

4.7.2.8   Summary

Of course, these were only some rough comparisons with a selected number of variables when these also belonged to the central themes of the research. The objections to a comparative analysis formulated at the beginning apply to the end- the comparison is possible then when abstracting from local peculiarities that we could not investigate.

A series of remarkable results were obtained (whereby their bivariate calculations advise caution in their interpretation). Concepts like insecurity, anxiety, unease or concern have no clearly defined or identifiable objects or situations that they are directed at. It is rather a more or less positive or negative picture the inhabitants have of the world, their city or their living area, made up of many facets. In fact, occasionally global and local problems seem to merge. Sometimes it looks as if it were not so much the urban space producing the problems, but a general feeling fed from many sources and motives projecting their insecurities into the urban space. Of course this observation must not be overrated. You cannot run away into global worlds when there is so much to do in the local ones. The data provides information on that too, of course.

What has been said similarly applies to the fear-of-crime issue. There is no question that the relation between fear of crime and the reality of crime exists. Yet the fear is also part of the more general feelings of insecurity, as this has already repeatedly become apparent. It is therefore difficult to separate crime from other factors generating insecurity; table 9 reflects this difficulty (this will be dealt with again in the next section).

With this in mind, the differences between the cities with respect to general feelings of insecurity shifted into the centre of our interest. The assumption of substantial east - west differences due to different historical and social developments since 1989 (see 4.7.1) were confirmed only to a limited degree. It is true that Kraków fulfils the researcher's expectations vested in its inhabitants, these showing the highest insecurity scores, but the distance to Budapest is very large, and Budapest's distance to the western cities sometimes very small (see, for ex. Tables 7 and 8) - , so it is hardly possible to speak of east-west

discrepancies. There are also some substantial differences among the western cities, whereby Vienna takes a position as an especially secure city. So there are throughout extreme differences between Kraków and Vienna.

It is not possible to interpret these discrepancies without involving other sources that were not available, however (see though the two city reports under 3.5 and 3.6). There may well be differences in the real security situation, but they could not fully explain the disparate perceptions and attitudes (both cities have less crime rates than Hamburg and Amsterdam, neither has terrorism reached Austria or Poland yet). In the case of Vienna, an old, not yet modernised welfare state idea my play a role; the citizens may trust that the state will protect them from most calamities including crime (if this model be in a state of crisis, *Stangl* 2004, 99-103, then this has not yet found its expression in our surveys). Added to this may be a relaxed dealing with the alien and a greater preparedness to integrate him - a heritage from the multi-ethnic composition of the Habsburg Empire. In Kraków the foreigners just do not exist in the same way, at least not as locally settled minorities. Perhaps Polish society has become alien to itself after the change of 1989. Perhaps the catching up processes of modernisation are still at work, and this on both sides; the citizens have not yet got used to the confusion of the new situation, the state has not yet adapted itself to them. The basis idea that there is no order without disruption (*Luhmann* 1992, 138) has perhaps not sunk in yet.

4.7.3   *Ethnic segregation and urban insecurity*[9]

4.7.3.1 Introduction

The aim of the presentation was to point out some characteristics of crime-related insecurities of people living in ethnically segregated urban areas in Hamburg and Amsterdam. Ethnic segregation in this context means the high concentration of ethnic minorities in a specific urban area.

In many of the woks on ethnic segregation in Urban Sociology, its effects on feelings of insecurity are mentioned without however being sufficiently investigated. What is intended here, therefore, is to deal with one particular predictor of crime-related insecurities of people living in ethnically segregated districts. The research question is thus part of the more general debate about the relationship between fear of crime and other factors than crime.

Concerning the research areas integrated in this study, the focus here lies on each one district in Hamburg (Wilhelmsburg) and Amsterdam (De Baarsjes). Both districts have a migrant population of about 40% and, compared to the other districts, a specifically different ethnic composition of migrants. In Wilhelmsburg, the Turkish population is by far strongest among all migrant groups. In De Baarsjes, first come people from Morocco, followed by Turkish and Surinamese. The interest of this part of the study is, however, in the natives' feelings of crime-related insecurity in view of the strong presence of migrants.

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[9]   This passage is based on a paper which was given by *Wolfgang Keller* at the Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology in Amsterdam in August 2004.

Measuring crime-related insecurities, we allowed for the following dimensions:

- *Subjective risk assessment;* measured by the likelihood of being beaten and injured or of being attacked and mugged,[10]

- *Protective and avoiding behaviour*; measured by arrangements made by the respondents to avoid criminal situations or to reduce their effects, such as taking a self-defence course, installing an additional door lock, carrying a weapon, avoiding public transport, certain groups of people or certain streets and places,[11]

- *Staying at home after dark because of being afraid to go out*, measured by items like being afraid of the dark, being afraid of going out alone, being afraid of being attacked and robbed, being afraid of something else of being happening.[12]

Those attitudes cover three different aspects of personal worry about crime. Whereas *subjective risk assessment* is something like a more or less "rational" assessment of personal concern about crime, the latter two cover the *behavioural level* on the one hand, and an *emotional level* on the other. Nevertheless, all of these aspects represent a form of, or a reaction to insecurity related to criminal victimisation.

Thereby, subjective risk assessment may be preliminary to the behavioural and the emotional level of crime-related insecurities. For this reason, it will be integrated as a possible predictor of these attitudes as well.

Our first approach to consider other factors than crime as a condition for fear of crime was the observation that in Wilhelmsburg/Hamburg the German inhabitants displayed higher rates of feelings of insecurity than the migrants in the same district although the victimisation rates for the last three years preceding the interviews were about the same in both groups. Also, natives as well as migrants had similar perceptions of the crime problems of Hamburg and of the problems of Wilhelmsburg in terms of physical and social disorder. In contrast to those observations the factor "ethnicity" showed a significant effect

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[10] See Questionnaire E5: *"…how likely do you think the chances are of being…":* "attacked and robbed?" (b) / "beaten and injured?" (d). The variable consists of an additive index of these items which measured by a 5-step scale ranging from 1 = very unlikely to 5 = very likely

[11] See Questionnaire G1: "*Some people take measures to protect themselves against criminal acts. Please tell us whether you are using any of the following precautionary measures…":* "I have attended a self-defense course" (a), "I have installed additional protective measures in my home" (b), "When going out I take something with me to defend myself" (c), "When going out at night I avoid public transportation" (e), "I avoid groups of people on the street such as loitering teenagers, people being drunk, beggars or drug-addicts" (f), "I avoid certain streets and places" (g). Possible answers were 0 = no and 1 = yes. The variable is an additive index of these items.

[12] See questions C2: *"How often do you leave your home after dark?":* "hardly ever" (a), "rarely (less than once a month)" (b), "occasionally (at least once a month)" (c) or "frequently (at least once a week)" (d) and C3: *"You just said that you hardly ever/only rarely leave your home after dark. What are the reasons?":* "I am afraid of the dark" (b), "I am afraid of going out alone" (d), "I am afraid of being attacked and robbed" (f), "I am afraid that something else could happen to me" (g). Possible answers were 0 = no and 1 = yes. The variable is an additive index of these items.

when being integrated into multiple regression with risk assessment and protective and avoiding behaviour as dependent variables.

The assumption was that the different levels of crime-related insecurities of Germans and migrants might be ascribed to further factors which have not yet been considered. Those factors might lay in the specific situation of migrants and Germans living together in the same district, which may cause some kind of cultural conflict between both groups. The differences described here may consequently have their origins in these conflicts.

In the previous models we constructed several aspects were considered to have an effect on crime-related attitudes. We included these, covering the following theme areas:

- the perception of district (crime / threat, physical & social disorder)[13] and
- city problems (crime & social problems),[14]socio-demographic factors (i.e. gender, age, level of school education…),[15]
- non-problem orientated perceptions of the district; integration and well being (i.e. perceived atmosphere, satisfaction to live in district, length of living in district, neighbourhood contacts, contentedness with personal life…),[16] andvictimisation (personal and reported (indirect) victimisation).[17]In order to introduce an item

representing one aspect of possible ethnically, respectively culturally induced conflict, we constructed an index *"Xenophobia"* out of the following statements:[18]

- I agree to many people of different nations living together in my district.
- The foreigners living in this city should adapt to our lifestyle.
- The foreigners living here contribute to the general wealth.
- Foreigners should marry among themselves.
- Because of the many foreigners I feel like a stranger in my city.
- The foreigners take away jobs.

4.7.3.2   The models

In the following, three (respectively six) predictive models of crime-related attitudes will be presented, referring to the three dimensions of crime-related insecurity mentioned above. The models are based on multiple linear regressions and on a data base of about 250 to 300 cases.

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[13]   See questionnaire E2

[14]   See questionnaire D1

[15]   See questionnaire, part I

[16]   See questionnaire, part A, C5, G2

[17]   See questionnaire, part F

[18]   Additive index xenophobia is constructed out of these items, measured by a 5-step scale varying from 1 = don't agree at all to 5 = fully agree. Item ,1' and ,3' were converted. (Question Ha2)

Due to reasons of clarity, these models are presented in a very simplified form. No indirect effects will be shown up, which of course there are.

The variables representing the perception of crime and disorder on the city (see questionnaire D1) as well as on the district (see questionnaire E2) level consist of additive indices compiled with the help of factor analyses. Thus, their compositions differ slightly between both cities. But nevertheless, they represent fairly the same categories. Due to the aim of this chapter: to show up an additional category of predictors of crime-related insecurities, a detailed description of the composition of each singular index / variable is not necessary at this place. Neither will be presented each variable integrated into the starting models because an overview over the thematic fields covered by the variables before was shown above.

4.7.3.2.1 Hamburg (Wilhelmsburg)

a) Risk assessment

The first model presented is the one predicting subjective risk assessment of Germans in Hamburg Wilhelmsburg.

Figure 2: *Regression Model: Predictors of Risk Assessment of Germans in Wilhelmsburg (β - values)*

We find that the variables predicting risk assessment can be allocated to different super ordinate categories. At first, there is the age category representing *vulnerability,* secondly there is the *perception of the crime situation* represented by the perceptions of crime and respective threat on the city and the district level. Another one is the *perception of disorder phenomena* within the district as well as (the intensity of) neighbourhood contacts representing some kind of *personal integration* into the living area. Finally, we find also an impact of *xenophobic attitudes* on subjective risk assessment.

The most predictive influences on subjective risk assessment are given by the perception of the crime situation on the one hand, and xenophobic attitudes on the other. Compared to

that, the influence of age, disorder phenomena and neighbourhood contacts seems – although being evident - to be rudimentary.

An interpretation of these results will be given after the presentation of these models.

b) Protective and avoiding behaviour

Figure 3: *Regression Model: Predictors of Protective and Avoiding Behaviour of Germans in Wilhelmsburg (β - values)*

As seen in the model before, aspects of crime are also predictors for avoidance and protective behaviour, the assessment of personal vulnerability (represented by gender), and xenophobia, whereas the gender variable shows the strongest influence. The influence of the perception of crime on the city level and subjective risk assessment lies at about the same level as xenophobia. Aspects of physical and social disorder or other district specific perceptions do not play any role here.

c) Reasons of fear for not going out at night

Figure 4: *Regression Model: Predictors of Fear of not going out at night of Germans in Wilhelmsburg (β - values)*

The model predicting fear for not going out at night is obviously different. In accordance with its emotional dimension, fear is mainly predicted by *age and gender*, thus, representing personal *vulnerability*.

Xenophobia and crime do not play any role here. Despite this, feelings of fear seem to be fully independent of any crime-related perceptions. The influences of the variables *atmosphere* and *disorder* indicate that *fear* is more an effect of the general perception of social and physical decline within the district or a matter of well-being of its inhabitants.

4.7.3.2.2 *Amsterdam (De Baarsjes)*

For comparison, in the following the analogous models of the Amsterdam district De Baarsjes will be presented. Although there are some minor differences in the composition of the variables predicting these dimensions of crime-related insecurities, the models nevertheless seem to be comparable. Furthermore, and what I regard as basic under the aspect of ethnic segregation, we find the same influences of xenophobia on subjective risk assessment and protective and avoiding behaviour in De Baarsjes as we did in Wilhelmsburg.

Figure 5: *Regression Model: Predictors of Subjective Risk Assessment of the Dutch in De Baarsjes (β - values)*

Xenophobia — .271
Crime (city) — .215
Disorder (district) — .191
Gender — -.184
Contentment with daily life — -.160

Subjective Risk Assessment

adj. R^2 =.392

Figure 6: *Regression Model: Predictors of Protective and Avoiding Behaviour of the Dutch in De Baarsjes (β - values)*

Disorder (district) — .230
Xenophobia — .163
Gender — -.146

Protective and Avoiding Behaviour

adj. R^2 =.128

Figure 7: *Regression model: predictors of fear of going out at night of the Dutch in De Baarsjes (β - values)*

As shown, in the models predicting perceptions of crime-related insecurities in Hamburg Wilhelmsburg and Amsterdam De Baarsjes, xenophobia plays a strong role in predicting the cognitive and the conative component of these attitudes, but not for the emotional component.

4.7.3.3 Conclusion

Three, respectively six models have been presented above, predicting different aspects of crime-related insecurities in our research areas. The predictors of those models can be generally assigned to the following super ordinate categories:

- *Perception of crime* (i.e. the perception of crime (city & district), subjective risk assessment);
- *Vulnerability* (i.e. age, gender, level of school education);
- *Integration in district & well being* (i.e. neighbourhood contacts, atmosphere in district, contentment with daily life);
- *Perception of physical and social disorder* (i.e. social & physical disorder);
- *(Feelings of) Strangeness* (xenophobia).We find, that crime-related insecurities are not merely a matter of the actual crime situation, but in the same way a result from further factors not related to crime.

What is to be emphasised here with regard to the specific situation of ethnic segregation is the comparatively strong influence of xenophobia on feelings of insecurity of the native inhabitants. The situation of ethnic segregation appears to be – mediated by feelings of strangeness and under specific circumstances - an insecurity provoking situation itself. At this point it is important to note, that, as I think, one should see xenophobia in this context more as a metaphor of a *fear of* rather than as an open *hostility* towards foreigners.

Surprisingly, we did not find any of these relationships with xenophobia in the other districts of Amsterdam and Hamburg, although the concentration of migrants there is quite high or even higher than in the presented districts.

Table 14: *Migrants in the research areas of Hamburg and Amsterdam*

	Hamburg	
	Wilhelmsburg	**Steilshoop**
Migrants in district	40 %	20%
Dominant groups of migrants	Turks	Mixed; no dominant group
	Amsterdam	
	De Baarsjes	**De Bijlmer**
Migrants in district	40%	53%
Dominant groups of migrants	Turks, Moroccans	Surinams, (Africans)

But what becomes notable in this context, is the significantly different composition of migrants in the districts: Whereas there is no dominant group of migrants in Hamburg-Steilshoop, respectively the quite well integrated group of Surinamese in Amsterdam-De Bijlmer, there is a high concentration of Turks in Wilhelmsburg and of Turks and Moroccans in De Baarsjes. This leads us to the conclusion, that it is not the concentration of migrants itself which makes the native residents feel insecure.

It rather is an interplay between the concentration of stigmatised, poorly integrated and marginalised ethnic groups, who thus appear as strangers to the native population of the districts. This in the end leads to feelings of strangeness amongst the native population, which in turn causes insecurity.

In the end the problem of xenophobia and its effect on crime-related insecurities in an ethnically segregated district is to a certain extent also a problem of a lack of integration and social coherence between separated ethnic groups. Recently, this problem led to a huge eruption induced by the murder of the Dutch filmmaker *Theo van Gogh*, by a Muslim of Moroccan origin who lived in De Baarsjes. The assassination of the regisseur on the one hand led to a number of violent reactions on the part of the (Christian and secular) Dutch population, and on the other hand initiated a process of rethinking the effectiveness of the Dutch immigration and integration policy, which so far had been regarded as one of most exemplary in Europe.

Of course, this is only one aspect. The perception of crime still plays a crucial role in the perception of urban insecurities, but dealing with this topic, one should always take into account the specific composition of the population of one's research areas.

4.7.4 Some impressions from the qualitative research

Two topics are dominant explaining insecurity and fear regarding the qualitative results of our study. The first one has something to do with the "alien" or "foreigner", with foreign behaviour, culture or lifestyle. We do not really know how to categorise this phenomenon, but we try to go a step forward to explain the connection between the perception of the foreigner/ foreign behaviour and its effects to the well being of our respondents. There are two different aspects searching for this connection in our material:

a) A quantitative aspect when the habitants talked about the *concentration* of foreigners (or young people) in the street or at places. So they refer to the scientific theme of ethnic segregation and of "tipping points" (the point of heterogeneity when the racial structure of the habitants is changing: if the concentration of "the others"[19] seems to be too high, the original habitants leave the district and "the others" more and more are going to be the majority).

b) A qualitative aspect when they talked about conflicts between the natives and immigrants, of the problems of "Cultures living together" or, generally speaking, of the "foreigner in the city? Who, when and where, is made to feel insecure by the alien? Is it possible to get any idea of characteristic differences between the cities regarding being made to feel insecure by the "alien"? The following considerations should also give hints on this central topic for a growing Europe.

The second topic touches the fact that insecurities, fears, worries and uncertainties are obviously stored on different spatial levels. Following on from the differentiations made above (the abstract "space" and named "places" and "locations") we directed our research at finding different "contexts of insecurity': global, national, urban and local contexts. Now we have to ask the question: Are insecurities and fears space-connected? If some of them are: Could we influence them by restructuring the urban space? Which factors were named at the different (analytical) levels and do they influence the everyday live of our respondents? A first impression of the material will be given, originating from the results of the research teams. Are there differences between our five cities, finding a dominant 'context of insecurity' for each city? Let us begin with the second aspect: The contexts of insecurity and fear.

4.7.4.1 Contexts of insecurity and fear

When talking about "contexts of insecurity and fear" in the following, it means *a very broadly drawn connection between social and spatial factors, which together lead to different fears;* "in common" means that they influence each other: The man lying on the park bench provokes another perception than an old woman sitting on the same bench; the place in its physical construction is the same, the person as a factor of the whole makes the difference. Some of these factors are in the foreground, others are hardly noticed, but complement the overall picture. In the following it will be about the prevailing fears and their context. The overall positive impression of the city and their district described by the

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19   There is always the distinction between „We" and „the Turks", „the Moroccans", „the Blacks" etc.

responds is then relativised by the "contexts of insecurity and fear" to be presented. None of the contexts mentioned involves despair - all respondents can live with the fears, worries and uncertainties stated, even if they envisage a negative development for the future.

4.7.4.1.1 Inter-/national context of insecurity and fear

The first context is the inter-/national context of insecurity and fear, the context of modernisation and transformation:

"These days anything could happen."

This quote of a 64-year-old female respondent of our qualitative research from *Budapest* shows that an abstract uncertainty concerning the future is one major aspect when researching for insecurity in a post-socialist city. It is the changing society, the economic changes that build up the dominant context of insecurity and fear in Budapest and Kraków.

During the 1990s these cities underwent a process of modernisation, both political and economic accompanied by high social costs of transition for the majority of the people. The effects of transformation processes could be clearly seen and experienced when modernisation and renewal had happened in the inner districts (the 6th, 7th and 8th district) of Budapest city. The *physical environment* hardly changes.[20] In contrast, the industrial 9th district – that is divided by big streets and characterised by industrial areas – is not suitable for such urban renewal and development of the same magnitude. There are still buildings in bad or dilapidated conditions, signs of vandalism, dirt and litter in niches between the old houses. They form visual contrast to the modernisation of other places and locations. The "cleaned" parts of the city contribute to the fact, that "the own dwelling" often looks "worse" than before. Their own 9th district is behind in urban development and so becomes a place avoided by others who live elsewhere in the city.

Another concern becoming most apparent in the qualitative results is the changing labour market. High unemployment rates have been the most visible sign of transformation and modernisation costs with widespread lack of social and economical security, pessimism and resignation as a result. Several interviewees had lost their jobs recently and even if they will found work quickly, the "flowing employment" disturbed their everyday life, especially in Budapest and Kraków:

"Well, now it's OK, because things are going well, we have no financial problems, but what if a business fails? The creditors will come and seize your home and your car. You can lose a lot. We should save some money but …", so is the speech of a respondent from Budapest.

Here the respondents assume that the social change will "automatically" lead to rising crime rates.

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[20] The Budapest housing market, especially the inner city one, was substantially privatised at the beginning of the 1990s – The most respondents of Budapest live in their own apartments too.

"Many factories were closed, the companies have been restructured and a lot of workers have been made redundant so many people live under very difficult circumstances. Obviously the growth of crime is also due to that." (respondent from Budapest).

Added to this there is a "crisis of values" (or: a changing value system) that our researchers established, a lack of orientation that leads to personal life crises.[21] Generally speaking: The social (increasing polarisation) and spatial divided modernisation process of the Hungarian society builds up an inter-/national context of insecurity and fear. – This is truer for the industrial workers than for other professions; so it is truer for industrial areas and cities than for others.

The hierarchy of concerns about the problems of the city in the quantitative research shows that unemployment is perceived as the most serious issue not only in global terms, but also in terms of the immediate problem on the local level. The difference between our cities, looking at the results of our qualitative study, could be that the people in Amsterdam, Hamburg and Vienna could refer to their traditional reactions – no madder if they work – because of the fact that many of the middle aged respondents e.g. of Hamburg have been unemployed before. They had found a new job, so they hope to do so in the future – if they lose their job. They could refer to 'old models of reaction', the people from Budapest or Kraków cannot. The insecurity, uncertainty and fear looking towards the future seem to be on a higher level; and it includes more elements (job and housing market, crisis of values and traditional social networks).

4.7.4.1.2   Moving places

At the city-level we found another type of insecurity-context: *"moving" places* – often used public space, sometimes in the city centre, sometimes in the research area, sometimes near by the living surrounding of our respondents – or close walking distance away. The common characteristic of these places is that they have a wide spread public use. Mostly they stand for specific urban problems of the city, too: e.g. in Amsterdam or Hamburg for drug problems or the red light district.

This is the dominant context of insecurity and unsafety from the respondents of Vienna: Insecurities related to "Karlsplatz" underground junction (outside of our research areas) and its surroundings were named. A syndrome not really confined to that specific location but including most types of insecurities that are related to places that bear a reputation of being occupied by marginal groups. The marginal groups of "Karlsplatz" are not primarily understood to be a threat to passers by, but an unpleasant sight. The risk obviously is "getting involved in some sort of unwanted exchange" with deviant foreigners. (And furthermore there is the risk of verbal aggression as a sanction for refusing involvement and co-operation.) Consequently this kind of setting is (partly) avoided by many urban residents and those who (have to) use the place, usually practice some kind of strategy ("circumnavigating" problematic groups or individuals) in order to minimise contact and avoid potential trouble. In the case of the second Viennese place, "Praterstern", drug

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[21]   Lack of orientation due to accelerating change of values and the increasing signs of depression involved are a further element of the transformation process.

addicts or drug dealers are hardly associated with the image of the area. Essentially "Praterstern" is understood to be a traffic junction situated next to the amusement facilities of the Prater, and to the Stuwer Quarter (with its reputation for illegal prostitution), and known to be a place where groups of alcoholics and homeless people loiter, both in the station building and around the supermarket, and on the edge of some nearby green spots.

In all our cities "moving places" mostly are used by various nationalities (often young people) by day and night. It is a question of the personality if you would use these places and if your have your own experiences of using it. Some of our respondents talked about "no go areas", for others the things that happen there are normal for a modern society of customers or a modern city with amusement areas:

"I would not set foot in the amusement arcade at the corner even if I were enthusiastic about these games because I think that anything can happen there. The police have to go there regularly because of trouble." (35-year-old man) or

"In the next street there was a shop open day and night and there was always something going on there. People would sit on the roofs of cars, they kept shouting, made a terrible racket and also things kept disappearing from cars." (50-year-old man)

The common reaction is to prefer to go by car after dark. Those who do not have a car tend to take a taxi to get home. However, these problems were closely followed by issues related to the problems of crime and public order, in Kraków namely crime itself, dealing with and using of drugs on the streets and lack of safety in public busses and trams. In the post socialist cities a few other issues belonged to corruption within the authorities, groups of youth hanging around or – in a special district of Kraków – football hooligans.

The dominant element of these context is the feeling of "losing the rules" or of social disorder (in the words of Wesley Skogan): People sitting on the street, crying; waste everywhere etc. In Amsterdam and Hamburg the "foreigner" or "foreign behaviour" of others (culturally different or young people) is another very important element of this context.

4.7.4.1.3   *The living context of insecurity and fear*

The last context of insecurity and fear is the living surrounding. – Although the "home" could be another one, the dwelling of our respondents was always the safest place of the world for them. It is not the right time and the right place to say the typical things about the different places and location in our five cities. We have to analyse these things further more, "go back to the material". Now we could only say that there is more to do as better lightning or police in buses and at the tram station. Here, at the location in the neighbourhood, young and foreign people play an important role for the feelings of insecurity and unsafety of our respondents. This takes us to the other impression of our qualitative research.

4.7.4.2   *Insecurity and fears – arising from stratification and ethnic segregation*

Nearly all of our respondents, living in different segregated areas, talked about the juveniles who loiter and congregate in the yards and the living surrounding, especially in the late

evenings.[22] They engage in kinds of behaviour that are considered inappropriate by other residents. Noisy, aggressive behaviour, frequently associated with vandalism, behaviour that leaves unwanted traces behind (broken bottles etc.), consumption of alcohol and illegal drugs, setting dogs loose on passers by, scuffling, fighting – a range of activities that for some complainants mean not only actual disorder on the estate and repeated sleep disturbances, but seems to signify both a lack of perspective, a lack of opportunities (more "reasonable" leisure time activities etc.), and a lack of social control.

Some respondents from Hamburg and Vienna explicitly argue that the high level of unemployment among juveniles causes the above mentioned patterns of behaviour. It is precisely the higher educated and the older people who see "no future" as the explanation for the behaviour of youth.

The second most common item is to talk about "the Turks", "the Romanise", "Moroccans" etc. as (mostly young) people who influence the well-being and feelings of insecurity of our respondents. Stereotypes were named by the majority, but also by the minorities regarding other minorities as annoying people, criminals or offenders. In all cities we saw two sides of the same coin: On the first point of view we called it "fear of the foreigner" and on the other side "discrimination". Both sides title experiences in the stranger-to-stranger-interaction.

Taking as a starting point that certain (ethnic) groups with their own culture, religion and lifestyle stay in one part of the city, we then asked about the insecurities at such places of living. In *Amsterdam* our data show that especially Moroccans (living primary in De Baarsjes, the research area from the 19th century) experienced feelings of discrimination by institutions like the police, but also by other people. Moroccans themselves sense feelings of annoyance against their own youngsters. – The death of Theo van Gogh showed the problems between the natives and the Moroccan people in a dramatic way.

Because of the fact that the presence of foreigners in *Budapest* is so low that it does not constitute an issue in itself, we did not examine people's opinions on foreigners and immigrants in the quantitative survey. However, issues concerning the Romany population are acute both in Budapest as a whole and in the districts we examined. It is especially true for the old industrial 9th district, where a significant Romany population lives. The qualitative interviews clearly show that a significant part of the population in the district has deeply rooted and in some cases extreme prejudices towards the Romany. People mentioned different stereotypical images of them: first, as neglected, untidy people, an eyesore in the city, second as a permanent criminal group and third as violent thugs, who cause fear and uneasiness by their mere presence and behaviour.

These different images are not separate and distinct in the arguments of the interviewees: those who are prejudiced against the Romany as a group can give several arguments to prove their case:

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[22]   We have to remember that our respondents are under 18 years old.

"I hate Romanise. I see them appearing more often on T.V. and everything. But I say that no decent Romany has ever been born yet. Sooner or later their ugly nature and all that's in them comes to the surface." (42-year-old man)

This kind of "anthropological" reasoning, which considers the negative qualities attributed to the Romany as their inborn characteristics, is not rare at all. In fact one hears it more often than the reference to economical or social changes:

"You see, after the communist regime came to an end a lot of decent people who had worked hard all their lives were made redundant (…) were evicted from their flat and now they are down-and-out. What did they do? They went to the subways and slept there and collected stuff from the dust bins. But a Romany, he is different, if he has no money he will steal and look for an empty flat and moves in squatting there." (50-year-old man)

One could continue to cite examples for pages and the interviews clearly indicate that a lot of the interviewees explicitly identify the Romany with a criminal and immoral lifestyle.

A significant part of the Romany population live in the poorest part of the district and it seems that the other people living in the same area are much less tolerant with the "gipsy-problem" than the respondents of the better parts of the district. We could recognise a kind of *inner-segregation* of the 9th district with results for the discrimination: In the areas where the Romany population is concentrated, anxiety from the increasing percentage of Romanise within the population can be considered general according to the interviews; several people of this parts complained that they fear for their children and their homes (for example one of the interviewees said that in order to protect themselves from burglaries there is always somebody at home).

Additionally many people complained of the fact that the Romanise take no care of their environment. They leave destruction and dirt after themselves, they are loud and on the whole it is impossible to have a normal life in the area because of them. Another, quite shocking approach:

"… those lot of from here Romanise should be exterminated (…) The truth is that you can't go out after dark in fear of your life because of them. (…) The truth about the Romanise is that you can't do anything about them because they join forces and kill you. (…) I said that I would put them in a gas chamber where they would die." (32-year-old man)

Compared to this, other attitudes seem to be friendlier.

Most of the interviewees have never been attacked or insulted by a Romany (the interviewee who was in favour of gas chambers has never seen any killing by them, moreover, has never been involved in any conflict with them). The answers to the questions about their personal experiences were usually related to the lifestyle and the behaviour of the Romanise and rarely to crimes. In all probability the characteristic culture of the Romanise, which does not conform to the majority, their "loud" lifestyle, their big families and often their sheer numbers and physical appearance strikes fear among the other inhabitants, giving rise to other, much more negative attitudes.

This is also true for the situation of the Turks in Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg. But the answers and stories about the Turks pronounce quite different. Before leaving Budapest please have

some attention to another point: Looking to the interviews from 22nd "control-" district of Budapest, we could notice a absolutely different situation. The higher educated and well-off respondents of this district are much more tolerant against their Romany fellow-citizens. In fact we have two overlapping phenomena in the poor research areas: Especially in the industrial districts of the old working or underclass, like the 9th district in Budapest or the Wilhelmsburg area in Hamburg, we have the social discrimination, arising from economical competition in the urban underclass. – Not adequately laid down "You would have told another youth `what you thought of him".

This is conform to the results of Vienna were obviously foreigners being a source of trouble in the Transdanubian estates. This is due to the fact that a considerable number of new Austrians have settled there during recent years, which is why the relatively new phenomenon still causes various sorts of tensions, mistrust and irritation (around cultural conflict and resulting nuisances).

Another point is the form of heterogeneity in our research areas: Not knowing the differences very deeply, the grouping of the minorities and cultures seems to be a very important point for the everyday life in the districts. The heterogeneity of cultures makes it easier to live in a tolerant atmosphere; the stereotypes become more when a minority dominates. This applies to the minority itself, which in turn develops prejudices against others (e.g. the Turks towards the Romanises in Hamburg).

Generally all qualitative interviews showed that the opinions about threats on the street, the foreigners and other factors of insecurity and fear were influenced by respondent's age, professional status and place of residence (research area). So we have individual, group and space influences on insecurity, uncertainty about the future and worry or fear.

With an increasingly different way of life and declining system integration via the labour market urban peace is particularly endangered in those districts of the city in which economic competition is particularly strong. New ways of dealing with conflicts and living together have to be found. Here the "social indifference between the mutually alien" – maybe typical for the cities of the 20th century – should be *restored. A* certain degree of tolerance must be created again.

4.7.5   Outlook

The objective of this research project was to study factors of insecurity, including crime-related fear, mirrored by the perceptions and attitudes of the citizens of five European cities. The differences that were found had on one hand to do with the countries' and cities' diverse historical and cultural background and recent political developments – see the remarkable distinctions between the people's reactions in Kraków and Vienna. To alter those "root causes" in order to improve the citizens' well-being and safety, social-reform strategies for reshaping the communities may be the more appropriate means to meet the basic problems behind the people's unsafety and fears.

Things are different if concrete and detrimental neighbourhood problems in terms of "signs of incivility" or disorder affect the people's expectation about proper and safe conditions and conduct in public places (public drinking, loitering juveniles, derelict buildings,

everyday offences, etc.). We learned from our interviewees that for many of them crime was just another example or sign of neighbourhood disorder; at least it was sometimes hard to separate analytically crime from other social disintegrative factors as seen by the respondents. Without any doubt, crime reduction was one of the most essential issues for all residents; a strong police was required accordingly, at least in most of the cities. But many citizens asked for a thorough improvement of their neighbourhoods' poor conditions also in view of an old wisdom (and experience) that by eliminating signs of incivility and social disorder crime is reduced at the same time. The term could be "social crime prevention" as a parallel to traditional crime prevention. In fact, the point is not to apply the old inventory of crime combating to solve the community's problems but to find ways by which social policy and criminal policy are combined through the establishment of local partnerships (citizens, local organisations, local experts, political representatives, the police).

A third point refers to the ethnic residential composition of the city or its districts. The data from two districts, one in Amsterdam (De Baarsjes), the other in Hamburg (Wilhelmsburg) revealed considerable relationships between fear of crime (dependent variable) and what was called xenophobia (independent variable), with other independent variables being held constant (multivariate analysis). The epistemological gain was the proof of a link between fear of crime (the way, it is usually measured) and factors others than crime. Thus, what is called fear of crime in criminological terms is sometimes just another part of averse or inimical attitudes toward the strong presence of foreigners in one's own social environment. Maybe, this is a matter of a poor integration policy. The migrants in the two districts (mostly Turks and Moroccans in De Baarsjes, predominantly Turks in Wilhelmsburg) seemed to be much less integrated and are much less adept at the Dutch and German language, compared to the much better integrated migrants in the other two districts studied (South-East in Amsterdam with mostly Surinamese, Steilshoop in Hamburg with a mix of ethnic groups). In these latter districts, no such relationships between fear of crime and xenophobia were found. This led to the conclusion that it is much less the concentration of migrants which makes the native residents feel insecure or fearful; it is rather an interplay between the concentration of poorly integrated and very often marginalized ethnic groups who thus appear as a threat to the native population in the respective districts. Again, any attempt to combat fear of crime by applying the usual preventive measures would fail so far. A rational policy would rather try to enhance the integrative efforts which should include the cautious dissolution of ethnic segregated neighbourhoods for the benefit of multicultural communities.

It has to keep in mind that unlike Paris, London or Los Angeles the five investigated middle-European cities have rather medium-sized problems. They don't have no-go areas, for example. When we are talking about crime problems, we relate them to other urban problems, not to riots, terrorist attacks, racial conflicts or enormous homicide rates American cities are familiar with. Therefore, feelings of insecurity and fear of crime were primarily directed toward the concrete socio-spatial conditions of the respondents' everyday life. Since most of these conditions are different in the respective cities and districts, it would be difficult to develop common recommendations of how to establish and guaranty public safety. The difficulties increase by taking the different culturally bound

perceptions of social disorder into account. Loitering juveniles may be perceived as a threat or may provoke uneasiness or may go unnoticed, depending on the social and spatial conditions of the respective neighbourhoods. So, the huge diversities of thinking and behaving, of being religious, of belonging to a specific class or ethnic minority shape and form the people's attitudes and thereby safety.

There are first indications that the people's concern about global developments such as international conflicts including terrorism may be interrelated with their anxieties on the local level. Further research is needed in this respect, however.

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